The Diffusion of Electoral Reform: Gender Quotas in Global Perspective

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Abstract

Gender quotas constitute some of the widest-reaching electoral reforms of recent years, but their diffusion is not yet well-understood. The paper outlines four main explanations given for quota reform: women’s mobilization, elite strategies, political norms, and international and transnational effects. It then approaches quotas as a global phenomenon and considers the possibility of causal diversity, or the idea that different groups of factors produce the same outcome of quota adoption. Yet, it also argues that these variations are not infinite: actors and motivations tend to combine in systematic ways over time and across countries. Synthesizing policy models from comparative politics and international relations, the paper develops a ‘multi-faceted’ approach focused on four categories of actors, operating in civil society, the state, and the international and transnational spheres. In addition, the paper proposes two ways in which actors and motivations vary in systematic ways, related to (1) the debate’s location in ‘world time’ and (2) a country’s position of power in world politics. The framework reveals the benefits of thinking across subfield divides to develop and apply new theories of policy adoption.
Between 1930 and 1990, approximately 20 countries witnessed the adoption of quota policies aimed at increasing the selection of female candidates to political office. Over the course of the 1990s, however, quotas appeared in more than 50 new states, which have been joined by a further 50 more since the year 2000. As a consequence, elections in more than 100 countries today are governed by some type of gender quota policy (Krook 2009). The rapid rate of quota adoption is puzzling for several reasons. First, methods of affirmative action are controversial in many contexts, being framed as ‘unfair’ or as promoting ‘unqualified’ individuals over more ‘qualified’ ones (Bacchi 1996). Yet, these measures have gained the support of legislators, as well as party and election officials, in countries with a diverse range of political, social, economic, and cultural characteristics. Second, in most instances, quotas for women in elected positions requires, by definition, a reduction in the number of men. However, most policies are passed quickly, and often with substantial margins of support, by largely male-dominated political parties and national legislatures (Murray, Krook, and Opello 2009). Third, gender quotas are often criticized by feminists on the grounds that they may reify ‘women’ as a group, overlooking both diversity among women and shared points of interest with various groups of men (Mansbridge 2005). Despite this skepticism, quotas have been taken up by many women’s groups around the world as a basis for women’s organizing.

Viewed together, these developments indicate a growing international trend recognizing the need to include more women in political decision-making (Krook 2006). Although more than half of all quotas around the world involve party-level provisions, policies in nearly 50 countries – a number that continues to grow each year – entail changes to constitutions and election laws. When compared with other attempts to revise electoral arrangements, which tend to be limited to a small range of countries, quotas emerge as the widest-reaching electoral reforms of recent years. National-level quotas fall into

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1 In a limited number of countries, like Bangladesh, the adoption of quotas for women has entailed expanding the number of seats in parliament in order to incorporate the quota without the need to displace male office-holders.
two broad categories. *Reserved seats,* as their name suggests, set aside seats for women that men are not eligible to contest. They are most often established through changes to constitutions, but in some cases also electoral laws, to mandate a minimum number of female legislators. The proportion is often very low, usually between 1 percent and 10 percent of all elected representatives. However, since 2000, several countries have instituted much larger provisions of 30 percent. These measures are applied in a variety of ways. In some cases, reserved seats apply to single-member districts in which only women may run for election (Nanivadekar 2006). In others, they are allocated in multi-member districts to the designated number of women that win the most votes (Norris 2007). In yet others, women are selected to these seats several weeks after the general elections by an electoral college (Tripp 2006). As a group, these policies appear in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Krook 2004). They first emerged in the 1930s and were the main type of quota adopted through the 1970s. Since the year 2000, however, they have been passed increasingly in countries that otherwise have low numbers of women in politics.

*Legislative quotas,* in comparison, require parties to nominate a certain proportion of women. Enacted through reforms to electoral laws and sometimes constitutions, they generally call for women to form between 25 percent and 50 percent of all candidates. In most instances, the language is gender-neutral, speaking of women and men together or making reference to the ‘underrepresented sex.’ Yet, these measures vary in terms of how strictly their goals are articulated: some speak vaguely about ‘facilitating access’ (Giraud and Jensen 2001), while others offer concrete guidelines regarding the selection and placement of female candidates (Krook 2009). Legislative quotas are implemented in different ways depending on the electoral system, applying to party lists (Meier 2004) or a group of single-member districts (Murray 2004). Given their status as law, a distinctive feature of these measures – as compared with party-level provisions – is that they may contain sanctions for non-compliance and be subject to oversight from external bodies (Baldez 2004; Jones 1998). With some notable exceptions, they are found primarily in developing countries, especially Latin America, and post-conflict societies,
mainly in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe. They appeared for the first time only in the 1990s, but today are more common than reserved seats (see Tables 1 and 2).

Gender quotas thus constitute both a recent and a global political phenomenon. Although a growing number of scholars recognize the scale of quota adoption around the world (Dahlerup 2006; Ellerby 2009; Krook 2009), the predominant tendency is to focus on providing accounts of introduction in relation to individual countries and world regions (see for example, Bauer and Britton 2006; Kittilson 2006; Ríos Tobar 2008). By way of contrast, research on quota impact has increasingly been the subject of larger-n analyses (Schwindt-Bayer forthcoming; Tremblay 2007; Tripp and Kang 2008). This is due to the fact that, while data collection is still difficult, it is relatively straightforward to integrate information on policy design into existing statistics on the political, social, economic, and cultural factors that might explain patterns in women’s representation around the globe. A major barrier to an analysis of quota diffusion, in comparison, has been the lack of systematic data on quota campaigns around the globe. As a result, the vast majority of research on this question involves in-depth case studies of quota debates. Taken together, this literature points to four main explanations for quota adoption, connected to the mobilization of women’s groups (Bruhn 2003), the strategic calculations of political elites (Caul 2001; Davidson-Schmich 2006; Murray 2007), the ‘fit’ with reigning political norms (Inhetveen 1999; Opello 2006), and the influence of international and transnational actors (Krook 2006). However, each of these accounts is contradicted by evidence from other cases, at the same time that various arguments appear to work together in individual instances of quota reform (Krook 2007a).

