Measuring the Impact of Quotas on Women’s Substantive Representation: Towards a Conceptual Framework

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Abstract

Gender quotas have been adopted in more than one hundred countries around the world in recent years. While they are the subject of a growing literature, most existing work on these measures focuses on explaining their adoption and varied effects on the absolute numbers of women elected. Yet, quotas are often justified with reference to their anticipated effects on the representation of ‘women’s interests’ in the policy-making, as well as on democratic outcomes more generally. In this paper, we present some thoughts as to how scholars might undertake such research, in light of several complex dynamics: on-going debates on how to analyze women’s substantive representation, varied normative arguments with distinct expectations about links between the descriptive and substantive representation of women, and important differences in the design and conditions of adoption of individual quota policies. Based on these possibilities, we offer six sets of hypotheses as an initial step for undertaking individual and comparative case studies on the broader impact of gender quotas.
Measuring the Impact of Quotas on Women’s Substantive Representation: Towards a Conceptual Framework

One of the widest-reaching electoral reforms in recent years has been the adoption of gender quota policies, aimed at increasing the numbers of women elected to political office. To date, more than one hundred countries have adopted such measures, which may take the form of reserved seats, provisions that set aside places for women in political assemblies that men are not eligible to contest; political party quotas, pledges by individual parties to nominate a particular percentage of women; or legislative quotas, changes to electoral laws and/or constitutions that require that all parties put forward a certain proportion of female candidates. As a result, quotas have become one of the fastest growing areas of research on women, gender, and politics (Krook 2009). Most of this work maps the forms these measures take (Dahlerup 2006), reasons for their adoption in various political contexts (Baldez 2004; Kittilson 2006), and variations in their effects on the numbers of women elected (Htun and Jones 2002; Matland 2006; cf. Krook 2009). Few studies, however, have analyzed their broader impact (but see Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Zetterberg 2008), despite the fact that quotas are often justified in public discourse with regard to their anticipated effects on the representative process (Bird 2008; Skjeie 1991).

In this paper, we seek to expand the current research agenda by theorizing what effects quotas may have on the representation of ‘women’s interests’ in public policy. Our concern is to explore whether the introduction of quotas increases the number of laws proposed and passed on behalf of women as a group, and/or shifts features of the broader legislative environment in ways that facilitate the articulation of women’s concerns. There is little existing work that addresses this issue in a direct way. Although there is an extensive literature on substantive representation (see for example Beckwith 2007; Bratton 2005; Dodson and Carroll 1999; Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 2002; Swers 2002; Thomas 1994; cf. Celis, Childs, Kantola, and Krook 2008), studies
of legislative behaviour in countries with quotas have tended to frame their findings in relation to research on substantive representation rather than gender quotas (Chaney 2006; Childs 2004; Opello 2007; Rai 2007; Thomas 2004). Yet, there are good reasons to believe that quotas may alter the dynamics that normally operate between the descriptive and substantive representation of women, which are themselves highly contested: while some scholars argue that female politicians have distinct priorities than male elected officials (Swers 1998; Thomas 1994), others are sceptical of claims that an increase in the numbers of women will automatically translate into gains for women as a group (Crowley 2004; cf. Childs and Krook 2006).

We begin in the first section by reviewing three sets of debates in research on women’s substantive representation: definitions of ‘women’s interests,’ interventions at different points in the policy-making process, and relations between numbers and outcomes. Our goal is to outline some of the anticipated links between the descriptive and substantive representation of women, as a means to later theorize how these may be affected – both positively and negatively – by the application of gender quotas. In the second section, we turn to the various normative arguments that have been put forward as to why women’s representation should be increased, as well as to why quotas should or should not be adopted. Embedded in these discourses are expectations as to how politics will change as women’s numbers grow, with and without the help of gender quotas. We add a final layer of complexity in the third section, where we consider how the design and conditions of adoption of quota policies might influence their impact on women’s substantive representation. In the fourth section, we then bring these strands together to propose a series of hypotheses regarding the effects of quotas on policy-making. We conclude with a summary of the ambitions of the paper and thoughts as to why such studies are needed, as the next frontier of research on gender quotas and women’s political representation.
Theorizing Women’s Substantive Representation

The past decade has witnessed multiple debates over how best to study the links between women’s descriptive and substantive representation. These debates have revolved around three central themes: (1) the usefulness of the concept of ‘women’s interests’ given the diversity of women, (2) the meaning of women’s substantive representation in practice and how it ought to be studied, and (3) the impact of increased numbers of women on the policy process and the legislative environment overall. In this section, we discuss the main contributions of these debates and offer some insights as to how they might be resolved in empirical research.

Definitions of ‘Women’s Interests’

The concept of women’s interests has been a source of debate among feminists for almost three decades (Sapiro 1981, Jonasdottir 1988, Phillips 1995, Mansbridge 1999, Weldon 2002). Scholars have raised a number of concerns, the most prominent of which is that the concept of women’s interests essentializes women as a group by assuming that there is an objective and knowable set of interests shared by women, whether universally or in a given polity. This assumption denies the heterogeneity of women and the multiple and often competing interests that emerge out of the intersection of gender with other aspects of identity such as class, race, or sexual orientation (Weldon 2002). Nonetheless, many feminist scholars are unwilling to abandon the concept altogether given its utility in making claims for women’s political inclusion or for constructing strategic solidarities among women for projects of political change. Thus, for most scholars, employing the concept of women’s interests implies a recognition that these interests are neither objective, universal, nor static. Instead, most feminist scholars advance a
definition of women’s interests that fully acknowledges that they are partial, constructed, contextual, and fluid (Celis 2006; Mansbridge 1999; 2005).

In addition to its political utility, maintaining the concept of women’s interests is critical to the task of discerning gendered patterns of behaviour within political institutions, particularly in parliaments where interest representation is one of the primary objectives of the institution. Not surprisingly, a central concern of gender and politics researchers is whether elected women are more likely than their male counterparts to promote women’s interests as part of their representative roles. Indeed, this has been the central question in studies of substantive representation. In very general terms, researchers have found that women are more likely than men to engage in actions deemed to represent women’s interests (Carroll 2001; Bratton 2005; Jones 1997; Swers 2005; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003). There are two main problems inherent in making definitive claims based on this literature, however. First, researchers have operationalized women’s interests in different ways, and second, scholars have drawn conclusions based on analyses of different aspects or stages of the legislative process.

