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More in common: the domestication of misogynist white supremacy and the assassination of Jo Cox

Hannah Jones

Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

ABSTRACT
This article considers responses to the murder of a British Member of Parliament, Jo Cox, in June 2016. Cox, a white woman, was assassinated by a white supremacist whose violent hatred extended to white people he deemed “collaborators” and who also exhibited strong misogyny. Cox is remembered for the message in her first speech to Parliament (“we have more in common than that which divides us”) and a “More in Common” campaign was established in her memory. The article situates Cox’s assassination alongside other recent attacks on female, feminist, and racially minoritized political leaders in the UK. Considering feminist and colonial resonances of domestication, the article argues that while the message of “More in Common” holds appeal, the figuring of Cox as foremost a (white) wife and mother has prevented a political confrontation with the misogynist white supremacy of the society in which this violence occurs.

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Introduction: a political assassination

In June 2016, Labour Member of Parliament, Jo Cox, was shot and stabbed to death in the street in her constituency of Batley and Spen in Yorkshire, a week before the UK’s referendum on membership of the European Union. The man who killed her shouted “Britain First” and “Keep Britain independent,” and was later found to have far-right literature in his house and to have been involved with white supremacist groups. He was tried for terrorism offences and, six months later, found guilty of murder and sentenced to a whole-life prison sentence, the crime deemed by the judge to have been “committed to advance a cause associated with Nazism” (Cobain and Taylor 2016).

This political assassination drew national and international attention, outrage, and sorrow. Those close to Cox were determined that the tragic and violent end to her life would not be used to undermine the values she...
advocated. Her husband Brendan was instrumental in ensuring the message of Cox’s maiden speech in the Houses of Parliament was central to remembering her. In it, she described her parliamentary constituency of Batley and Spen in West Yorkshire:

It is a joy to represent such a diverse community. Batley and Spen is a gathering of typically independent, no-nonsense and proud Yorkshire towns and villages. Our communities have been deeply enhanced by immigration, be it of Irish Catholics across the constituency or of Muslims from Gujarat in India or from Pakistan, principally from Kashmir. While we celebrate our diversity, what surprises me time and time again as I travel around the constituency is that we are far more united and have far more in common than that which divides us. (Hansard 2015; emphasis added)

Mass gatherings in London, Batley and elsewhere in the week after her death (and before the EU referendum) came together under the “More in Common” banner. Good wishes of sorrow and solidarity were sent from around the world, including from Barack Obama (Cox 2017). Brendan Cox characterized the attack as:

a political act, an act of terrorism, but in the history of such acts it was perhaps the most incompetent and self-defeating. An act driven by hatred which instead has created an outpouring of love. (Cox 2017, 216).

This was based on a view that the murderer’s motive was to create fear and division; therefore drawing people together (and against such acts) was seen as a healing gesture, in line with Cox’s ethos. The More in Common campaign included establishing a charitable foundation in Cox’s name to focus on her political priorities of loneliness, the Syrian conflict, women in public life and civilians in conflict (Jo Cox Foundation, n.d.); and a day of public street parties and picnics under the banner “The Great Get Together”. Other initiatives in her memory include a leadership programme for women in the Labour Party, a fund named after her by the Department for International Development, an annual memorial lecture at the University of Cambridge, the renaming of Rue Jo Cox in Avallon, France and Place Jo Cox in Brussels, and a plaque in the House of Commons. Brendan Cox published a book about his wife’s life and death entitled More in Common (Cox 2017).

My argument in this article is that the More in Common response is insufficient and counterproductive in terms of countering white supremacy. While values of “love and solidarity” are laudable, their articulation in this campaign reinforce a deeply gendered form of white nationhood. The response to the assassination of a national elected representative has been dampened in significance because of an appeal to her life as a wife and mother rather than as a political actor in her own right. This appeal does not deal with why and how this assassination happened – the political context – and therefore how such attacks could be countered. Through a focus on the domestic, the murder is
imagined as a random, tragic occurrence. By figuring the assassination as an exceptional act by a “deranged individual” or “crazed loner”, the underlying context of domesticated misogynist white supremacy in which his wilder expressions of those values could be incubated, is ignored. The response to the murder – though perhaps not intentionally – re-centres normative white patriarchal family values as essentially “British”, whilst claiming to do the opposite. An alternative and more challenging approach would face head-on the roots of misogynist white supremacism in wider British society. It would also confront Cox’s assassination as an extreme example of more widespread resistance to the increasing numbers of women and racially minoritized people gaining positions of power.