An overview of this work suggests that evaluating explanations on the basis of their ability to explain all instances of reform may be misguided. Following recent insights in political methodology (George and Bennett 2005; Ragin 2000), it may be the case that different combinations of factors may produce the same outcome of quota adoption. To explore this possibility, this paper analyzes quotas as a global phenomenon, arguing that a broader perspective offers a chance to distill common trends and
map diversity across the processes leading to quota adoption. This approach remains consistent with the goals of case study research to present nuanced accounts of quota campaigns. However, it seeks to go beyond them by investigating shared influences and connections and highlighting the role of actors that might otherwise be overlooked, even if the same actors and motivations may not assume equal levels of importance across all cases of quota reform. Juxtaposing these trends, the paper suggests, permits insight as whether there may be systematic variations across the broader population, which may in turn, improve the analysis of individual campaigns. Framed in more general terms, the analysis also provides an opportunity to better understand the politics behind electoral reform, given that the widespread adoption of quotas offers more data than other types of electoral changes for assessing the role of various actors and motivations. At the same time, attention to multiple actors in these debates presents a chance to inform studies of policy diffusion, in light of the fact that quotas reflect a growing international norm regarding the need to promote women’s political representation.

To develop this argument, the paper begins with an overview of models of policy adoption in research on comparative politics and international relations. Whereas the former focus primarily on civil society and state or other elite actors, the latter emphasize international and transnational influences, although some authors do signal the importance of local groups or individuals. While these approaches are rarely viewed in conjunction with one another, the global reach of policy reforms like gender quotas suggests that a more comprehensive framework would attend to the parts played by civil society, state, international, and transnational actors. This alternative model is elaborated in the second section, which fleshes out these insights with reference to the literature on quota policies. This discussion reveals that quota reform cannot be explained adequately with a single model of quota adoption. Rather, a global perspective illuminates the importance of multiple potential actors and motivations for policy reform.

The third section then attempts to systematize these findings to theorize the source of these variations. Integrating two points left largely implicit in existing accounts, it proposes that actors and
motivations will differ depending upon (1) the debate’s location in ‘world time’ and (2) the country’s position of power in world politics. More specifically, while all four categories of actors will be present in most instances, debates that unfold at earlier points in the diffusion process are likely to witness a larger role played by actors in civil society and the state, while discussions at later moments will see greater involvement by those in the international and transnational realm. Consequently, normative and pragmatic considerations are likely to vary, given the more local versus more global framing of each set of debates. At the same time, countries with a greater degree of power in the international system are more likely to be able to resist reform. When they do adopt quotas, national level factors will tend to play a larger role, even if international and transnational influences are present. Conversely, countries with less power will be more vulnerable to international and transnational pressures to approve quotas, even if civil society and state actors also mobilize for change. Drawing on details of particular campaigns, this discussion seeks to move beyond more descriptive, post hoc analysis to present a more substantive theory of policy diffusion, as viewed through the case of electoral reform. The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of this approach for future research on policy adoption.

Theorizing Electoral Reform: Models of Policy Adoption

Questions regarding policy diffusion have been the focus of research in comparative politics and international relations, but have rarely been assessed side by side. Given its interest in domestic politics, the former tends to focus on legislators, political parties, and activists when theorizing conditions and reasons for policy reform. One prominent version focuses on ‘multiple streams,’ also known as the ‘garbage can’ model of public decision-making. The driving idea behind this model is that the policy-making process is rarely a rational procedure by which actors generate alternatives, examine their consequences, evaluate these consequences in relation to their objectives, and finally decide on which best option to pursue. Rather, decisions are the result of streams of choices, problems, solutions, and
energy from participants. The model frames choices within organizations as “a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated,” whose mix “depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on what garbage is currently being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972, 2). Translating these ideas into the agenda-setting process in legislatures, John Kingdon (1984) structures the fluid and indeterminate nature of policy-making processes in relation to three streams of problems, policies, and politics. While logically coequal, these streams develop independently and thus do not necessarily follow one another through time in any regular pattern. In this model, “ideas can come from anywhere” (75), and a complex combination of factors is generally responsible for the movement of a given item to agenda prominence, including political activities like election campaigns and pressure group lobbying.

A second set of models revolves about questions of responsiveness and party competition. This research focuses more explicitly on how parties shift their behavior and issue priorities as a means to appeal to voters, following citizen mobilization and/or changes in the profiles of their competitors. Early work framed these processes as a type of ‘contagion,’ whereby parties at one end would be forced to emulate organizational techniques used by those at the other end of the political spectrum (Duverger 1954; Epstein 1967). Similar processes may also operate with regard to policy positions, as parties move to the center to adopt priorities that will appeal to the ‘median voter’ (Downs 1957), abandoning their distinctive forms and ideologies to become ‘catch-all’ parties (Kirchheimer 1966). More recent studies, however, have sought to dispel the notion of parties as unitary actors, noting that strategies of conflict management pervade the internal life of parties, whose actors include party leaders, who may prioritize winning cabinet seats; party legislators, who may be more concerned with the possibility of losing seats in parliament; and party activists, who are less concerned with offices and more motivated to promote particular policy objectives (Bartolini 2002; Laver and Hunt 1992). While shifts in the environment may
create pressures for policy change, therefore, processes of internal bargaining may affect the prospects for recognizing and pursuing new opportunities (Harmel and Janda 1994). The scope of potential change is further constrained by the issue positions that the party has taken in the past, in order for the party to retain ideological credibility and to avoid alienating long-time supporters. Taken together, these various models offer a detailed and nuanced view of state, party, and social movement actors, but rarely confer a central role to actors beyond national borders.

Models of policy adoption in international relations, in contrast, tend to emphasize international and transnational influences on policy change, even as they recognize that actual policy decisions must be made by state actors. One group approaches these questions at the level of the international system. Interested in the cross-national diffusion of policy ideas, this work is joined by a concern to theorize how actors and incentives shift over time as a new ‘norm’ emerges, leading a growing number of states to adopt a particular policy innovation. One version is the ‘world polity’ model, which proposes that states are not fully independent actors that develop policies based upon unique cultures and histories. Rather, they are embedded in a ‘world society’ that promotes dynamics of learning and imitation, causing them to adopt similar strategies for addressing common problems. While acknowledging that the content and structure of these strategies is shaped by domestic actors, this account views international organizations as “primary instruments of shared modernity” (Meyer et al 1997, 161), who develop and disseminate new standards and practices, often but not exclusively through international conventions providing declarations of common causes and blueprints for change. The result is universalistic world models that are exogenously created and “not strongly anchored in local circumstances” (Strang and Meyer 1997, 156). States comply, and thereby converge in many aspects of state organization and policy, in efforts to increase or enhance their reputation and identity as ‘modern’ states (Finnemore 1996). A related model focuses on ‘norm cascades,’ which suggests that new policy ideas (or ‘norms’) emerge, gain acceptance
from a ‘critical mass’ of states, and then diffuse across the international community, causing countries to converge around a common set of principles and policy practices (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