Scholars have operationalized women’s interests in a host of different ways. Maxine Molyneux (1988), for instance, distinguished between “strategic” gender interests—those which challenge the gendered division of labour and promote women’s autonomy—and “practical” gender interests—those which emerge out of women’s subordinate position in society but do not necessarily challenge that position. This distinction has been criticized for prioritizing feminist concerns, and, in some cases, for prioritizing the concerns of middle-class and western women over those of women in less privileged social locations. One way around the problems of pre-defining the content of women’s interests emerges directly out of the acknowledgment that such interests are politically constructed and fluid rather than essential and static (cf. Celis 2006).
This recognition implies that: first, the content of women’s interests emerges through political and social processes in any given polity, and second, that the content of women’s interests will likely be contested rather than shared by all women. Even in cases where virtually all women agree on a *general* principle, for instance that violence against women ought to be penalized and that the state ought to play a role in preventing it, women are bound to disagree over the more specific measures that governments should adopt.

*Stages of the Policy-Making Process*

Generalizing about the link between the presence of women and the substantive representation of women’s interests is further complicated by the fact that existing research has focused on different aspects of the policy-making process while drawing conclusions about substantive representation in general. Scholars have variously surveyed legislator attitudes and priorities (Tremblay and Pelletier 2000, Htun and Power 2006, Schwindt-Bayer 2006), analyzed patterns of bill introduction or co-sponsorship (Bratton 2005, Jones 1997, Swers 2005, Wolbrecht 2002), and analyzed roll-call voting (Vega and Firestone 1995). Others equate women’s substantive representation with policy outcomes, that is, laws that are actually adopted that promote women’s interests (Bratton and Leonard 2002, Geisler 2000). The choice of which stage of the policy process to analyze – i.e., agenda-setting or policy outcomes – has a significant impact on findings. Researchers focusing on bill introduction are the most likely to find a positive relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, while the research on policy outcomes has produced more mixed and even ambivalent findings (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008).
Such divergent findings have prompted scholars to tackle some of the conceptual ambiguities surrounding substantive representation and the approaches scholars have employed to operationalize it (Celis, Childs, Kantola, and Krook 2008). A key insight produced by this work is that the substantive representation of women is carried out by multiple actors in diverse settings in other words, not just by elected officials in parliaments but also by bureaucrats in the public sector and by civil society actors in social movements, interest groups, and non-governmental organizations (Celis, Childs, Kantola and Krook 2008). Another important insight to have emerged is that scholars ought to focus on gender rather than sex when exploring women’s substantive representation. While much of the existing research has asked whether sex difference among legislators is linked to different attitudes, priorities, and behaviour, other scholars have argued that even if sex is a predictor of such differences, this should not be equated with women’s substantive representation (Childs 2006). Sex difference research yields a very partial and incomplete picture of something that is much broader and multi-faceted. Substantive representation occurs at multiple stages of the legislative process: Women’s interests are promoted when legislators introduce women’s rights bills; when they seek to mobilize support for these bills, both publicly and behind the scenes; and when legislators vote for and pass laws that promote women’s rights. At these various stages, outcomes are influenced not merely by the sex of the representative, but by the gendered power relations that are reflected in the institutional rules, operating procedures, and informal norms of legislative bodies (Duerst-Lahti 2005, Tamerius 1995).

Shifting the focus from sex-related differences among legislators to how gender shapes the preferences, actions, and outcomes pushes researchers to take a more dynamic view of substantive representation by exploring the various stages of the legislative process and how the
gendered dynamics of parliaments influence legislators’ actions and success at each stage. The effects of different institutional rules and norms are best revealed through comparative research where institutional rules vary across political systems (Franceschet 2008; Tremblay 2003). For instance, parliamentary systems depend on party discipline to a much greater extent than do most presidential systems, thereby influencing what legislators can do, especially in terms of how they vote. This affects how legislators can substantively represent women and at which stage of the policy process they are more likely to be successful. Where party discipline is invoked at the voting stage, legislators might promote women’s issues in other ways, for example, using Early Day Motions in the British parliament (Childs and Withey 2004) or introducing women’s rights bills in presidential systems, even if they have little chance of being debated and adopted.

Likewise, parliamentary systems, as well as some presidential systems, award far more legislative powers to the executive branch, constraining what legislators can do to represent women’s interests. Even in presidential systems, the legislative branch may not be a co-equal legislator as it is, for instance, in the United States. Where the executive branch enjoys substantive agenda-setting powers, the capacity of legislators to have an impact on policy outcomes is reduced. As a result, gender quotas that increase the number of female legislators may improve the representation of women’s interests in the legislative agenda, that is, they can introduce numerous women’s rights bills. But in executive-dominated systems, these initiatives likely will not succeed without strong executive support or support from the (usually male) leadership of the majority party (see Franceschet and Piscopo 2008).

Acknowledging the importance of institutional context at different stages of the policy process requires researchers to adopt multiple methods and strategies to see whether and where women’s substantive representation occurs. It may not be sufficient to count the number of bills
introduced, analyze roll-call votes, or compare the number of women’s rights policies actually
adopted. Instead, depending on the institutional context, women’s substantive representation
may occur behind the scenes, for example, when legislators lobby their parliamentary colleagues
or ministers in the executive branch to support certain initiatives, add a gendered dimension to
issues debated in committee or plenary sessions, or share information with women’s group in
civil society. This way of theorizing women’s substantive representation urges scholars to
explore how it occurs throughout the policy process: Substantive representation can thus be
operationalized as both a process, whereby legislators put women’s interests on the legislative
agenda, and an outcome, whereby laws and policies to promote women’s interests are adopted.
Moreover, success at various stages of the policy process is related to the institutional rules
governing a particular political system.