In this article, I refer to “white supremacy” in various registers. The man who murdered Cox can be straightforwardly regarded as a white supremacist given the documentation of his beliefs and associations; as The Guardian reported,

Mair was racist and a terrorist in the making, his home stuffed with far-right books and Nazi memorabilia and his mind brimming with a belief that white people were facing an existential threat… His greatest obsession, however, and his deepest bitterness was over those white people whom he condemned in his writings as “the collaborators”: the liberals, the left and the media… In the days before the murder he sought out information about the Ku Klux Klan, the Waffen SS, Israel, serial killers and matricide. (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor 2016)

Central to this article’s argument is that this extreme, virulent, overt, and mostly un-accepted white supremacism (and related misogyny) should not be separated in our analysis from the everyday white supremacism (and misogyny) which is embedded in British culture (Ahmed 2012). Everyday white supremacism is manifested: in the tendency of news media to immediately characterize violent attacks by people racialized as white as “lone wolf” or “mental health” issues, compared to an immediate identification of such acts by people identified as Muslim as “Islamic terrorism” (Freedman 2017); in the continuing normalization of everyday violence against people racialized as “of colour” (Gallagher and Winddance Twine 2017); in the ongoing understanding of whiteness as “the norm” which pervades our cultural codes and interactions (Du Bois [1920] 1969; Wekker 2016); and in the ways these racialized norms are intertwined and interdependent with the (racially differentiated) marginalization of women (Yuval-Davis 1993; Hill Collins 1998).

The distinction between “un-respectable” and “respectable” misogynist white supremacism might be considered the relationship between the “wild”, “unruly”, or “undomesticated” misogynist white supremacism of Cox’s murderer on the one hand, and the “domesticating” and “domesticated” misogynist white supremacism of daily life on the other. I build on Ghassan Hage’s writing on the domestication of difference and resistance inherent in nation-building multiculturalist projects. His analogy is with the
domestication of animals by humans through which one asserts dominance over an absolute other. For me, the analogy is of domestic oppression within the home. This links the domination inherent in patriarchal home- and family-building, with the taming of “internal” struggles over power inequalities within the nation.

The article begins with a consideration of the relationship of home and nation in terms of the domestic, bringing together work from security studies, feminist theory, and post-colonial thinking to understand power in relation to rhetorical and material struggles over national belonging. This is followed by an exploration of the broader political context in which Cox was assassinated, demonstrating the pervasive nature of misogynist white supremacist feeling and actions in the UK. This involves an examination of the contradictions of ongoing nationally-professed commitments to equality – particularly gender equality – and how concern for equality can reproduce racialized gender relations, where both racism and sexism are imagined as “others” to “British values”, thereby ignoring their ongoing operation within Britain (see e.g. Ahmed 2012). This is considered within and beyond the response to Cox’s assassination and her memorialization as primarily a (domesticated) wife and mother concerned with her local community – occupying the space misogynist white supremacy would see as suitable for a young white woman. These everyday forms of misogynist white supremacy are linked to the rise of more extreme, undomesticated actions, particularly directed against women and racially minoritized people and their supporters – but most virulently against racially minoritized women – who are visible in national political life, demonstrating further that Cox’s death was part of a pattern and not an isolated, random incident. I conclude by arguing that an alternative to “More in Common” would directly examine and challenge the misogynist white supremacism at the heart of our society.

Domestication, domopolitics: home, gender and nation

“Home” is commonly considered to be a place of safety and value. Yet there is an underside to the surface pleasantry of “home”. The right to claim a place as “home” is frequently contested in the politics of nation and belonging, with the racist call of “Go Home” at once imagining a place where the person told to “go home” will be safe/welcome, and refusing that their current location could be their home (Jones et al. 2017). The safety and comfort of the more intimate home, too, has been questioned by feminists and sociologists of the family (e.g. Barrett and McIntosh [1982] 2014). In this section, I consider the framing of domestication that will be used to understand the limitations of the dominant public response to Jo Cox’s assassination.

apparent in the New Labour statement of intent on immigration for its second
term of government, following a significant rise in asylum claims in the UK (see
also Yuval-Davis, Anthias, and Kofman 2005). Walters identifies a strain in gov-
ernmental security regimes which he calls "domopolitics", arguing this represents
a shift from thinking about the nation as a household, towards thinking of it as a
home. The emphasis, he suggests, moves from "an image of rule in which the
state is conceived as a vast household requiring the wise stewardship of a patri-
archal sovereign" (Walters 2004, 241) with rules to be made and obeyed, to a
place of intimacy, belonging and feeling – a cosier, affective national belong-
ing, but one where there remains a distinction between insiders and outsiders.
The term "domopolitics" makes an etymological link with both forceful (dom-
ination, domestication) and cosy (domestic) resonances of home. Walters'
emphasis is on how governments figure the "homeland" as at risk from
unwanted intruders, and associate transnational movement as linked to
threats (terrorism, criminality, unfair use of resources) to those "at home".