In contrast to these theories, which focus on broad processes of policy diffusion and recognize that distinct actors may be relevant at different stages, another set of models presents a more detailed account of interactions among actors and mechanisms of change, but largely frames these in terms of single ‘one-size-fits-all’ explanation. One rendering seeks to understand how policy diffusion occurs in situations where governments refuse or are not responsive to civil society demands. Whereas social movements traditionally direct most of their energies towards lobbying the state, domestic groups are increasingly able to bypass the state to connect to transnational allies. These transnational advocacy networks use the power of principled ideas to lobby their own states or international organizations to put pressure on the recalcitrant state from the outside (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Via this ‘boomerang effect,’ local activists gain access, leverage, and information that they would not have had on their own for instigating policy change. A second model elaborates this process in terms of a ‘spiral pattern’ of transnational influence, or a five-stage process of socialization driven in large part by the activities of principled-issue networks. These stages are domestic repression, state denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behavior. Crucially, however, movement through these stages may be halted or reversed at any time (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). As a group, these models go further to incorporate international and transnational influences on national-level policy debates, but gloss over features specific to individual countries that might affect how global ideas are translated into domestic policy initiatives.

**Rethinking Policy Diffusion: A Multi-Faceted Model**

Existing frameworks thus revolve largely around different subsets of actors, who have a variety of motivations for pursuing policy reform. In itself, the presence of multiple approaches exposes the
limits of each individual model to adequately capture the full range of contributions to policy debates. Additionally, however, the main gap between these schools runs between those that emphasize civil society and state actors, on the one hand, and those focusing on international and transnational actors, on the other. Yet, the global spread of certain policy innovations, like gender quotas, has been matched by extensive campaigns at the grassroots. Together, these patterns suggest that a more comprehensive model would analyze the respective roles played by civil society, state, international, and transnational actors, while also leaving their exact importance open for empirical investigation. The advantage of this ‘multi-faceted’ approach is that it recognizes a broader spectrum of actors, but it does not require that they exert the same influence across all cases. Keeping all four categories of actors in mind, further, is likely to improve scholarly analysis by facilitating comparisons across cases and drawing attention to actors that might otherwise be overlooked. Attempts to understand the origins and decisions behind policy reform should therefore consider whether civil society actors generate and mobilize in favor of new policy proposals, state actors initiate or respond to pressures for policy adoption, international actors serve as ‘teachers’ and enforcers of new policy ideas, and transnational actors step in as cross-national policy entrepreneurs and advocates.

Research on gender quotas provides broad support for the utility of this revised approach. The literature on quota adoption offers four main explanations as to why quota policies have been passed, often quickly and with substantial margins of support. Juxtaposed, these accounts present conflicting views on the actors and their reasons for pursuing quota reform, at the same time that the evidence in support of each argument is undermined by details from other cases. In other words, no single account suffices to explain all, or even the majority of, cases of quota adoption. Remaining open to the potential for causal diversity, however, suggests that each offers a partial explanation that must be supplemented by others, although these combinations may be varied and not engage all actors to the same degree. A common narrative is that women’s groups mobilize for quotas, usually when they come to realize that
quotas are an effective, and perhaps the only, means for increasing women’s representation. These women may include women’s organizations inside political parties, women’s movements in civil society, members of the national women’s machinery, and even individual women close to powerful men (Bruhn 2003; Kittilson 2006). Some scholars go so far as to argue that efforts to select more female candidates never occur without the prior mobilization of women, even when male elites are ultimately responsible for the decision to establish quotas. However, there is also evidence that women as a group are in fact frequently divided as to the desirability of gender quotas. Some of the strongest opposition comes from feminists, both inside and outside the political parties, who express concerns that quotas do not further the cause of female empowerment (Amar 1999; Kishwar 1998). Further, even in cases where a large number of women do support quotas, their proposals rarely gain consideration until they are embraced by at least one well-placed elite man who pressures his own party, or his own colleagues in parliament, to approve quotas for women (Schmidt 2003).

A second account is that political elites adopt quotas for strategic reasons, generally related to competition with other parties. Various case studies suggest, for example, that party elites often adopt quotas when one of their rivals adopts them (Caul 2001; Meier 2004). This concern may be heightened if the party is seeking to overcome a long period in opposition or a dramatic decrease in popularity. In other contexts, elites view quotas as a way to demonstrate a degree of commitment to women without actually altering existing patterns of inequality (Htun and Jones 2002; Mossuz-Lavau 1998). Elites may also see quotas as a means to promote other ends, like maintaining control over rivals within or outside the party. If these motives are correct, the adoption of quotas may be less about empowering women in politics and more about how quotas fit in, perhaps serendipitously, with various other struggles among political elites. Yet, most of these accounts overlook instances where quotas meet with opposition from party leaders and male politicians. Instead of outspoken and pragmatic convergence on quota policies, some elites abstain from taking public positions on quotas, adopt quotas but do not publicize this policy
widely, or engage in acrimonious debate within and across parties as to the desirability of quotas (Bruhn 2003; Scott 1998; Squires 1996). In addition, a number of studies cast doubt on the general applicability of these purported incentives, finding that parties uncertain about electoral outcomes often fall back on more traditional male politicians (Murray 2004), single party regimes use inclusion as a means to gain social legitimacy (Goetz and Hassim 2003), and elites appear at least in some cases to act more from normative rather than strategic concerns (Meier 2004).

A third set of explanations are focused less on actors than on favorable conditions for quota passage, suggesting that quotas are adopted when they mesh with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation. For example, left-wing parties are generally more open to measures such as quotas because these match with their more general goals of social equality (Hassim 2002; Opello 2006). In other countries, gender quotas may be viewed as an extension of guarantees given to other groups based on linguistic, religious, racial, and other cleavages (Inhetveen 1999; Meier 2000). Finally, many quotas emerge during periods of democratic transition, when quotas may be seen as a way to establish the legitimacy of the new political system, as has also been the case in many post-conflict societies (Bauer and Britton 2006). Quotas may thus simply ‘fit’ with features of the political context, rather than reflect principled concerns to empower women or pragmatic strategies to win or maintain power. Emphasizing connections between quotas and broader political ideals, however, neglects cases where proposals for gender quotas encounter fierce opposition among a wide range of domestic groups. Detractors often argue against quotas on equality grounds, suggesting that they discriminate against men and thus should be seen as unconstitutional or illegal (Guadagnini 2005; Mossuz-Lavau 1998). In other cases, quotas for women can interact in various ways with claims for the representation of other groups, leading governments to recognize certain groups to the exclusion of others (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Jenkins 1999). Finally, quotas for women are sometimes rejected by reformers on the grounds
that such measures are fundamentally anti-democratic and thus contrary to the spirit of the transition (Waylen 2007; Yoon 2001).