In addition to initiating and adopting policies that promote women’s rights, another
important component of women’s substantive representation involves changes, or attempts at
change, to political practices, particularly to the formal rules and informal norms that govern the
behaviour of legislators and their relations with constituents. Changes to the practice of politics
are critical because even though gender quotas are adopted with the primary goal of facilitating
women’s access to elected office, women may still find themselves marginalized within
parliament (Archenti and Johnson 2006; Walsh 2008) thereby undermining their capacity to
legislate successfully on women’s issues. Moreover, the rules and norms associated with the
parliamentary process may inhibit women from wanting to run for office in the first place. This
dynamic could lend credence to claims by quota critics that there simply are not enough women
who want to run for office. Hence, promoting changes to parliamentary procedures and norms to
make them more women-friendly is an important aspect of substantive representation.
The impact of increasing women’s presence in parliaments on the norms and procedures of the legislative process has not received all that much attention by researchers, but those scholars who have addressed it tend to find that even when women’s presence increases, the norms and style of politics remains masculine and not amenable to the empowerment of women (Marx, Borner, and Caminotti, 2007; Delvin and Elgie 2008; Vincent 2004). This is problematic for a number of reasons. Often, quotas are justified as transitory or temporary measures to overcome historical patterns of gender discrimination. According to this argument, the need for such measures will disappear once women’s presence in politics becomes routine and widely accepted. But for this to occur, women need to increase not merely their presence in politics, but their power and influence in decision-making circles, especially among the inner circles where candidacies are determined (cf. Kittilson 2006). Determining what kind of impact quotas have on the formal rules and informal norms of politics is not always easy for researchers. While the formal rules are easily identifiable, determining the kinds of informal norms—especially those surrounding appropriate styles of speech, interaction with colleagues and constituents, or even the kinds of issues deemed appropriate for legislative attention—are more difficult to ascertain, precisely because they are not written down anywhere or publicly communicated (cf. Puwar 2004; Ross 2002). Thus, learning what the informal norms are and whether they are affected by the adoption of gender quotas requires a fairly extensive and in-depth familiarity with a political system (Franceschet 2008). Most importantly, it requires access to interview respondents who themselves have been active in politics long enough to be familiar with such norms and willing to talk about them. Despite the difficulty in gathering these kinds of data, it is a crucial task in order for researchers to ascertain the impact of women’s political presence.
**Numbers and Political Outcomes**

A final debate in the literature on substantive representation in recent years is the debate over the impact of numbers, namely, whether a ‘critical mass’ of women is needed for legislative change. The concept was originally invoked in a context where few women occupied political office to explain why the presence of women did not appear to affect policy outcomes. The argument was that women were unlikely to have an impact until they grew from a few token individuals into a considerable minority of all legislators (cf. Dahlerup 1988). The intuition was that as women’s numbers increased, women would be able to work together more effectively for women-friendly policy change (Saint-Germain 1989), as well as influence their male colleagues to a greater extent to accept and approve bills promoting women’s concerns (Flammang 1985). These accounts are supported by evidence showing that legislatures with high proportions of women introduce and pass more bills on women’s issues than their female counterparts in low representation legislatures (Bratton 2005; Thomas 1994; Vega and Firestone 1995). Scholars speculate that the presence of more women produces a more supportive legislative environment that leads even those who do not prioritize women’s issues to be drawn into the process. While these ideas have been interpreted and applied in many different ways over the last twenty years, they have gained wide currency among activists, politicians, the media, and international organizations as a justification for measures to bring more women into political office (Childs and Krook 2006; Krook 2008).

Nonetheless, a growing body of research criticizes these assumptions, arguing that a ‘critical mass’ of women is insufficient for promoting women-friendly policy outcomes. This work is more sceptical of the magic of numbers, finding that women make a difference even when they form a very small minority (Crowley 2004; Reingold 2000), or alternatively, that a
jump in the proportion of women may decrease the likelihood that individual female legislators will act on behalf of women as a group (Carroll 2001; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). In some cases, a rise in the numbers of women provokes a backlash among men, who take active steps to block women’s policy initiatives (Towns 2003). In addition, there are important boundary conditions that may prevent women from pursuing reforms addressing ‘women’s interests.’ These include diversity among women, in terms of their race, class, and party identities (Barrett 1995; Childs 2004), as well as features of the political environment, such as committee membership (Norton 1995), institutional norms (Mackay 2008), legislative inexperience (Beckwith 2007), and the electoral system (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007). These findings have led many to question the continued utility and relevance of ‘critical mass’ as a concept in research on the substantive representation of women (cf. Studlar and McAllister 2002).

These insights are crucial to integrate into a study of the impact of quotas on women’s substantive representation, given that the purpose of quotas is to increase the numbers of women in elected office. Initial evidence suggests that women elected through quotas have reported feeling obligated to act for women as a group (Schwartz 2004; Skjeie 1991), which has inspired them to bring new issues to the table (Kudva 2003; Thomas 2004). However, others have sought to disassociate themselves with the quota in an attempt to demonstrate that they are ‘serious’ politicians (Childs 2004). At the same time, many have been accused of acting only as proxies for men (Nanivadekar 2006) and of being more loyal to party leaders than men and women who win open seats (Cowley and Childs 2003). These patterns lead some scholars to suggest that women might be more effective in non-quota environments (Archenti and Johnson 2006; Walsh 2008), although some view these dynamics as problems faced by women in parliament more generally, not related to quota provisions (Zetterberg 2008). These trends suggest that quotas
may create new opportunities for women’s substantive representation by bringing more women into political office, often with the stated goals of incorporating women’s interests into the political process and bringing new values and resources to political debates. However, quotas may also restrict the capacity of these female legislators to act for women, in light of the often strong controversies surrounding their mechanism of selection.

**Arguments for Increasing Women’s Representation**

Debates about the impact of numbers are also reflected in normative arguments for increasing women’s representation, as well as the more specific arguments for and against gender quotas. While few would disagree that women have historically been under-represented in politics, and further, that women’s under-representation is a problem, there is substantial disagreement over what to do about it, especially whether some form of gender quota ought to be adopted. Among the many reasons for this disagreement is the fact that, upon closer inspection, claims about women’s under-representation in politics are fairly complex. Arguments for addressing women’s under-representation appeal to different normative goals, and therefore assume that women’s increased presence will lead to different kinds of outcomes.

*Arguments for Women’s Politics Presence*

Anne Phillips (1998) distinguishes among three types of arguments for increasing women’s presence in politics. The ‘justice argument’ holds that because women comprise half the population, their relative absence from spheres of power and influence is unfair and ought to be rectified for reasons of justice alone. The ‘women’s interests argument’ claims that female representatives are more likely to promote issues of concern to women, issues that have been
ignored in parliaments composed mainly of men. Finally, the ‘revitalized democracy argument’ claims that incorporating members of historically marginalized groups into politics challenges negative stereotypes about their unsuitability for political office, promoting more democratic outcomes overall. The ‘women’s interests’ and the ‘revitalized democracy’ arguments are linked, and are similar to those made by Jane Mansbridge (1995; 2005) and Melissa Williams (1998). In their view, increasing the presence of marginalized groups in political institutions—especially representative ones—“increase[s] the polity’s de facto legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination” (Mansbridge 1999, 628). But precisely because these group members share a legacy of discrimination, it is further assumed that this shared perspective permits greater knowledge about the group’s interests, and at the same time imbues representatives from the group with a proclivity to pursue those interests more vigorously (Phillips 1998, Swers 2002).