Though Walters references links with family, gender and race, these are not
elaborated in his paper. The gendered nature of home, and how this translates
through domopolitics, was more recently taken up by Gwyneth Lonergan
(2018), to consider the undertones of fertility and reproduction (and fear of
migrant fertility and reproduction) which Walters’ term also carries and
which reflect a long-standing concern of those who would control movement
across national borders. Lonergan focuses on how policies she considers
"domopolitical" construct and constrain the ways migrant women "repro-
duce" the "national home". The association of (racialized) family with nation,
and the control of women's fertility (and its "purity") have long been linked
with desires to defend national identity (see, among others, Yuval-Davis
1993). Domopolitics aiming to imagine a national “home” – however exclusive
or inclusive access to that “home” might be – will always be domesticating,
showing force not just towards “external” threats to safety, comfort, etc, but
also to internal ones. Those who are deemed part of a family/home are
expected to help one another out “simply because they belong” (Hill Collins
1998, 71); this simplicity of belonging is appealing and sustains the “More
in Common” idea.

Here, Ghassan Hage’s use of the concept of “domestication” is useful. Hage
conceives domestication as a “colonial mode of instrumentalising, dominat-
ing, and exploiting the natural world, as well as differentiating oneself from
it” (2016, 38). This encompasses the practices large and small through
which humans (as individuals and socially) place themselves at the centre
of importance, and organize life and its environs to their own advantage
(Hage 2017; see also Bauman 1991). This might involve domestication of
crops and livestock to produce food resources humans need or want; arrang-
ing a living room so that the light points a particular way and the tempera-
ture is pleasing; the colonization and exploitation of people and resources; or
the changing of conversations or focus so that some of these things can be more easily achieved. We might also think of it as making ourselves comfortable (Jones 2013).

In a striking analogy, Hage illustrates how domestication can be used to understand policies and practices like multiculturalism as means of taming the other, and on a spectrum with more obviously violent and silencing colonial processes such as slavery or extermination:

Multiculturalism stands to assimilation in the way freerange chooks [Australian informal term for “chickens”] stand to battery [i.e. caged] hens. Free-range chooks are certainly … freer than battery hens and living a healthier and happier life … Nonetheless it should be remembered that neither process of farming chicken has the interest of the animal other as its final aim. (Hage 2016, 46; original insertions)

This imagery demonstrates how attempts to mitigate oppression, while they may improve some aspects of life, do not make a fundamental difference if they do not deal with the basic terms of the relation of power – the chickens may have a happier life, but they are still to be slaughtered. The analogy is with inclusion practices based on “tolerance”, which may improve social relations on the surface, yet the powerful remain in charge with others able to exist only with their permission. Hage references how Muslims from the Global South are figured in ideas of threat, belonging and nationhood in white-dominated societies, in particular, settler colonial societies, and most specifically Australia. In discussing the “état de siège” experienced by white-majority countries in relation to migration from the majority world, Hage notes that anti-racist analyses tend to argue that while people may really feel threatened, the actual threat itself is fictional and “Western colonial societies ‘really’ have nothing to worry about” (2016, 45). He questions the completeness of such analysis, asking:

why can’t Islamophobia be a racist mode of coming to terms with a real threat, a threat to the colonial order, as opposed to the racist manufacturing of a nonexistent threat? (Hage 2016, 45; original emphasis)

Hage’s implication is not that Muslim populations are the kind of threat imagined by racist Islamophobes (taking our daughters, etc.) but that their presence and/or demands for equality may indeed form a challenge to institutionalized white supremacy which may have to give way to more democratic or uncertain forms of society – and this is a real “threat”. The reaction to this threat – violent and virulent Islamophobia – reimagines and distorts the threat and remains a racist reaction. Hage suggests that while the dismissal of the idea that global movements of people represent any change (or “threat”) may be meant in a spirit of “welcome”, it instead promotes an idea of powerlessness and benignity, removing agency from the people it is intended to “defend”: 
the task is no longer to say … “There is no threat here.” Rather, we must say, “Yes, there is something threatening this increasingly toxic modern colonial order, and just as well!” Now, how are we to negotiate this something? (Hage 2016, 48)