A fourth story is that quotas are supported by international organizations and spread through transnational connections. This work locates the origins of these policies in international meetings and conferences. Over the last fifteen years, a variety of international organizations – including the United Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Socialist International, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, and the Organization of American States – have issued declarations recommending that all member-states aim for 30 percent women in all political bodies (Krook 2006). Yet, national campaigns interact in a number of ways with international and transnational trends. In some post-conflict societies, international actors play a direct role in pressing for the adoption of quotas for women (Corrin 2001; Norris 2007). In other countries, campaigns develop locally, prior to international conferences establishing the legitimacy of quotas as a measure to increase women’s representation, as women’s groups and transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) share information on quota strategies across national borders (Lubertino Beltrán 1992; Russell 2005). As such, international events provide leverage to domestic campaigns already in progress, rather than as initial inspirations for these campaigns (Araújo and García Quesada 2006; Bauer and Britton 2006). Lastly, in rare instances, international actors turn out to be pivotal to the rejection, rather than the promotion, of quotas, despite the mobilization of local women’s groups and transnational activists in support of these measures (Hall and True 2008).

Examining these accounts together points to four types of actors involved in quota campaigns, as well as at least seven motivations for quota reform. The latter encompass a range of normative and pragmatic considerations, like principled stands, electoral considerations, empty gestures, promotion of other ends, extension of representational guarantees, international pressure, and transnational learning (Krook 2009). In most cases, quota adoption is the result of a combination of incentives, pursued by
multiple groups of actors who support reform for various and often conflicting reasons. Individual case studies identify a number of common alliances, demonstrating how actors often come together within and across civil society, the state, and the international and transnational spheres. One joins women in civil society and women in the state, who both take principled stands on the need for increased female representation. Examples include campaigns that mobilize women’s movement organizations and/or women inside political parties, who work with members of women’s policy agencies to support quota reform (Kittilson 2006; Lovenduski 2005). A second brings together women in civil society and men in the state. While civil society groups generally assume principled stands, elites typically espouse quotas for pragmatic reasons: they respond to electoral considerations, make empty gestures, promote other political ends, or extend representational guarantees (Htun and Jones 2002).

A third alliance occurs between women in civil society and various kinds of transnational actors. Both groups are generally inspired by principled concerns, but transnational actors are also interested in transnational sharing, which may occur via regional networks (Araújo and García Quesada 2006; Tripp, Konaté, and Lowe Morna 2006), as well as international meetings of party federations (Russell 2005). A fourth coalition links women in civil society with global and regional international organizations. While both sets of actors are committed to gender quotas for principled reasons, international organizations also exert international pressure, an effective tactic when states are sensitive to international scrutiny and seek to foster perceptions of domestic legitimacy (Ellerby 2009). A fifth partnership connects women in civil society across two or more countries, who espouse similar normative beliefs regarding the need to increase the numbers of women in elected office. However, their interest in exchanging information on concrete strategies for adopting quotas means that they are also motivated by a need for transnational sharing. These groups often organize sessions during meetings of regional and global organizations, but they also frequently initiate their own contacts by planning conferences, arranging personal visits, and circulating memos (Lubertino Beltrán 1992). In some cases, their contacts are
facilitated through financial and logistical assistance from national and transnational research centers. Opening up the investigation to explore and map multiple combinations of actors and motivations thus provides substantial leverage for uncovering paths to policy reform, which are not easily – or accurately – reduced to a single generalizable model of origins, mobilization, and adoption.

**Tracing Quota Adoption: Paths to Electoral Reform**

Recognizing diversity among quota campaigns is important for drawing attention to the multiple sources of quota reform. However, this insight is somewhat limited if it can only be employed to develop descriptive analyses of individual cases. Fortunately, the available case study evidence – garnered from a broad literature review, as well as original research on a large number of cases – provides some clues as to how groups of actors and motivations may vary in systematic ways across countries. The possibilities are suggested, but largely under-theorized, in existing theoretical and empirical work. Models derived from research in comparative politics generally stress the unpredictable nature of policy reform, noting that a series of more or less contingent events contribute to the salience and resonance of new policy ideas, even if activist mobilization and elite bargaining are generally anticipated to occur. Frameworks presented by international relations scholars, in contrast, suggest two main intuitions. Drawing on the insights of the ‘world polity’ and ‘norm cascade’ accounts, the first is that actors and motivations will differ depending on the debate’s location in ‘world time.’ The second, suggested implicitly by the ‘boomerang’ and ‘spiral’ models, is that actors and incentives for policy reform will vary according to a country’s position of power in world politics. Models derived from comparative politics help flesh out these two accounts, highlighting the multiple streams of ideas and opportunities for policy change, as well as the internal processes of lobbying and bargaining that inform patterns of decision-making.
Effects of ‘World Time’

The concept of ‘world time’ was initially used by Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) to explain the presence of multiple paths to economic development. Analyzing trends in industrialization, he argued that the rate of adoption of innovative technology takes place slowly among early innovators, because they must themselves create the technology, but occurs much more quickly among later innovators, because the technology already exists and they can simply adopt or elaborate on the earlier technology. In other words, the potential for learning means that historical events leading to a given outcome in one country may change the causal ‘prerequisites’ for similar shifts to take place later in other countries. This notion has strong affinities with ‘world polity’ ideas about the slow emergence of cultural models from domestic contexts, which are developed and disseminated by international organizations as new standards of ‘modernity.’ Taking a global perspective on patterns in policy adoption, therefore, uncovers how the relative importance of particular causal factors may vary systematically over time, via a set of linked processes affecting the rate and events leading up to policy change. More specifically, whereas domestic actors and motivations will prevail in cases of early adoption, international and transnational pressures will grow in importance over time.

An event history analysis of the diffusion of women’s suffrage provides support for this account. Examining 133 countries from 1890 to 1990, the authors discover two patterns. Between 1890 and 1930, the granting of suffrage occurred sporadically and could be explained primarily with reference to national factors like Western status, the extent of welfare state provision, and a high number of national women’s political organizations. Between 1930 and 1980, however, countries with suffrage increased steadily and its passage was associated more with non-Western status and international factors like participation in the International Suffrage Alliance and regional and global changes in the percentage of countries where women had the right to vote (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997). In the process, suffrage for women was transformed from a rare event into a taken-for-granted feature of national
Stated in the language of ‘norm cascades,’ a point is reached where a ‘critical mass’ of states adopts a policy innovation, causing a large proportion of other states to follow suit. Temporal location, nonetheless, may also limit the possibilities for political learning: while later campaigns have knowledge of tactics devised and employed during earlier campaigns, these strategies may not be as effective in the new context without some modifications.