Although these arguments share the same goal, their justifications for women’s political presence entail distinct predictions as to what will occur as women’s numbers increase. The argument from justice views women’s presence as an end in and of itself: a fair outcome is achieved if there are equal proportions of men and women in political office. This argument is therefore agnostic as to whether or not policy change will ensue with greater numbers of women. In contrast, the interests and democracy arguments are consequentialist: their validity depends on demonstrating that women’s increased presence results in greater attention to women’s interests, as well as more democratic outcomes overall. In symbolic terms, the democracy argument assumes that when elected bodies include previously excluded groups, their legitimacy is enhanced. In substantive terms, the interests and democracy arguments anticipate that women’s difference, a difference at least partly based on experiences of marginalization, leads them to favour different styles of doing politics. For instance, many believe that women will promote
consensual rather than combative styles and promote negotiation over unilateralism. As such, they are more likely to engage in consultation and more likely to seek input from constituents or others potentially affected by their policy deliberations. Others argue that women bring unique perspectives to social and economic issues, perspectives that emerge out of women’s gender roles and the associated responsibilities for others that define these roles (Kathlene 2001). Thus, according to these consequentialist arguments, the presence of more women in politics will improve both the procedural elements and substance of democracy.

**Arguments For and Against Gender Quotas**

Feminist scholars and activists have long forwarded the types of arguments above to call for improving women’s representation in politics. It is only more recently, however, that these arguments have entered into mainstream public debates, particularly in countries where quota advocates, both domestic and international, have successfully put gender quotas on the political agenda. Quota supporters appeal to the general arguments outlined above about why there should be more women in politics. But in order to succeed, they must also make the case that aggressive steps need to be taken and that women’s under-representation in politics will not change on its own. To make this case, quota advocates often emphasize the closed and elitist nature of political parties and in particular the discrimination women face in the candidate nomination process. Elsewhere, quota campaigners highlight the deeply entrenched sexism in both society and the political class, arguing that quotas—as a ‘fast-track’ mechanism—will immediately transform the gender composition of elected bodies and thereby lead the way in broader socio-cultural transformation (Dahlerup and Friedenvall 2005). What is most important here is that the various kinds of arguments used by quota advocates contain competing
assumptions about what elected women will do, and what broader impact women’s increased presence will have in politics and on society. These expectations can shape the actual impact that quotas have on women’s substantive representation.

Significantly, the majority of the countries that have adopted mandatory quotas—legislated candidate quotas or reserved seats—are in the global South. Many of these countries adopt quotas, or debate adopting quotas, following periods of armed conflict or authoritarian rule. This context lends itself to justifying quotas using the ‘revitalized democracy’ argument. This justification, along with arguments about entrenched sexism among political elites, especially party leaders who control candidate selection, can produce high, and often unrealistic, expectations about women’s political impact. That is, the public may believe that increasing women’s presence in politics will lead to less corruption and clientelism and reduced elite control. This has turned out to be a double-edged sword for women. Where politics are dominated by party elites, and lines of patronage and clientelism are deeply entrenched, then these same elites can use quotas to tighten their control over candidate selection (Baldez 2004), while also nominating elite women, especially women who are linked through romantic or family relationships to male party leaders (Nanivadekar 2006). In these cases, a demeaning stereotype about ‘quota women’ can emerge, potentially under-cutting the ability of women to accumulate the necessary political influence to achieve the changes that quota advocates had anticipated (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Zetterberg 2008).

Paradoxically, where the ‘revitalized democracy’ arguments are the most appealing, that is, in political systems marked by clientelism, corruption, and a closed political elite, quotas may be the least likely to transform politics or improve women’s substantive representation. Even if the practice of nominating family members or pliable and inexperienced women is less
widespread than critics proclaim, and even if ‘quota women’ gain gender consciousness as a
result of witnessing women’s political marginalization up close, patterns of clientelism and elite
dominance are not easily disrupted, especially not by political newcomers. Here, however,
researchers would benefit from examining women’s impact at multiple stages of the legislative
process. Female newcomers may be successful in putting women’s issues on the agenda, even if
party discipline and elite dominance undermine the successful passage of women’s rights
initiatives (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Schwartz 2004). Hence, it is important to examine
women’s impact at various stages of the policy-making process.

The implementation of both legislated candidate quotas and reserved seats has led to
claims that ‘quota women’ are tokens or proxies for male relatives or that their lack of political
experience makes them more pliable and loyal to party leaders (Waylen 2000, Childs 2003,
Goetz and Hassim 2003, Bird 2008). These claims reinforce the arguments of quota opponents,
both feminist and non-feminist. Non-feminist critics of gender quotas often argue that quotas
primarily benefit elite women and do nothing to address the concerns of the average woman.
This was precisely the sentiment expressed by a rightist politician in Chile, Joaquin Lavín, who
argued that quotas are an elitist mechanism that displaces attention from those issues, such as
poverty and domestic violence, that are most important to women as a group (El Mercurio, May
28, 2006). Feminist critics argue that quotas are unlikely to lead to the election of feminist
women, but only party loyalists who will make little effort to promote women’s interests or seek

Another line of argument used by quota critics is that quotas reinforce essentialist ideas
about women as a group. This argument can take multiple forms. First, opponents worry that, in
acknowledging that women cannot win elected office ‘on their own merit,’ quotas reinforce
beliefs that women need special treatment and that they lack sufficient political experience. Second, gender quotas, especially when justified on the grounds that they will improve women’s substantive representation, can create the impression that only women are responsible for promoting women’s interests, thereby ignoring the role that men play in women’s substantive representation (Childs and Krook 2006). Such ideas reinforce rather than challenge the gendered division of labour in parliaments, whereby men legislate on issues of ‘national’ importance, such as foreign affairs and the economy, while women address ‘soft’ issues like family, education, and health. This dynamic is a double-edged sword for women. On the one hand, when quota campaigns involve wide-spread civil society mobilization, and appeal to arguments about the need for women’s distinct voices in politics, they can create mandates for elected women to promote women’s interests. Likewise, quotas in the form of reserved seats for women can create mandates for those elected to those seats, precisely because their election is intended to improve the representation of women as a group (Schwartz 2004, Skjeie 1992). There is some evidence that this is occurring. Franceschet and Piscopo (2008), for example, find that many female legislators in Argentina draw an explicit link between their responsibility for promoting women’s interests and the arguments used by quota campaigners. On the other hand, while a mandate for female legislators improves the link between descriptive and substantive representation, this same mandate can weaken the responsibility that male legislators perceive for promoting women’s rights. Preliminary evidence drawn from patterns of bill introduction in the Argentine congress suggests that male legislators become less active on women’s issues once women’s presence increases.
Mapping Gender Quota Policies

In addition to the various discourses used for and against quota measures, there are also important differences in the design and conditions of adoption of specific quota policies. These may affect the ability of women elected through quotas to act for women and, in turn, influence how central ‘women’s issues’ become to the policy-making process. Features that may play a role in mediating the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation include the types of quotas adopted, the coalitions of actors behind their passage, and the effects that quotas have on the absolute numbers of women elected.