How does this translate to an understanding of the violent incursions of visible white supremacy into political life? My argument is that there is indeed something to be reckoned with in terms of political differences. Women and racially minoritized people (including of course racially minoritized women) are increasingly taking on positions of power in British life. They are not always feminists or anti-racists of course, but many are – and they are taking up space that white patriarchy would otherwise expect to maintain. “More in Common” responses imagine that the killer’s misogynist white supremacy is an aberration. This fails to recognize a more disturbing phenomenon; the pervasiveness of “polite” misogynist white supremacy in political and social life.

Are British values anti-racist feminist values?

For the last two decades, under governments of various parties, politicians have been trying to define “British values” as if these can be both inclusive and definitive. Currently, “fundamental” British values – defined as “democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all … to live free from persecution” (H.M. Government 2011, 34) – are expected to be taught in schools; public sector workers must report any suspicion people are “undermining” such values to counter-terrorism officers. Government has also stated that “intolerance of other cultures and gender inequality” is “contrary to British values” (H.M. Government 2011, 68).

There is plenty to critique within the British values agenda – that these values are characteristic of British behaviour, or that they are particular to Britain, for example. Yet it has much mileage in government. In December 2016, the Conservative government produced another report they had commissioned on “integration” (Casey 2016), which describes the UK as welcoming migrants – and yet suggests that new migration adds new pressures, and that political leaders have failed to address this because they are scared of being labelled racist. The report does not engage with how “new pressures” might relate to austerity, cuts to government services, or global politics and economics.

A well-publicized finding of the report was that abuse of women in Muslim communities was not being challenged. This was endorsed by, among others, Nigel Farage MEP (Farage 2016), who was suddenly, apparently, a feminist, as were right-wing newspapers which usually spend their time commenting on women’s bodies (e.g. Press Association 2016). In an interview, the report’s author discussed women unable to go out of their houses without their
husbands’ permission, claiming “if the women were white and living in Surrey, we’d be up in arms about it” (BBC News 2016). That same week, a feminist charity demonstrated that 936 women were killed in England and Wales between 2009 and 2015 in acts of femicide and domestic violence – that is, because they were women (Brennan 2016). Many of them were white, and they lived all over England and Wales. “We” – the general public – were not “up in arms”; it barely made a press mention. This is a classic example of the “misuse of feminism”, where appeals for women’s rights are prioritized only to make a point about the depravity of racially minoritized men (see Bhattacharyya 2008). In Walters’ (2004) sense, the “national home” is taken for granted as safe except when threatened by racialized outsiders; the dangers to women within the “home” are irrelevant in this misogynistic white supremacist common sense except when mobilized to defend the border (see also Farris 2017).

We can see a related dynamic at play in the “More in Common” response to Cox’s assassination. The campaign itself, and the association of the Jo Cox Foundation with campaign group Hope Not Hate, demonstrate a refusal of racism focused on the undomesticated extremism of those who overtly sign up to white supremacism; a refusal which is of course essential. However, this does not engage with how racism, like sexism, bathes all aspects of the culture in which we live, and fails to confront “the role of racialized nationalism in the definition of the populist political community” discussed in Ben Pitcher’s contribution to this special issue. It similarly ignores the underlying misogyny of the attack.

A year on from Cox’s death, her husband Brendan published a biography of her, predominantly a story of devastating private grief, yet also positioned as a political intervention in memory of his wife (Cox 2017). The book characterizes Cox as a wife and mother with local, domestic roots. This aspect of her life was undoubtedly the most important and devastating loss for those close to the person, Jo Cox. And yet the significance of her murder as a national event cannot end there.