These patterns suggest that debates that unfold at earlier points in the global diffusion process are likely to witness a larger role played by actors in civil society and the state, while discussions at later moments will see greater involvement by international and transnational actors. As a result, the specific normative and pragmatic motivations will also vary, in light of distinct reference points for framing each set of debates. A closer look at quota campaigns across countries and over time confirms this intuition.

Viewing global developments, Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall (2005) discern two routes to women’s increased representation: the ‘incremental track,’ where numbers grow gradually over the course of many years, and the ‘fast track,’ where dramatic gains can take place virtually overnight. The first path, they argue, describes Scandinavian countries, where quotas were largely adopted at the end of this trajectory, as a means for women to prevent future decreases. The second is more in line with much of the rest of the world, where quotas are introduced when women’s numbers are relatively low, sparking jumps in the proportions of women elected. In other words, the ‘technology’ of quotas, broadly speaking, took many years to develop. Once the use of this technology was publicized, however, it soon spread around the world, with international and transnational actors pointing to the experiences of the Nordic countries as a means to justify quota adoption in other cases (Krook 2006). In the course of the diffusion process, many actors erroneously attributed high numbers of women in politics in this region to the application of gender quotas (Phillips 1995), which as noted by several scholars, appeared at the end rather than at the beginning of this process (Freidenvall, Dahlerup, and Skjeie 2006; Krook 2009).
Turning to examples from individual countries, it becomes evident that the first cases where national level quotas were adopted are largely characterized by more contingent processes of policy adoption. All the same, a closer look reveals that, even in these instances, reigning frameworks in comparative politics do not suffice for explaining the developments leading up to quota reform. India was the first country to reserve seats for women. During the period of British rule, the Government of India Act (1935) included women among 15 groups guaranteed seats in the federal legislature. The Simon Commission set up in 1927 to draft this act was divided on the question of women’s political rights. While all major political groupings agreed in principle to women’s suffrage and eligibility, the British committee members and one section of the women’s movement supported special franchise qualifications and reservation of seats for women, while the nationalist movement and another section of the women’s movement strongly opposed any mechanisms that would not provide for universal suffrage and would recognize divisions among the population (Everett 1979).

The former claimed that women would not be able to win election without reserved seats, while the latter argued that women should stand for election on the same terms as men because legislators should rise above their personal identities to consider the country’s best interests. For similar reasons, nationalists viewed reserved seats for all groups – including Anglo-Indians, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, and ‘depressed classes’ – as a strategy for creating divisions within the movement. Their suspicions stemmed in part from the fact that communal representation of this type was central to the British colonial system (Reynolds 2005). Concluding that reservations were tactics to perpetuate British control (Jenkins 1999), they objected to special rights for any groups, and following independence, reserved seats for women were eliminated. Quota debates in India, therefore, largely took place among civil society, party, and state officials. Yet, the context of colonialism is crucial for understanding the origins of these proposals and their mixed reception among domestic policy actors. The continued importance of international and transnational influences can be seen, in turn, in policies adopted in other countries
in the wake of the Indian experience. After partition, seats were reserved for women in Pakistan, and upon independence from Pakistan, seats were reserved for women in Bangladesh (Krook 2009).

The benefits of a ‘multi-faceted’ approach can also be seen in Argentina, the first state to adopt a legislative gender quota. For several years in the 1950s, the governing Peronist Party (PJ) applied a 30 percent quota for women in elective positions. The record numbers of women in parliament, however, soon dropped, following a coup, and political instability over the next decades left women largely under-represented. Although the return to democracy in 1983 did not bring a change to this status quo, it did create new opportunities for women to connect with other women’s groups around the globe. Through contacts with women in similar political parties, as well as at national, regional, and international women’s conferences, they soon became familiar with attempts in Europe and elsewhere in Latin America to institute quotas for women in politics (Lubertino Beltrán 1992). These examples inspired women inside the parties and across civil society to lobby for a gender quota law, which eventually passed due to combined pressure from women’s groups and from then-President Carlos Saúl Menem.

Despite origins in transnational sharing, however, this particular law was in fact unusual in international perspective in that it was a national quota law, rather than a quota embedded in political party statutes. A bill was introduced in the Senate in 1989 and passed nearly unanimously in 1990, revising Article 60 of the National Electoral Code to institute a 30 percent gender quota. The vote took place in near silence, according to one insider, because most Senators were certain that the bill would be rejected or would expire before it could be addressed in the Chamber of Deputies (Durrieu 1999). One year later, the bill was submitted to the lower house, following extensive mobilization by female legislators, party activists, and journalists. On the day of the vote, women held a “vigil for the quota” (Chama 2001, 65), holding a demonstration in the square outside and occupying the parliamentary galleries and hallways until 2 AM, when the president finally instructed the interior minister to give a speech supporting the measure and instruct his party’s deputies, the majority of legislators, to vote in
favor of the bill. This move shifted the position of deputies from the other parties who were no longer comfortable opposing the measure on their own (Chama 2001; Durrieu 1999). At 3 AM, the measure again passed nearly unanimously (Krook 2009). Debates over quotas in Argentina, therefore, primarily developed among civil society, party, and state officials, stretching back in one party as far as the 1950s. Nonetheless, opportunities for transnational sharing played a crucial role in inspiring the later quota campaign. The success of this measure, in turn, transformed Argentina into a regional model, informing efforts leading to the adoption of similar 30 percent quota laws in 14 other countries in Latin America.  

Later campaigns for national level quotas, in contrast, tend to witness a larger role played by international and transnational actors. There is clear evidence of learning and even direct intervention by international actors. All the same, simple accounts of policy diffusion miss out on important aspects of how the adoption of gender quotas is shaped in important ways by politics ‘on the ground.’ One of the most successful reserved seats provisions, as gauged by the overall numbers of women elected, is Rwanda, where women now occupy 56 percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009). The origins of the 30 percent reserved seats policy can be traced by to the 1994 genocide, which brought the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to power after many years of exile in countries like Uganda. Inspired by experiences there, where seats had been reserved for women in parliament since 1987, and contacts with South Africa’s African National Congress, which had adopted a 30 percent party quota in 1994, the RPF pursued a series of measures to guarantee women’s representation. Influenced by the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, calling on member states to ensure women’s participation in post-conflict regimes, a new constitution was drafted and came into force in 2003, which set aside 24 seats for women in the 80-member lower

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2 A 30 percent quota law was passed in Colombia, but has never been applied to legislative elections on the grounds that it would be “impossible” to do so (taking advantage of a crucial ‘escape clause’ written into the law). The quota law in Venezuela was deemed unconstitutional in 2000, but was reintroduced to some extent in 2004, when the National Electoral council passed a resolution recommending that parties ensure female representation on electoral lists at all levels.
house. Open elections in each province resulted in the election of 15 additional women in 2003 and 21
in 2008. In this case, therefore, international and transnational influences played a central role in quota
adoption. Nonetheless, women’s networks did mobilize for the inclusion of women’s concerns into the
new constitution (Longman 2006), and as early as 2001, the government had created a triple-balloting
system at the district level, where voters cast one vote each for a general ballot, a women’s ballot, and a
youth ballot. These initiatives did not simply replicate measures operating elsewhere, but reflected a
certain degree of local innovation (Krook 2006), powered by civil society, party, and state actors.