Types of Gender Quotas

As noted above, there are three main categories of quota measures: reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas. The type of quota may play a role in shaping women’s substantive representation because it affects how female candidates are selected, and thus by extension, what kinds of women may benefit from quota provisions. There are also important regional patterns in terms of the quotas adopted, which may in turn intersect with social, economic, political, and cultural differences that may affect the prospects for women to act for women, as well as the content of the policies that they pursue. Reserved seats, for example, appear in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Krook 2004). They first emerged in the 1930s and were the main type of quota adopted through the 1970s. Since the year 2000, however, reserved seats have been passed in countries that otherwise have low numbers of women in politics. They are established through reforms to constitutions, and occasionally electoral laws, which create separate electoral rolls for women, designate separate districts for female candidates, or distribute seats for women to parties based on their proportion of the popular vote. They mandate a minimum number of
female legislators, but often provide for low levels of female representation, usually between 1% and 10% of all elected representatives, although since 2000, several countries have instituted much larger provisions of 30%. In some cases, reserved seats apply to single-member districts in which only women may run for election (Nanivadekar 2006). In others, they are allocated in multi-member districts to the designated number of women that win the most votes (Norris 2007). In yet others, women are selected to these seats several weeks after the general elections by members of the national parliament (Goetz and Hassim 2003).

Party quotas, in contrast, are the most common type of quota. They were first adopted in the early 1970s by a limited number of socialist and social democratic parties in Western Europe. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, they began to appear in a diverse array of political parties in all regions of the world. In some countries, they exist alongside the presence of other types of quotas to promote women’s representation (Meier 2004; Araújo and García Quesada 2006). At their most basic, party quotas are measures adopted voluntarily by individual parties that commit the party to aim for a certain proportion of women among its candidates to political office, usually between 25% and 50%. However, the particular phrasing of this requirement varies: some policies identify women as the group to be promoted by the quota (Durrieu 1999; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Valiente 2005), while others set out a more gender-neutral formulation (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006; Guadagnini 2005). Party quotas govern the composition of party lists in countries with proportional representation electoral systems. They are directed at a collection of single-member districts in countries with majoritarian arrangements (Campbell, Childs, and Lovenduski 2006; Opello 2006; Russell 2005).

Legislative quotas, finally, tend to be found in developing countries, especially Latin America, and post-conflict societies, primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeastern
Europe. This distribution can be explained by the fact that legislative quotas are the newest kind of quota policy, appearing first only in the 1990s, at a time when women’s representation had reached the agenda of many international and non-governmental organizations (Krook 2006). Enacted through reforms to electoral laws and sometimes constitutions, they are mandatory provisions that apply to all parties. They generally call for women to form between 25% and 50% of all candidates, and in most instances, the language is gender-neutral, speaking of women and men together or making reference to the ‘underrepresented sex.’ Yet, these measures vary in terms of how strictly their goals are articulated: some speak vaguely about ‘facilitating access’ (Giraud and Jensen 2001), while others offer concrete guidelines regarding the selection and placement of female candidates (Jones 2004; Meier 2005). Like party quotas, legislative quotas are implemented in different ways depending on the electoral system, applying alternatively to party lists (Meier 2004) or to a broader group of single-member districts (Murray 2004). Given their status as law, however, a distinctive feature of these measures is that they may contain sanctions for non-compliance and be subject to oversight from external bodies (Baldez 2004; Jones 1998).

*Actors in Quota Campaigns*

Research on individual cases reveals that a range of different actors may be involved in quota campaigns. As a consequence, quotas may be the result of various coalitions, which may influence how quotas are perceived by elites and the public at large. In addition to affecting the legitimacy of these measures, the relative balance of principled versus pragmatic motivations for quota adoption may again shape what kinds of women benefit from quotas, as well as their scope for acting on behalf of women as a group. If quotas result from sustained grassroots mobilization
that focuses on normative reasons for their adoption, they may be more likely to result in positive results for women, as compared to quotas imposed from above, inspired mainly by the strategic calculations of political elites. Viewed as a whole, existing case study research points to three main categories of actors in quota campaigns: civil society actors, state actors, and international and transnational actors. On their own or in conjunction with others, these actors may support quotas for various reasons, including principled stands, electoral considerations, empty gestures, promotion of other ends, extension of representational guarantees, international pressure, and transnational learning.

In most instances, quota campaigns involve the mobilization of women, including women’s organizations inside political parties, women’s movements in civil society, women’s groups in other countries, and even individual women close to powerful men (Bruhn 2003; Kittilson 2006). This usually occurs as women’s groups realize that quotas are an effective, and perhaps the only, means for increasing women’s representation. In all of these cases, women pursue quotas for both normative and pragmatic reasons. They believe that there should be more women in politics in order to promote justice, interests, and resources (Phillips 1995). However, in the absence any ‘natural’ trend towards change, they acknowledge that this is likely to be achieved only through specific, targeted actions to promote female candidates (cf. Krook 2006).

However, quotas are not usually adopted without the support of political elites, who often pursue quotas for strategic reasons, generally related to competition with other parties. Various case studies suggest, for example, that party elites often adopt quotas when one of their rivals adopts them (Caul 2001; Meier 2004). This concern may be heightened if the party is seeking to overcome a long period in opposition or a dramatic decrease in popularity. In other contexts, elites view quotas as a way to demonstrate a degree of commitment to women – often to increase
their vote base – without actually intending to alter existing patterns of inequality (Htun and Jones 2002; Mossuz-Lavau 1998). Alternatively, they treat quotas as a convenient means to promote other ends, like maintaining control over rivals within or outside the party (Chowdhury 2002). If these motives are correct, the adoption of quotas may be less about empowering women in politics and more about how quotas intersect, perhaps serendipitously, with various other struggles among political elites.