Brendan’s memoir describes Cox as “loving”, “warm”, “shining”, “strong”, ambitious – while “small”, “feisty”, and with a “distinctive” Yorkshire accent. Something seems to be lost of Cox as a real woman as Brendan writes about her. The moments when she comes alive as a more complex character are in extracts he uses from her diaries – for example, she describes herself as having a “sarcastic nature” (63) and asks whether she should temper her sarcasm to fit in. This aspect of her “nature” is never otherwise mentioned by Brendan; she is more likely to be “plain-speaking” (86) “sunny and optimistic” (120), with “an easy smile and a devilish sense of fun” (212). Gender norms are constantly reinforced in the telling of this life: in the image of Cox’s “essence” and “nature” constantly expressed; in the way Brendan positions himself as doing equal parenting while describing the ways he does not
(e.g. 219–220); in his exploits such as grabbing a big pole to smash the ice around their houseboat and save them; in him proposing to her without discussing it in advance; announcing her pregnancy without her permission; in how remarkable it seemingly is when she carries his bag when he is injured. These gendered tropes of infantilized womanhood re-situate someone described elsewhere as “an extremely talented MP … a proud Labour feminist” (Labour Party, n.d.). Her husband of course mourns the loss of his wife and the way he knew her, but in doing so in this public way, in a book positioned as a political intervention, this domestication of her memory risks missing the importance of her role as a political force in her own right.

Similarly, the treatment of race in the book is far from a critically-informed anti-racist standpoint – from the language used to discuss racialized voting patterns (261); to the depiction of Cox’s empathy and strength through an image of her “holding hands” with Darfuri rape victims reproducing white saviour tropes (119); to Brendan professing a belief that “fundamental rights and principles of equality … were sacrosanct in America” (175) until the election of Trump, suggesting a shocking lack of understanding of race politics and history for a former Prime Ministerial advisor. This superficial anti-racism is important because it gestures to a hostility to racism without deeply engaging, recognizing, and reckoning with pervasive white supremacy. To express political resistance to Donald Trump’s presidency on the basis of his “naked bigotry” (175) as a contrast to timeless values of the USA, rather than as a step backwards in the direction of the founding of the USA as a state built (with the British) on extermination and enslavement of peoples, is to miss important context for the political moment. Trump’s appeal is his promise to re-instate a more forthright and unapologetic misogynist white supremacy; but it is to re-instate it, not to invent it. Further, ignoring the realities of ongoing white supremacism hampers the possibility of solidarity across its power imbalances; it domesticates the reality of political division in an attempt at a bland consensus centrist which accommodates rather than threatens the misogynist white supremacist order.

This erasure, or domestication, of power struggles is also visible in public-focused More in Common interventions. On the first anniversary of the murder, people around the UK gathered for “The Great Get Together”, street parties and picnics to assert the “More in Common” idea through shared food and conviviality, “love” in defiance of “hatred” (notwithstanding the emphasis on eating and drinking as what “we have in common” during the Ramadan fast might have been awkward). This was a pure expression of domopolitics. Interrogation of political differences and power were obscured in favour of a populist diversity drawing intransigently on the racialized nation state as its base (see Pitcher, this issue). Let’s watch a video of a series of celebrities publicizing this event:
The video opens with a drawing of Jo Cox and the quotation: “We are far more united and have far more in common than that which divides us.”

Patriotic orchestral music starts playing, and a pink gingham frame appears with the words “The Great Get Together” in the top left-hand corner, and a series of celebrities (most of whom at some point have been described as “national treasures”), apparently sitting in their living rooms, appear one by one and speak to camera:

Helen Mirren: So what does unite us as a country?
Ed Sheeran: Fish and chips. Yeah.
Andy Murray: Everyone loves a bit of 007 don’t they?
Nadiya Hussain: Cake. Correct me if I’m wrong!
Andy Murray: Sean Connery’s the best one for sure.
Jamie Carragher: Sport is what unites our great country.
Stephen Fry: Tea and biscuits.
Minnie Driver: Tea and hot cross buns.
Bill Nighy: Toast … Unless it’s spread with Marmite.
Helen Mirren: We love our pubs. We LOVE our pubs.
Stephen Fry: I do find the British generally speaking cheerful.
Andrew Marr: Stroppy.
Claire Balding: Stoical and brave.
June Sarpong: A society where difference is valued.
Bill Nighy: A genuine concern for other people’s welfare.
Nadiya Hussain: No matter who we are, where we’re from.
Girl at street party (member of the public): We’re all one race, and that’s human.
David Haye: Moaning, it’s such a British thing.
Helen Mirren: I think our bloody-mindedness, as well.
David Haye: The weather. It’s either too hot, too cold, too wet, too sticky.
Adil Ray: I would say it’s openness.
Martin Sheen: A sense of outrage at any injustice.
Andrew Marr: Our sense of humour.
Claire Balding: Morecambe and Wise or Miranda Hart or French and Saunders, or John Cleese doing a silly walk.
Helen Mirren: We all love Dame Judi Dench.
Ed Sheeran: I think the things that unite us as a country are the things that are meant to tear us apart, but they actually make us stronger.