In other instances, the impact of international and transnational actors is even more direct. The
first is especially apparent in the case of Kosovo, where the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assumed responsibility for
promoting democracy and human rights following the end of war in 1999. In 2000, they introduced a 30
percent quota on lists for local and national elections, reproducing a provision adopted in Bosnia several
months earlier (Corrin 2001). Although the policy in Bosnia was shaped by extensive contact with local
and transnational women’s groups (Lokar 2003), UNMIK did not hold any meetings in Kosovo before
passing the quota regulation, provoking strong resistance among international officials and local male
leaders. Opposition to the measure was overcome to some degree by strong support from the OSCE and
women’s groups, who worked to ensure that the quota was applied. In a series of recent reforms, the
role of transnational learning is increasingly clear, as evidence by similarities in the language of various
quota laws and supporting legislation around the world. In Portugal, for example, a legislative quota was
approved in 2006 stipulating that all lists must have a minimum of 33% of the under-represented sex. If
parties do not comply, they will receive a public reprimand and be subject to a reduction in their public
subsidies. The procedure outlined very closely resembles the language of the quota law in Mexico, with
elements of the French law also integrated into the text (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires forthcoming).
Along similar lines, recent changes to a draft bill in Liberia incorporate language and insights from a
range of other countries’ experiences (Bacon 2009). Taken together, these developments suggest that while actors in civil society and the state continue to play a role, international and transnational factors have increased in importance, meaning that when campaigns begin in ‘world time’ is likely to shape the actors and motivations involved in electoral reform.

**Power and World Politics**

Questions of timing are related to, but distinct from, issues of power in global processes of policy diffusion. Although rarely theorized, the structure of the ‘boomerang’ and ‘spiral’ models implies that some countries may be more vulnerable than others to international and transnational pressures for policy reform. In particular, these frameworks and many of their applications assume a target country that is in a relatively weaker position, whether political in the case of non-democracies or economic in the case of developing states. Yet, the failure to explicitly consider questions of power limits the ability of scholars, as Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall argue, to “understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates” (2005, 41). In their view, attention to the multiple ways in which power may operate is crucial for analyzing trends in global governance. These dynamics intersect with socially constructed hierarchies among countries, which may be categorized – often implicitly, but sometimes explicitly – as higher or lower in the ranks of “civilized” states (Keene 2007, 311). While such distinctions may be problematic from a moral point of view, they matter theoretically for comprehending why some states are able to ignore, while others are compelled to follow, various new standards set by international organizations. More specifically, countries in more powerful positions may have greater leeway than those who are less powerful to decide whether or not to adopt a particular policy innovation. The implication, in turn, is that national level factors will play a larger role when powerful states pass reforms, as compared with less powerful ones, where international and transnational pressures will be greater.
Several studies illustrate these dynamics. In a book examining similarities and differences in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, with respect to state policies on abortion, divorce, and gender equality in the family, Mala Htun (2003) finds that all three countries granted women greater rights in marriage, but only one legalized divorce, and none liberalized abortion. A key factor explaining these trends is the presence of military governments, which the case studies reveal have been more likely than democratic governments to confer some of these rights. On the one hand, this is because the military governments that came to power in these countries established various kinds of expert commissions, which advised changes in women’s rights. On the other hand, being a military government also made these leaders more sensitive to the demands of international norms. Many not only came to power with the goal of modernizing their countries, but also perceived a need to legitimize their rule through these kinds of policy concessions. Democratic governments, in contrast, had a more difficult time, precisely because they allow a broader range of voices into policy debates, which in Latin America, has entailed greater involvement by the Catholic Church on issues like divorce and abortion. In addition to such political vulnerabilities, countries may similarly face economic constraints promoting policy reform. In these instances, financial incentives may shape the priorities of governments, who have adopted and quickly implemented new international policy approaches like ‘gender mainstreaming,’ which require them to consider the gendered implications of all public policies (Rai 2003). Sources of funding also influence the tactics of civil society activists. In Mexico, for example, a campaign against pregnancy screening in the maquiladoras outwardly accepted international policy frames like labor and human rights, recognizing that it would give activists on the ground access to the substantial resources of foreign NGOs. However, campaigners grafted these ideas onto local struggles using frames like economic rights and social justice as a means to foster support among female factory workers at the heart of these debates (Hertel 2006).

These discussions indicate that proposals for reserved seats and legislative quotas are unlikely to be initiated in more powerful countries, and when they are, domestic actors and incentives will assume
a more central role, even if international and transnational influences are present. Conversely, countries with less power will be more vulnerable to international and transnational pressures to consider quotas, even if civil society and state actors also mobilize for change. Work by Ann Towns (2004) provides some evidence for the validity of these assumptions. Analyzing the global diffusion of women’s suffrage, state bureaucracies for women, and gender quotas, she uncovers – on the basis of extensive content analysis of policy documents and speeches – strong support for the notion of ‘international hierarchy.’ The states that sought to improve their ‘rank’ in world society and were targeted by international organizations for improvement in women’s rights were overwhelmingly poorer countries. Notably, discourses justifying these rights were generally couched in terms of their ability to improve economic development and efficiency. Other scholars refer to this trend as the ‘business case’ for gender equality, or a shift to a type of ‘market feminism’ (Kantola and Squires 2008). This follows a broad reversal in strategy, from earlier programs framing economic development as the key to women’s empowerment, to more recent ones viewing women’s empowerment as an impetus to development. In these processes, gender quotas are seen as a key policy component for broader political and economic change. These discourses have the effect of increasing pressures for developing countries to adopt quotas, while enabling developed countries to largely ignore quota demands, at least when issued by the international community.