Elites and civil society groups may also be motivated to advocate quotas in light of existing or emerging norms of equality and representation. For example, some scholars argue that quota adoption is consistent with ideas about equality and fair access. They point out that left-wing parties are generally more open to measures such as quotas because these correspond to their more general goals of social equality (Hassim 2002; Opello 2006). Others interpret quotas as a method to recognize difference and the need for proportional representation. According to this view, quotas for women can be seen as a logical extension of guarantees given to other groups based on linguistic, religious, racial, and other cleavages (Inhetveen 1999; Meier 2000). A final observation is that quotas tend to emerge during periods of democratic innovation. In these countries, quotas may be seen as a way to establish the legitimacy of the new political system during democratic transition or the creation of new democratic institutions (Bauer and Britton 2006). Taken together, these arguments analyze quotas in relation to their ‘fit’ with features of the political context: they do not reflect principled concerns to empower women or pragmatic strategies to win or maintain power.

Finally, quotas may be promoted by international norms and spread through transnational sharing. Over the last ten years, a variety of international organizations have issued declarations recommending that all member-states aim for thirty percent women in all political bodies. These
norms may shape national quota debates in at least four ways (Krook 2006). International actors may be directly involved in quota adoption, either by directly applying quotas or by compelling national leaders to do so themselves. Local women’s movements and transnational NGOs may share information on quota strategies across national borders. International events may provide important leverage in national debates, shifting the balance in favour of local and transnational actors pressing for quota adoption. Lastly, international actors may seek to prevent the adoption of gender quotas, despite mobilization by local women’s groups and transnational NGOs in favour of these policies.

Dynamics of Quota Implementation

Quotas are adopted, ostensibly, as a means to elect a higher proportion of women. Yet, the advent of these measures has not resulted in a uniform rise in the numbers of women elected to national parliaments. Some countries have experienced dramatic increases following quota adoption (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Kittilson 2006; Longman 2006), while others have witnessed more modest changes (Murray 2004; Siregar 2006) or even setbacks (Araújo 2003; Verge 2008) in women’s representation. To the degree that numbers shape the prospects for women to act for women, these differences themselves indicate that not all quotas will create similar opportunities for ‘women’s interests’ to be articulated in the policy process. Further, when juxtaposed with variations in the types of quotas adopted, as well as the motivations for adopting quota policies, these outcomes suggest that quotas may be deliberately designed not to have a major impact on the numbers of women elected. As such, in some cases, quotas may not do much to alter women’s descriptive or substantive representation. At the same time, however, it has also been suggested that some of the mechanisms that facilitate quota adoption may also
negatively affect the prospects for women to act for women. Consequently, there may be a trade-off between descriptive and substantive goals (Tinker 2004; Zetterberg 2008x).

Quotas may have different effects depending on the type of measure involved. Reserved seats generally produce small changes in the numbers of women elected, but scholars disagree as to whether party or legislative quotas tend to more effective. Some claim that party quotas result in the election of more women because they are voluntary measures. Others insist that legislative quotas have more force because they bind all parties, not just those who choose to adopt quotas, and are enforced by state bureaucracies and the courts, rather than party leaders (Jones 1998; Norris 2007). Recent work delves deeper into variations within and across types to understand why specific quotas are more or less effective in achieving changes in women’s representation. It notes that quotas differ in terms of their wording (Htun 2002), requirements (Chama 2001; Meier 2004), sanctions (Murray 2004; Schmidt and Saunders 2004), and perceived legitimacy (Yoon 2001), all of which may have intended and unintended effects.

Other research relates the impact of quotas to the ‘fit’ between quota measures and other political institutions. Electoral systems, in particular, play a major role in determining the effects of quota policies. Most studies observe that quotas have the greatest impact in proportional electoral systems with closed lists and high district magnitudes (Caul 1999; Htun and Jones 2002), although it also identifies idiosyncratic features of particular electoral systems that negatively affect quota implementation (Htun 2002). Other work considers characteristics of the party system, as well as the features of parties themselves, to discern dynamics that may aid or subvert quota implementation. They argue that quotas are more likely to have an impact in party systems where several parties co-exist and larger parties respond to policy innovations initiated by smaller parties, as well as in parties with left-wing ideologies where the party leadership is
better able to enforce party or national regulations (Caul 1999; Davidson-Schmich 2006). In these instances, however, the centralized nature of candidate nomination may entail a trade-off: while party leaders committed to change may select a higher number of female candidates, the women – as well as men – chosen may feel especially beholden to party leaders, on whom they depend for re-selection.

These intuitions point to a third possible explanation for the varied outcomes of quotas, namely the respective roles of the actors who support and oppose these measures. Party elites are the group most directly responsible for variations in quota impact, as the effective application of quotas largely hinges around elites’ willingness to recruit female candidates. Yet, in many cases, elites often seek to mitigate the impact of these policies through passive refusal to enforce quotas or more active measures to subvert their intended effects (Araújo 2003; Costa Benavides 2003). Other actors may also play a direct or indirect role in enforcing quota provisions, like women’s organizations inside and outside political parties (Durrieu 1999; Sainsbury 1993), national and international courts (Chama 2001; Jones 2004), and ordinary citizens (Baldez 2004; Kolinsky 1991), all of whom may monitor party compliance with quota measures in ways that lead elites to ignore or honour, and possibly even exceed, quota requirements.

**Hypothesizing the Impact of Quotas on Substantive Representation**

The complexities of studying substantive representation, conflicting predictions of normative arguments for women’s increased political presence, and diversity in the design and conditions of adoption of quota policies suggest that there is not likely to be a straightforward relationship between the introduction of quotas and the promotion of ‘women’s interests’ in the policy-making process. Drawing on these insights, we propose six sets of hypotheses regarding
the effects of quotas on the substantive representation of women’s concerns. We anticipate that there will be important differences across cases related to variations in definitions of ‘women’s interests,’ stages in policy-making processes, numbers of women elected, discourses articulated in quota debates, features of quota policies, and campaigns leading to quota adoption. Aiming to facilitate individual and comparative case studies, we discuss how these hypotheses might be operationalized and tested in empirical research.

‘Women’s Interests’

The promotion of ‘women’s interests’ is inherent to the concept of women’s substantive representation and, as noted above, has often been used as a justification for measures to increase the proportion of women in elected office. The exact content of these interests, however, has been subject to extensive debate. Many feminists hesitate to attribute a universal and objective set of interests to all women, recognizing that gender interacts with a range of other identities to shape political priorities. At the same time, most are loathe to abandon the concept of ‘women’s interests’ altogether, preferring instead to employ a more flexible definition that allows women’s issues to remain a priori undefined, context-related, and subject to evolution (cf. Celis 2006). As arguments about women’s interests are often voiced in quota debates, often as a means to justify their adoption, we hypothesize that gender quotas in general will result in greater attention to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes. While we anticipate that the women elected through quotas are more likely to feel obligated to articulate women’s concerns, it is also possible that the politicization of ‘women’s interests’ in quota debates may lead incumbent women, as well as some male legislators, to promote women’s issues as well. Further, as women’s numbers grow, we expect that quotas will lead to the election of a more diverse
group of women who will in turn contribute to an expansion – or diversification – of what are viewed as ‘women’s interests.’ Testing these intuitions will require analyzing the content of policy proposals, debates, and outcomes before and after quotas are adopted to explore whether there is a quantitative or qualitative change in the types of bills introduced.

**Stages of Policy-Making**

Where they are effective, gender quotas produce changes in the composition of elected bodies. As shown above, changing the composition of parliaments can affect what legislators do, but in various ways and at various stages of the policy-making process. More importantly, existing institutional rules matter, and the application of quotas alone does not alter the parliamentary procedures that make the successful adoption of women’s rights policies more likely. In the words of an Argentine senator, “quotas [in Argentina] have increased the number of women in politics, but they have not increased women’s *power* in politics” (cited in Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). We hypothesize that *gender quotas that result in the election of more women will lead to increased attention to women’s interests in the legislative process, even if policy outcomes do not change*. In order to change policy outcomes, women need to do more than increase their presence in parliament. They also need to occupy influential committee positions (Norton 1995) or leadership posts where they can influence which policy proposals are debated and voted on. Researchers investigating the policy impact of gender quotas could map the policy process, highlighting the location of gate-keepers and identifying whether women occupy positions that permit influence over the policy process. In those cases where women remain outside of circles of power, and are therefore unlikely to change policy outcomes, researchers need to explore other stages of the policy process to look for the ways that legislators
represent women’s interests. For example, researchers can examine the transcripts of parliamentary debates, they can analyze patterns of bill introduction, and do surveys and face-to-face interviews with legislators to determine additional strategies for promoting women’s interests.

Some work in this area has been done, although few studies have been systematic, or attempted to connect women’s policy impact directly to the application of gender quotas. Research from African countries points to a variety of conclusions about the impact of quotas on policy-making. On the one hand, researchers highlight a number of successful policy outcomes, especially in the areas of domestic violence, land rights, family law, and HIV/AIDS policy (Bauer and Britton 2006). On the other hand, many scholars note that existing patterns of patronage and one-party dominance have not been disrupted by women’s increased presence and these features of the political system allow female legislators very little scope for autonomous action (Tripp 2006; Burnet 2008; Devlin and Elgie 2008). Research on the policy impact of quotas in Latin America is also fairly scarce, although one study finds that gender quotas, and the corresponding increase in women’s presence in congress, has had a greater impact on the legislative agenda (in terms of numbers of women’s rights bills introduced) than on policy outcomes (that is, few women’s rights bills have actually succeeded) (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). In part, this finding is attributed to the virtual absence of women in influential positions. Given that women are unlikely to accumulate sufficient political influence in such contexts, more research is needed to explore whether women elected through quotas pursue alternative strategies for promoting women’s rights. Qualitative methods involving interviews with legislators are a necessary first step to addressing this gap.
Numbers of Women Elected

The ostensible aim of all quota policies is to increase the proportion of women selected as political candidates. As already noted, however, not all quotas produce similar levels of female representation; indeed, many have little or no effect at all on the numbers of women elected. The rate of change also varies significantly across cases: while some countries experience gradual increases, others witness jumps that dramatically alter the composition of parliament overnight (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). These differences may affect the kinds of women who benefit from quotas, especially in terms of their political experience, as well as how women’s increased presence is viewed within the broader political context. At the same time, the main lesson from the critical mass literature is that numbers are no guarantee of the substantive representation of women’s concerns, even if there is substantial evidence showing that male and female legislators have distinct policy priorities and the latter often sense an obligation to act on behalf of women as a group.

With these findings in mind, we hypothesize that gender quotas that produce higher numbers of women in parliament will result in greater attention to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes. These trends may be influenced in various ways, however, by the rate of change. We anticipate that incremental change will be associated with more gradual increases in attention to women’s concerns, as well as slow but increased attention to women’s interests in policy-making among both male and female legislators. In contrast, overnight change is more likely to lead to the election of women with little political experience, who may want – but be unable – to promote women’s concerns in policy-making. Given dramatic turnover in the profiles of those elected, overnight change may also lead to abrupt and unpredictable shifts in attention to women’s issues among both male and female legislators. On the one hand, these
changes may reflect a broader commitment on the part of elites, as well as the public at large, to alter the practices of politics-as-usual. On the other hand, if these changes are accompanied by strong negative controversies surrounding quotas, they may introduce uncertainty to the policy-making process, leading to broad array of possible outcomes for women as a group.

Numbers may also be associated with a second set of dynamics that affect the content of the policies pursued. As women’s representation grows, it is possible that the profile of female legislators will become more diverse in terms of their descriptive characteristics and their sense of the need to represent women’s concerns (cf. Carroll 2001; Phillips 1995). A second hypothesis is thus that gender quotas that produce higher numbers of women in parliament will result in greater diversity in the types of women elected, as well as their commitment to policy change on behalf of women as a group. Again, there are likely to be important differences based on the rate of change. In cases of incremental change, the profile of female legislators will more closely approximate that of male legislators, leading to higher levels of political experience, as well as affording them greater opportunities to ‘normalize’ the incorporation of women’s interests into the policy-making process. At the same time, their more diverse profiles may lead them to expand the definition of ‘women’s interests,’ or alternatively, to prioritize another facet of their identity over ‘sex.’ These various possibilities may be heightened in instances of overnight change, where women’s lesser political experience may make them more likely to put forward women’s issues, especially when there is a broader ethos for change, but may also lead them to be more susceptible to prioritizing other identities to demonstrate that they are ‘serious’ politicians (cf. Childs 2004), or because they are elected due to their family connections to powerful male elites (cf. Nanivadekar 2006).
To test these hypotheses in empirical research, it is first necessary to collect data on the numbers of women elected before and after quotas are adopted. This information will enable a case to be classified in relation to the relative and absolute numbers of women elected as a result of the quota. Examining developments over time also makes it possible to determine whether a case is an example of a gradual or fast track to change. These categories can then be combined with data on the various stages of the policy-making process to see whether increased numbers of women inspired greater attention, or not, to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes. Testing the second hypothesis requires slightly different data on the profiles of male and female legislators, for example in terms of ethnicity, age, education, and occupation. This information is often available in parliamentary handbooks, which include various types of details on the background on all members of parliament. It can again be juxtaposed against data on the various stages of the policy-making process to explore how the respective backgrounds of male and female legislators may affect the articulation of women’s concerns in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes.