Claire Balding: What else?
Woman at street party (member of the public): L.O.V.E. Love [laughs].
Helen Mirren: What do you think unites us a country?
Ed Sheeran: Share this video and tell us what you think.

The screen is filled completely with pink gingham. Then the logo “The Great Get Together”, underneath “Inspired by Jo Cox”. Finally, on a black screen, white writing with a red swirl passing across it (reminiscent of the St George’s cross of the English flag): “Please share #moreincommon greatgettogether.org”.

(Author’s transcript of Great Get Together 2017)
In amongst the banal patriotism and suggestion that nationalism (expressed through love of elderly actors and jovial disagreement about sandwich spreads) is a common sense accepted by all – and has something to do with combatting hatred – the closest we get to dissent is actor Martin Sheen’s claim that antagonism to injustice is “what unites us as a nation”. The setting of this celebration is the nostalgic, feminized, domestic iconography of pink gingham picnic blankets. Women and racially minoritized people are present and speak directly – but without outrage from anyone about the assassination or any other injustice. Such a challenge would rip apart the comfort of the picnic blanket; it might represent the direct “threat” to misogynist white supremacism which is here entirely domesticated.

This critique of the Great Get Together is not meant to malign the good intentions of those involved. Considering a widower’s memoir of his assassinated partner is not intended to intrude on or minimize grief. But it seems important to highlight how interventions positioned against anti-democratic, white supremacist violence, can reproduce the everyday, domesticating and domesticated common-sense of misogynist white supremacy. That this turns out to be the case should not be surprising; we live in a society premised on misogynist white supremacy. It is the basis of the organization of society and the distribution of power and authority. This is also why it is unsurprising that when liberation struggles of marginalized groups result in women and racially minoritized people beginning to gain positions of authority, violent outbreaks of undomesticated misogynist white supremacy arise, no matter how far those liberation struggles have been domesticated to prevent underlying power relations being addressed.

**Breaking point: one deranged individual?**

The day that Jo Cox was brutally murdered, Nigel Farage (Member of the European Parliament, prominent Leave.EU campaigner and leader of the UK Independence Party) revealed a campaign poster claiming the UK was at “Breaking Point” because of immigration (mixed up with refugees), and that a vote to leave the EU would solve that (see also articles by Abbas and by Pitcher in this special issue). The man who murdered Cox later in the day shouted “Britain First”, the name of a far-right organization which has aligned itself with Farage’s party and policies (Cusick 2015). When, among the outpourings of solidarity, sorrow and defiance in the wake of Cox’s murder, the parallels between some Leave campaign rhetoric and the murderer’s motivations were pointed out, Farage responded that the murder was down to “one deranged, dangerous individual” (M. Smith 2016), dismissing any consideration that the tenor of political debate may have contributed to a climate of hate and fear. The day after the EU referendum – a week after the shooting – Farage said the Leave campaign had won “without a single bullet being fired” (Saul 2016).
In December 2016, two weeks after the conviction of Cox’s murderer, another man was convicted for abuse of a female MP, Luciana Berger. Berger was not physically attacked, but she was subject to a concerted campaign of anti-semitic, misogynist abuse on social media and in her private life, including 2,500 messages a day at some points from organized neo-Nazis (P. Smith 2016). In November 2017, two members of a banned white supremacist group, National Action, were charged in connection with a plot to kill another female Labour MP, Rosie Cooper, to which one man pleaded guilty to preparing an act of terrorism by buying a machete for the purpose of the planned murder (Dearden 2017; BBC News 2018b). In January 2018, a far-right group, the White Pendragons, attempted to make a “citizen’s arrest” of Labour London Mayor, Sadiq Khan, for “subverting our English constitution”, apparently on the basis of his (Muslim) religion, as he made a speech on gender equality to the Fabian Society (Johnston 2018). They also “brought a homemade gallows with them to London” (TellMAMA 2018). That same month, a man was convicted for murder and attempted murder after driving a vehicle into worshippers at the Finsbury Park mosque in June 2017, stating in court that his initial intention had been to murder Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, at a march that day, adding that if Sadiq Khan had also been present “It would have been like winning the lottery” (BBC News 2018a). An increase in verbal and physical attacks on MPs was documented after the 2017 election (Wheeler and Carter 2017), with evidence that women and racially minoritized candidates face the worst abuse (BBC News 2017). Diane Abbott MP, the Shadow Home Secretary at the 2017 general election and the UK’s first black woman MP, faced the very worst of it – 45 per cent of all 25,688 abusive tweets to female MPs during the election campaign were personally directed at Abbott (Dhrodia 2017).