One of the most notable examples of the latter trend is the United States, where quotas for women in electoral politics have not entered the realm of public debate, despite their rapid diffusion around the globe. In one sense, this pattern is perplexing from a domestic point of view, given that both major parties have long applied gender quotas for internal party positions, first for party committees and then for party conventions (Baer 2003). Further, many states have redrawn electoral districts in an attempt to maximize the representation of African-Americans and Latinos. Lack of mobilization around quotas can be explained in part by a tendency among U.S. voters to overestimate the percentage of women in Congress (Sanbonmatsu 2003), which is in fact quite low by international standards at 17
percent, as compared to the world average of 18.5 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2009). It may also stem from controversies over affirmative action more generally, which have been used with great effect to remove existing provisions for under-represented groups, particularly in higher education but also in disputes over racial redistricting (Kousser 1999). The key factor, however, appears to be its status as a global hegemon, as evidenced by the country’s patterns of accession to human rights treaties and organizations. For example, the U.S. remains one of the few countries that have not yet ratified the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), putting it in the company of countries like Iran and Qatar and making it the only developed country not to do so, despite having signed the convention in 1980. Further support for this argument can be seen in the attempts by U.S. officials to block the adoption of gender quotas in Iraq, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, in spite of UN Resolution 1325 on the need to promote women’s political representation in post-conflict regimes. Although quotas were eventually incorporated into the new Iraqi electoral law, this was due to substantial grassroots mobilization by women combined with pressure from the British government, a partner in the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) (O’Brien, Krook, and Swip forthcoming).

Along similar lines, the adoption of national level quota policies has been relatively rare across Western Europe, another set of countries with greater ability than others to resist global trends, apart from directives mandated by the European Union. The lack of interest in these types of measures can be attributed, at least to some degree, to the widespread presence of party quotas in the region (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires forthcoming), which in most instances reduce the need for constitutional and legal reform. When national level policies are adopted, however, civil society, party, and state actors tend to play a larger role in quota debates than international and transnational considerations, which are present but to a lesser degree. The ‘technology’ of party quotas first emerged in Western Europe in the 1970s, when they were adopted by several socialist parties, and spread to green parties, social democratic parties, and even conservative parties over the course of the 1980s and 1990s (Kittilson
In contrast, reserved seats have never appeared and legislative quotas are relatively uncommon, with the highest proportion of these measures appearing in Southeastern Europe, not in the West. Interestingly, this pattern still fits the general ‘rule’ in the sense that the Balkan countries have witnessed far greater involvement by international and transnational actors, including the impact of UN Resolution 1325, as a result of the wars stemming from the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia.

Countries where legislative quotas for elected positions do appear are Belgium, France, Portugal, and Spain. In each case, reference is made to developments elsewhere in Europe, but for the most part, debates revolve around questions about how to reconcile demands for quotas with existing political values of equality and representation (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires forthcoming). The key participants and motivations for quota reform are therefore rooted firmly in domestic contexts, engaging women’s groups, political parties, and state officials like presidents and women’s policy agencies (Baum and Espirito Santo 2009; Krook 2007b; Meier 2005; Verge 2008). In contrast, recommendations from EU actors like the Commission or the European Parliament are rarely mentioned, despite longstanding commitments to gender-balanced decision-making (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008).

Countries with a lower ‘rank,’ in contrast, are more likely to adopt reserved seats and legislative quotas, in most instances because they are exposed to outside pressures to pursue quota reform. The presence of local campaigns, as in the case of Kosovo discussed above, is not a prerequisite for change, although there may also be support from actors ‘on the ground.’ The most direct evidence in support of this argument is visible in post-conflict societies, where international and transnational actors have become more heavily involved in electoral processes over the last 25 years. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military invasion in search of Osama bin Laden in 2001 was accompanied by strong politicization of the status of women under the Taliban regime (Hunt 2002). This generated strong pressures for inclusion of women in the transition to a new political system. The UN had been present in the country in the form of the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), which was established in December 1993 following
two peace accords that temporarily ended many years of civil war. After the overthrow of the Taliban, the UN convened the Petersberg Conference in December 2001, whose Agreements mandated that the interim government and the Loya Jirga Commission were to ensure the participation of women in both the new government and parliament. In addition, two women were designated ministers in the interim government and three women were appointed to the Loya Jirga Commission due to massive pressure from UNSMA, the UN, and the U.S. (Bauer 2002; Dahlerup and Nordlund 2004). As a consequence, the new Afghan constitution approved in January 2004 reserved 27 percent of seats for women in the lower house as well as 17 per cent of seats for women in the upper house (Norris 2007). Despite apparent international consensus on the importance of women’s representation, Afghan women themselves were divided as to the desirability of quotas: many women inside Afghanistan viewed quotas as unrealizable and even dangerous, while many women in the Afghan exile community demanded quotas as a measure to ensure women’s participation in the new regime (Bauer 2002; O’Brien, Krook, and Swip forthcoming).

Another example of these trends is Iraq, where international and transnational influences were more diverse and were met by stronger interest among women in civil society. The policy has its roots in the U.S. invasion, but unlike in Afghanistan, the main motivation for this operation was the removal of Saddam Hussein from power; women’s rights figured little – if at all – in the rhetoric justifying military intervention. Further, on several occasions, U.S. officials explicitly distanced themselves from quotas as a measure to ensure women’s representation in the new regime. They considered quota adoption to be an internal Iraqi issue (Khalil 2004) and believed that women could best be supported through women’s organizations and democracy training (Ciezadlo 2003). However, the British government, a vital coalition partner, supported a 25 per cent quota, as did the UN, while agencies like the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) all provided input into the process of constitutional design (Norris 2007). Further, the three women appointed to the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council actively campaigned for quotas.
(Ballington and Dahlerup 2006). Interestingly, however, they undertook a very internationally-oriented strategy to pursue this aim: one of their key actions was an editorial published in the *New York Times*, in which they urged the U.S. to ensure slots for women in all levels of government and made reference to a wide range of quota debates, including the Nordic countries but also more recent laws implemented in Argentina, India, Uganda, and Rwanda (Khuzai and Chapouk 2003). Similarly, women in civil society were quick to identify quotas as an important issue, organizing a series of conferences and workshops where they debated the merits of quotas and discussed the appropriate percentage of seats (Norris 2007). Yet, many of these meetings were made possible by financial support from international actors, including the CPA and USAID (O’Brien, Krook, and Swip forthcoming). As a result of these campaigns, the constitution approved in 2005 included a 25 per cent target, which was strengthened in the new electoral law passed later that year mandating that every third candidate be a woman. As a group, therefore, these various examples lend strong support to the intuition that structures of inequality in the international system will affect the types of countries that adopt national level quota policies, as well as the relative balance of national, international, and transnational influences on quota debates.