Discourses in Quota Campaigns

Quota advocates commonly appeal to two different kinds of arguments to make the case for quotas: justice arguments and consequentialist arguments. Justice arguments revolve around the idea that equalizing women’s representation in politics is a requisite of democracy and an extension of ideals of equality and justice. These arguments make no assumptions about what elected women will do or what women’s presence in politics will achieve, other than demonstrate that equality and justice have been accomplished. Consequentialist arguments, on the other hand, make two kinds of claims: (1) that more women in politics will lead to more
attention to women’s issues, and (2) that women’s presence will enhance democratic procedures. We hypothesize that *gender quotas adopted primarily for consequentialist reasons will produce more attention to women’s interests in the policy process but may not transform political outcomes*. Where the predominant discourse of quota campaigners focuses on the need for women in politics to take up women’s issues, then a “mandate effect” can emerge whereby women elected through quotas perceive an obligation to undertake women’s substantive representation. To test this, researchers need to investigate the kinds of discourses deployed in the quota campaign. This can be done by examining the media record, party documents, parliamentary debates and committee reports, and by conducting interviews with key activists and quota supporters in the political parties. Researchers would then need to examine whether women elected through quotas perceive such a mandate. This can be accomplished through surveys or interviews with legislators elected after the quota and also by looking at what women do, that is, the bills they introduce, and their interventions in parliamentary debates.

While consequentialist arguments can produce mandates for women elected through quotas, these kinds of arguments are also more likely to be deployed in post-conflict or post-dictatorship contexts, or where politics is marked by corruption and clientelism. In these contexts, quota campaigners will often gain public support for quotas by appealing to women’s “difference,” especially to gendered stereotypes about women’s greater concerns for vulnerable social groups. These arguments imply that women’s greater involvement in politics will improve or clean up the conduct of politics. Some of these arguments echo the arguments first-wave feminists used to mobilize support for women’s suffrage. We hypothesize that *gender quotas adopted in countries marked by patronage, one-party dominance, and entrenched patterns of corruption are unlikely to produce widespread policy changes that benefit women*. Even if
women succeed in putting women’s rights on the parliamentary agenda, unless these issues are embraced by party leaders, especially those in the dominant party, women will not succeed in changing policy outcomes where patterns of patronage or clientelism require loyalty to political elites in order to access resources and sustain a political career.

Design of Quota Policies

All gender quotas, at least on their face, share the same goal of reforming electoral and candidate selection processes to facilitate women’s access to political office. Yet, as discussed above, individual policies may take a number of forms, and within these types, they may alter candidate selection processes in a variety of ways. As a consequence, they may not only result in the election of higher and lower numbers of women, but may also create different opportunities for quota women to act for women, depending on how they were selected as candidates and in turn elected to political office. There have been several debates among researchers as to which type of quota is most likely to produce the greatest proportion of women (Jones 1998; Norris 2007). While reserved seats guarantee a minimum number of women, this percentage has often been very small; however, more recent reforms mandate as much as 33% women. The provisions made by party and legislative quotas tend to be higher, usually between 25% and 50%, but there are often enormous variations across parties – both within and across countries – that produce a wide range of results (Krook 2009). To the degree that individual policies lead to the election of more women, we expect that quotas will foster increased attention to women’s concerns, as per the hypotheses above.

To nuance this point, however, we emphasize the significance of how candidates are selected to hypothesize that gender quotas that involve more decentralized modes of selection
will result in greater attention to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes. More specifically, we anticipate that reserved seats that entail direct election by voters, as opposed to appointment by political elites, will lead to greater attention to women’s concerns in policy-making; party quotas will lead to greater attention to party concerns in policy-making and thus similarities in the policy priorities of men and women nominated by a particular party; and legislative quotas that are enforced by bodies external to parties will lead to greater attention to women’s concerns in policy-making. Testing these hypotheses requires taking a close look at the design and implementation of quota policies, in order to determine which groups exercise the main authority over candidate selection processes in a given country. These classifications can then be combined with data on the various stages of the policy-making process to see whether increased numbers of women inspired greater attention, or not, to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes.

Quota Campaigns

Gender quotas are now found in more than one hundred countries worldwide, with the majority of these measures appearing in just the last fifteen years. Despite these similarities in timing, there is considerable diversity in the processes leading up to quota adoption (cf. Krook 2006; Krook 2009). As detailed above, quotas may be the result of bottom-up mobilization by women’s groups, top-down decisions by political elites, or outside imposition by international organizations and transnational NGOs. In light of these actors’ often distinct motivations for pursuing quotas, the question of how quotas reach the political agenda – and the reasons why they are ultimately passed – may play a crucial role in shaping how effective these policies are, the kinds of women who benefit from them, and the degree to which the broader political context
presents a supportive environment for the articulation of women’s concerns. For these reasons, we hypothesize that gender quotas that are adopted following broad-based mobilization will result in greater attention to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes. In particular, we expect that quotas adopted following the active engagement of women’s groups will be the ones that are most likely to lead both male and female legislators to promote women’s concerns in policy-making. In contrast, quotas adopted by elites with little pressure or input from civil society, or alternatively, strong pressure from international organizations, will result in little attention to women’s interests in the legislative process. To test these hypotheses, it is necessary to establish which actors, or combinations of actors, were involved in quota debates, as well as their stated and implicit motivations for supporting quota reform. This information can then be compared with data on the various stages of the policy-making process to see whether increased numbers of women inspired greater attention, or not, to ‘women’s interests’ in policy proposals, debates, and outcomes.

Conclusions on Quotas and Women’s Substantive Representation

Gender quotas have been adopted in more than one hundred countries around the world in recent years. While they are the subject of a growing literature, most existing work on these measures focuses on explaining their adoption and varied effects on the absolute numbers of women elected. Yet, quotas are often justified with reference to their anticipated effects on the representation of ‘women’s interests’ in the policy-making, as well as on democratic outcomes more generally. In this paper, we present some thoughts as to how scholars might undertake such research, in light of several complex dynamics: on-going debates on how to analyze women’s substantive representation, varied normative arguments with distinct expectations about links
between the descriptive and substantive representation of women, and important differences in the design and conditions of adoption of individual quota policies. Based on these possibilities, we offer six sets of hypotheses as an initial step for undertaking individual and comparative case studies on the broader impact of gender quotas. As the field moves forward, it will be crucial to accumulate knowledge on these questions in order to establish whether quotas in fact empower women and promote democracy.

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