These attacks or planned attacks were on specific individuals. They were not targeted as “ordinary people”. Nor were they attacked precisely because of who they are personally. They were symbolic for the attackers, as leftists, liberals, racially minoritized people and their supporters, Jewish and Muslim people and their supporters, migrants and supporters of migrant rights, and women and feminist men. Arguing that there is “More in Common” between Jo Cox (or Diane Abbott), and the people who hate Jo Cox (or Diane Abbott) – as individuals, and for the politics and values they represent – misunderstands the problem. It turns the problem into a cosy, domopolitical question of “getting along” in the home, rather than an oppositional political struggle attempting to silence a (feminist and/or racially minoritized) “other”.

The political and media response to the assassination of Jo Cox has domesticated it as if it was an attack on a member of the public, emphasizing the implications for her family. The images of Cox in her wedding dress used on the front pages of national newspapers including *The Daily Mirror, The*
Guardian, and the i at the close of her murderer’s trial were clearly intended to memorialize the joy in her life rather than remembering her solely for her terrible death. Yet they also put her role as wife and mother, rather than as political representative, to the fore, as did newspaper cover stories on the day after her death. In The Sun:

MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD
Husband’s moving tribute as MP shot 3 times and knifed 7 times by crazed loner MY JO
The husband of MP Jo Cox wrote a poignant tribute to his wife less than an hour after she was murdered by a crazed loner yesterday. Heartbroken Brendan Cox also tweeted a photo of her by the River Thames, where the couple lived on a boat with their two young children. Jo, 41, was shot three times and stabbed seven times in her West Yorks constituency yesterday afternoon. (Sims 2016).

This was accompanied by images of Cox by their boat (“Home … photo tweeted by husband Brendan showing Jo by Thames”) and of the couple at their wedding (“HUSBAND Brendan & Jo on wedding day”) and a photo of the murderer (“‘KILLER’ Loner Thomas Mair”). And in The Daily Mail:

Devoted mother of two. Dedicated public servant. MP Jo Cox was a remarkable woman. Yesterday she was brutally murdered by a loner with a history of mental illness. WHAT A TRAGIC WASTE
The husband of an MP allegedly murdered by a troubled loner last night called on Britain to unite and “fight against the hatred that killed her” … The rising Labour star and dedicated MP died from catastrophic injuries … Witnesses saw the gunman shout “put Britain first” as he kicked, stabbed and then shot the slightly-built 5ft mother-of-two … . (Greenwood, Brooke, and Dolan 2016)

These front pages of the two highest circulation UK newspapers focused on Cox’s relationship to her husband and children as the most pressing aspect of her murder, not her democratic role. Though a “rising Labour star” in the Mail, The Sun does not even acknowledge which party Cox represented; both focus on the brutality of the attack, by a “crazed” or “troubled” “loner”, and on the consequences for Brendan (and their children). The description of Cox’s physique in the Mail (“the slightly-built 5ft mother-of-two”) is in line with Brendan’s victim statement to the court regarding the murderer:

… his only way of finding meaning was to attack a defenceless woman … . (Cox 2017, 212)

Cox, in these presentations, is a vulnerable feminine victim of random violence, rather than a political target. The focus on her family’s grief as the key site of violence continued throughout reporting and memorialization of this political assassination (e.g. Griffiths 2017; ITV 2017; Falvey 2018).

Though the concern for Cox’s family is important, to make this the focus of national grief is to de-politicise this political assassination – or rather, it is
to re-politicise it in a particularly gendered and domesticated way. Focusing on the tragedy of a young woman of potential being murdered (rather than a political figure) is a way of domesticating the narrative. It reduces Cox to only what the attacker thought she should be – a wife and mother – and reminds us that in broader British society, the domestic or family role is still seen as fundamental to the identity of a woman, no matter what her political or other engagements. In Hage’s terms, it minimizes the “threat” that Cox and the feminist, anti-racist, pro-migrant internationalism she was seen to stand for posed to the white supremacism which her killer sought to defend. By recloaking her as a first and foremost a harmless, “defenceless woman”, it fails to say that “Yes, there is something threatening this increasingly toxic modern colonial [and patriarchal] order, and just as well” – an order that the killer wished to defend with his crime (Hage 2016, 48). Instead, her murder is taken out of this context and re-homed within the domestic, but as a meaningless attack on the idealized home represented by a (white) wife and mother.

Resisting the domestication of misogynist white supremacy

Jo Cox’s murder was named as a political assassination by her family and political colleagues, and tried as such in the criminal justice system. However, the loudest voices memorializing her have identified the target of the assassination as the idea that “we have more in common than that which divides us”. Their response has been to demonstrate such commonality through a re-articulation of fundamental British identity as embodied in shared tea and cake, pubs and celebrities. This sits alongside re-assertion of “British values” as being associated with equality, particularly gender equality, and against discrimination. This presents, as I have demonstrated drawing on Walters’ “domopolitics” and Hage’s “domestication”, a double sense of the domestic, where the nation is imagined as a cosy home in which food, drink and entertainment unite the (national) family, and a national home in which shared values embrace and are embraced by all.

In Malcolm James’ paper in this special issue, he argues for acts of care as a means of confronting cruelty; but here I have shown that if events like the Great Get Together are imagined as acts of care, they still fail to confront the cruelty of misogynist white supremacy, and indeed reproduce some of its everyday forms (see also Sirriyeh 2018). Actions centred on the performance of “shared values” of care depend on the idea that Cox’s assassination was an anomaly, the work of “one deranged individual”, an outsider to the “More in Common” consensus – and to the national home. As I have shown, though his violent misogynist white supremacy was extreme and unregulated, it was not out of step with wider patterns. We can see this in the way everyday untimely deaths of women – whether confronting the
violence of international borders at sea, or at the hands of their immediate family in their own homes – are rarely of political interest except as a tool to pathologise racialized others. It is visible too in the pattern of targeted verbal and physical attacks on prominent feminists and anti-racists, and particularly the virulence of attacks on racially minoritized women in the public eye.

So what is the alternative to “More in Common” and its domestication of political conflict? It is to resist the simplification and the pull towards comforting narratives. What is needed is a refusal to repair existing systems of misogynist white supremacist power and knowledge. Cox’s murderer did identify an anomaly: that the presence of Cox and others like her do represent a threat, however latent, to misogynist white supremacy – and “just as well!” as Hage would say. However, the threat she – we – represent has been largely domesticated, neutered, by the reincorporation of liberation struggles into existing structures – for example, through “diversity agendas” over-taking equity demands (Ahmed 2012), through neoliberal market prerogatives dominating free movement politics (Pitcher, this issue), or through the appropriation of feminist agendas for the purpose of racialized border control (Bhattacharyya 2008; Farris 2017). Feminist anti-racist politics is not (yet) a hegemonic common-sense (Ahmed 2008). It is rather an internal contradiction in the system of misogynist white supremacy.

A proper response to Cox’s assassination must place it in social, political and historical context. It must recognize – at the very least – that this took place at a moment of enormous political cleavage signalled by the Brexit campaign, and forms part of a pattern of “backlash” against the increasing prominence of women, racialized minorities, and their supporters, in public life. The answer to that is not to imagine a shared, easy – but inevitably illusory and unsustainable – centrist consensus, where all will feel “at home” in domestic bliss, but to identify the connections between the unruly extremes of misogynist white supremacism and its everyday forms found in politics (Dhrodia 2017; Wheeler and Carter 2017), institutions (Puwar 2004) and the home (Barrett and McIntosh [1982] 2014; Brennan 2016; Lonergan 2018). Though the moment requires a much broader societal movement, the Jo Cox Women in Leadership programme (Labour Party, n.d.), as an explicitly feminist and (less explicitly) anti-racist action supporting more women (including racially minoritized women) into positions of power, is a far more appropriate response to Cox’s assassination than community picnics. Acknowledging and confronting the political differences and power imbalances which underpin British society is the only way to come to terms with Jo Cox’s assassination in a way which does justice to its significance for political life.
Notes

1. Handel's Zadok the Priest, written for the coronation of King George II in 1727 and played at the coronation of British monarchs ever since.
2. Actor.
3. Musician.
4. Tennis player.
5. TV chef.
6. Footballer.
7. Actor.
8. Actor.
11. TV presenter.
12. TV presenter.
15. Actor.
16. All British comedians.
17. Actor.
18. The purity of Cox's anti-racism or other politics are not the point; her position of relative power as a woman, and her statements on Syrian refugees, multiculturalism, feminism and Brexit meant she posed enough of a threat for her murderer to fear.

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ORCID

Hannah Jones http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2508-0284

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