**Conclusions**

Gender quotas constitute some of the widest-reaching electoral reforms of recent years, and their rapid diffusion raises a number of questions for theoretical and empirical analysis. Initial research on their adoption focused on four main explanations for quota reform, related to women’s mobilization, elite strategies, political norms, and international and transnational effects. Noting that none of these accounts suffice to explain all – or even most – cases of quota adoption, the paper approaches quotas as a global phenomenon and considers the possibility of causal diversity among campaigns, or the idea that different groups of factors may produce the same outcome of quota adoption. However, variations are not infinite: actors and motivations tend to combine in systematic ways over time and across countries.
The paper builds the case for this argument by presenting an overview of models of policy adoption in research in comparative politics and international relations. Together, they suggest four categories of actors, operating in civil society, the state, and the international and transnational spheres. Linked to research on gender quotas, this suggests multiple potential actors and motivations for quota adoption. While this ‘multi-faceted’ approach does not require that all actors are relevant in the same ways across all quota campaigns, keeping a broader set of possibilities in mind facilitates comparisons and has the advantage of drawing attention to actors that might otherwise be overlooked. This model proposes that efforts to understand the origins and decisions behind policy reform should consider whether (1) civil society actors generate and mobilize in favor of new policy proposals, (2) state actors initiate or respond to pressures for policy adoption, (3) international actors serve as ‘teachers’ and enforcers of new policy ideas, and (4) transnational actors step in as cross-national policy entrepreneurs and advocates.

To give more structure to this account, however, two further points are developed. Integrating intuitions that are often implied, but rarely theorized, in existing models of policy adoption, the paper proposes two ways in which actors and motivations may vary in systematic ways, related to (1) the debate’s location in ‘world time’ and (2) a country’s structural position in ‘world society.’ The prediction is that quota proposals that unfold at earlier points in the global diffusion process are likely to witness a larger role played by actors in civil society and the state, while debates at later moments will see greater involvement by those in the international and transnational realm. As a result, normative and pragmatic considerations for reform are likely to vary, given the more local versus more global framing of each set of debates. Similarly, countries with a greater degree of power – or higher ‘rank’ – in the international system are more likely to be able to resist reform. When they do adopt national level quotas, domestic factors will tend to play a larger role, even if international and transnational influences are present. Conversely, countries with less power – or lower ‘rank’ – will be more vulnerable to international and transnational pressures to approve quotas, even if civil society and state actors also mobilize for change.
The aim of this exercise is to provide a better understanding of individual quota debates, while also moving beyond more descriptive analyses to offer a more substantive theory of policy diffusion and reform.

While elaborated with reference to national gender quotas, this ‘multi-faceted’ approach offers new insights into the politics of electoral reform more generally. Asking scholars to consider a broader range of actors and motivations not only enables more structured comparisons across cases. It also presents an opportunity to contextualize local developments within a broader universe of campaigns and reforms over time and place, thereby signaling broad similarities – or unusual features or events – across individual instances of reform. The ability to better situate case studies, in turn, contributes to the broader project of theory-building with respect to electoral change. The spread of quota policies to diverse countries around the globe provides an excellent test of the validity of this framework, as these campaigns offer a greater amount of data than other types of electoral reform. Nonetheless, it can be applied in a relatively straightforward manner to many other examples, which may be less numerous but subject to similar trends and pressures. In addition, the approach outlined in this paper presents a new perspective on the dynamics and processes of policy diffusion. Building on existing models from research in comparative politics and international relations, it theorizes in a more systematic manner how various actors and motivations may come together for policy reform. This provides structure to the analysis, while still recognizing that there are important elements of contingency and the factors that combine in one campaign may be different from those at work in another. The framework presented here thus reveals the benefits of thinking across traditional subfield divides to develop and apply new theories of policy adoption and diffusion.
References


Table 1. Reserved Seats for Women in National Parliaments (as of January 1, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year Adopted</th>
<th>Women in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>27% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh(^1)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15% (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11% (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea(^2)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>22% (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6% (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7% (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11% (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan(^3)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>21% (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>56% (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>18% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania(^4)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>30% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda(^5)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>30% (2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Legislative Quotas for Women in National Parliaments (as of January 1, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year Adopted</th>
<th>Women in Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>27% (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>40% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>35% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>14% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>31% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20% (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>29% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>23% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>11% (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>26% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>25% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>30-50</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>18% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>17% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>17% (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29% (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Must include women</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>23% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21% (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20% (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>36% (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18% (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>19% (2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Krook (2009, 227-238).
*Does not include quotas adopted since January 1, 2008, or policies that were adopted and subsequently overturned.
Notes to Tables

1 Earlier reserved seats adopted in Bangladesh include a 5% policy in 1972 (for 10 years), a 10% policy in 1978 (for 15 years), and a 10% in 1990 (for 10 years). Although separate elections were not organized, the 2004 provision was allocated to parties in 2004 and 2005 based on the proportion of the vote they won in 2001.

2 An earlier reserved seats policy set aside 10% of seats for women in Eritrea.


4 Earlier reserved seats adopted in Tanzania include a 6% policy in 1961, 15% policies in 1975 and 1995, a 20% policy in 1996, and a 20-30% policy in 1999.

5 Earlier reserved seats adopted in Uganda include a 13% policy in 1989 and a 14% policy in 1995.

6 An earlier law passed in 1999 required parties to include at least 5% women. Both laws apply only to the proportional representation list-component of the mixed electoral system.

7 An earlier law passed in 1994 required parties to include 33% women.

8 An earlier regulation passed in 1955 stated that an ‘appropriate’ and increasing proportion of women should be elected; this commitment was emphasized again in 1992 to read that the proportion of female deputies should not be lower in current than in earlier congresses.

9 An earlier law passed in 1997 required parties to include 25% women.

10 An earlier law passed in 1997 required parties to include 20% women.

11 An earlier law was included as part of a new equality law passed in 2000.

12 This regulation applies only to elections by proportional representation in the mixed electoral system. In addition, the law recommends that parties include 30% women among their candidates in single member districts.

13 The regulation varies according to the magnitude of each district: in constituencies with two members, all party lists must include one candidate of each sex; when there are three members, lists must include at least one woman; when there are more than three members, each group of four candidates must include equal numbers of women and men.

14 An earlier law passed in 1996 ‘recommended’ that parties include 30% women.

15 The interim constitution approved in 2007 required parties to include 33% women, half fielded on closed party lists and half in open elections. The resulting assembly will be charged with the task of writing a new constitution, which may or may not include gender quotas.

16 An earlier law passed in 1997 required parties to include 25% women.

17 The Constitution of 1986 provided that half of all seats elected by proportion representation lists must be filled by labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth.