

**THE POLITICS OF GROUP REPRESENTATION:
QUOTAS FOR WOMEN AND MINORITIES WORLDWIDE**

Mona Lena Krook (*Contact Author)
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1063
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
United States
mlkrook@wustl.edu
Cell phone: (314) 935-5807
Fax: (617) 496-4640

and

Diana Z. O'Brien
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
Campus Box 1063
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
United States
dzobrien@wustl.edu

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Abstract

Countries around the world have established quotas for the representation of women and minorities in electoral politics. Despite parallels in their forms and goals, empirical studies on provisions for each group have developed largely in isolation from one another. Drawing on normative arguments often made to justify such measures, we outline three hypotheses – selection, hierarchy, and competition – which we find do not account for empirical patterns in how, where, and when groups receive guarantees. Working inductively, we propose an alternative explanation that highlights the importance of two types of ‘repertoires’ of group representation: (1) historical practices with regard to group recognition, and (2) transnational influences in the form of international pressure and information sharing. We evaluate these hypotheses through case studies of four countries where proposals have been made for women and minorities and conclude that quotas are the product of vivid struggles over what kinds of identities ‘deserve’ recognition.

In recent years, a growing number of countries have established quotas to increase the representation of women and minorities in electoral politics. Policies for women now exist in more than one hundred countries. Individual political parties have adopted many of these provisions, but more than half involve legal or constitutional reforms requiring that all parties select a certain proportion of female candidates (Krook 2009). Policies for minorities, in comparison, are currently present in more than thirty countries (Reynolds 2005). These measures generally set aside seats that members of other groups are not eligible to contest. Despite parallels in their forms and goals, empirical studies on quotas for each group have developed largely in isolation from one another. The absence of comparative analysis is striking, given that many normative arguments treat women and minorities together in arguments for increased descriptive representation. Further, many scholars generalize from the experiences of one group to make claims about the other, assuming that women and minorities present analogous challenges to the goal of fair and equal representation. The intuition behind these analogies, despite the lack of cross-group comparative research, is that women and minorities have been similarly excluded from positions of political power based on ascriptive characteristics like sex and ethnicity. The concern is that these dynamics deny the central role of these groups in society, as well as undermine basic democratic values of inclusion. As such, many argue, the participation of both women and minorities should be actively promoted as a means for reversing these historical trends.

In this article, we examine the assumptions implicit in this literature to explore their leverage in explaining the quota policies implemented to ensure the presence of women and minorities in national parliaments around the world. We begin in the first section by outlining three normative arguments often made to justify such measures, which we transform into three hypotheses for empirical investigation: (1) both women and minorities will receive representational guarantees, (2) women or minorities will receive guarantees, and (3) women will receive guarantees in some

countries, while minorities will receive them in others. We find the strongest confirmation for the third hypothesis, but note that its related expectation – that differences in the nature of these group identities will lead women to gain legislative quotas and minorities reserved seats – is not supported by actual patterns in group guarantees. To better understand the links between identities and measures, we substitute a more inductive approach in the second section, where we generate a fourth hypothesis: group recognition¹ emerges through the active construction of ‘relevant’ political identities, which are framed in the process as innately or historically important. To theorize how and why groups receive guarantees when and where they do, we introduce the concept of ‘repertoires’ of group representation, which we argue have two sources: (1) historical practices with regard to group recognition, and (2) transnational influences in the form of international pressure and information sharing. After reviewing the evidence for historical and transnational repertoires, we evaluate the relative validity of the four hypotheses in the third section through a more detailed examination of four cases where proposals have been made for both women and minorities. We then conclude with some implications of these findings for future research on the politics of group representation.

Analyzing Group Representation

The normative literature on group recognition centers largely on developing arguments for the increased descriptive representation of marginalized groups, which are often but not always linked to its anticipated effects on their improved substantive representation. Descriptive representation is attained when elected officials ‘mirror’ the broad spectrum of ascriptive characteristics present in the population. Substantive representation, on the other hand, is achieved when office-holders promote public policies that reflect the needs and preferences of the various

¹ We use the terms ‘representation’ and ‘recognition’ interchangeably in this manuscript in order to avoid repetition, although we realize some normative literature treats these terms as related to, but distinct from, one another.

groups within the electorate as a whole (cf. Pitkin 1967). Although some of this literature does not address quota policies specifically, but speaks instead to other mechanisms of group recognition like federalism and group autonomy, in most discussions women and minorities are treated as facing analogous challenges, and thus needing similar justifications, for increased representation. A closer look at these arguments and their applications, however, reveals at least three distinct approaches to sex and ethnicity as political identities: one emphasizes common features of the experiences of women and minorities, a second recognizes similarities but places identities in a hierarchy of importance, and a third theorizes that they require distinct modes of recognition that lead them to compete – implicitly or explicitly – for group recognition. While developed with reference to normative standards, this work can be transformed into three hypotheses for empirical examination: (1) women and minorities will both receive representational guarantees, (2) women or minorities will receive guarantees, and (3) women will receive guarantees in some countries, while minorities will receive them in others.

The Selection Hypothesis

Scholars in the first school of thought concentrate on devising criteria for selecting which groups require improved descriptive representation. They focus primarily on features that are shared across these groups, even when they recognize that membership in these groups constitute different facets of identity or experience. In her “theory of fair representation,” for example, Melissa Williams outlines four characteristics that can be used to identify the “marginalized ascriptive groups” that have strong claims to increased descriptive representation. These include groups where (1) patterns of social and political inequality are structured along the lines of group membership; (2) membership is not usually experienced as voluntary; (3) membership is not usually experienced as mutable; and (4) negative meanings are generally assigned to group identity by the broader society or the

dominant culture (Williams 1998, 15-16). By way of illustration, she states: “In the United States African Americans and women offer paradigmatic examples of historically marginalized ascriptive groups...if *any* marginalized groups have strong moral claims for recognition, these two groups must be among them” (Williams 1998, 17, emphasis in original). While she acknowledges that women and minorities may differ as identity groups stemming from distinct histories of exclusion, she views sex and race as presenting analogous challenges to liberal theories of political representation.

Iris Marion Young (1990) makes a similar set of points. In her work, she contends that “all oppressed people suffer some inhibition in their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings,” groups which include “women, Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, American Indians, Jews, lesbians, gay men, Arabs, Asians, old people, working-class people, and the physically and mentally disabled” (Young 1990, 40). Advocating a more comprehensive view of oppression, she argues that “many different groups must be said to be oppressed in our society, and [thus]...no single form of oppression can be assigned causal or moral primacy” (Young 1990, 42). All the same, she recognizes that members of these distinct groups do not experience “oppression” in the same way, but instead through various “faces” that include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. For Young, the presence of at least one of these conditions suffices for calling a group “oppressed,” and thus in need of improved group representation. Therefore, despite her focus on the multi-faceted nature of oppression, she treats these groups as identities along a continuum of exclusion that share common challenges in their efforts to attain greater voice in political processes.

The selection approach thus focuses on developing a common set of criteria for determining which groups require increased descriptive representation, which scholars have in turn used to devise longer and shorter lists of the groups that qualify. These arguments can be translated into the expectation that, in cases where groups are recognized, both women and minorities will receive

representational guarantees. At first glance, this hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the empirical evidence: many of the groups singled out by these authors are indeed among those guaranteed representation around the world. These include identities based on sex, language, religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, caste, age, expatriation, profession, domicile, and ability (see Appendix). Upon further inspection, however, there are few countries where the same range of groups is recognized; instead, the identities that are granted some measure of group representation vary enormously across cases. Further, despite beliefs about commonalities between groups, most countries recognize *either* women *or* minorities: only sixteen countries have enacted measures guaranteeing legislative representation for both types of identity groups. It is thus more the exception than the rule that women and minorities are seen as presenting similar challenges, or reflecting similar criteria, for group representation. Rather, these patterns intimate that something beyond objective criteria are driving the political recognition of different kinds of identity groups.

The Hierarchy Hypothesis

A second group of theorists acknowledges similarities between sex and other identities as categories that structure patterns of inequality, but implicitly or explicitly prioritize one group to the exclusion of the other. Will Kymlicka (1995) offers one example of this approach in his work on multiculturalism. Initially, he states that “an adequate theory of the rights of cultural minorities must...be compatible with the just demands of disadvantaged social groups” – which he defines as including “women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled” – because “there are important analogies between the claims of justice made by these social movements and the claims of ethnic groups, since both have been excluded and marginalized in virtue of their ‘difference’” (Kymlicka 1995, 19). To justify his focus on minority cultures, however, he goes on to qualify this point by excluding these groups from consideration, on the grounds that “there is a sense in which gays and lesbians, women,

and the disabled form separate cultures within the larger society. But this is very different from the sense in which the Quebecois form a separate culture within Canada, and it is important to keep these different senses of culture (and ‘multiculturalism’) in mind” (Kymlicka 1995, 19). The important distinction for Kymlicka, in turn, becomes one between national minorities and ethnic groups. However, at the same time that he gives emphasis to these groups over “new social movements” – whose members he acknowledges have often been marginalized within their own national societies or ethnic groups – he also suggests that closer examination of minority cultures can shed light on the plight of these other groups.

The hierarchy perspective thus postulates a rank-order of political cleavages, which makes some groups more likely than others to gain provisions for group representation. Taking the form of a hypothesis, this approach suggests that either women or minorities will receive representational guarantees. This intuition is borne out by the evidence, but not in the way that advocates might expect. In most instances, one identity is recognized to the exclusion of the other. However, the group in question varies significantly across cases: thirty-four countries make provisions only to women, while twenty-one countries have passed policies that apply only to minorities. In addition, as previously noted, sixteen countries employ measures for both women and minorities. Together, these patterns undermine the argument that some identities are more likely to be recognized than others. Instead, they point to the possibility that attention to certain groups over others may derive from factors specific to the political context of each country, rather than the intrinsic importance of particular identities.

The Competition Hypothesis

A final set of scholars also addresses multiple groups, but with the intention of exploring differences among these identities that in some cases lead them to compete for recognition. At the

heart of these arguments is the notion that the under-representation of women and minorities may pose related but separate challenges to state integration. Anne Phillips (1995) observes that women tend to be promoted through party quotas, while minorities benefit from the redrawing of electoral districts, which she attributes to sensible political strategy: women are distributed evenly across the population, while minority groups are often more geographically concentrated. These strategies, however, are not necessarily complementary. In discussing justifications for a “politics of presence,” Phillips emphasizes that “equality does *not* require proportionality according to each and every characteristic ... [rather the] case for a different system of representation depends on more historically specific analysis of the existing arrangements for representation and the existing conditions of political exclusion” (Phillips 1995, 46-47). For Jane Mansbridge (1999), such measures can be justified in only four situations, in contexts of group mistrust, uncrystallized interests, history suggesting inability to rule, and low de facto legitimacy. Which identities are recognized is an open question that must be resolved on a case-by-case basis: “because there are always costs to privileging any one characteristic than enhances accurate substantive representation over others, voters and institutional designers alike must balance those benefits over the costs” (Mansbridge 1999, 652).

Consequently, the competition approach theorizes that the differing historical grounds for exclusion cause groups to implicitly or explicitly compete for political representation, given the need to weigh the costs and benefits of group recognition. Differences in their distribution, as well as the nature of sex and ethnicity as political cleavages, will in turn lead women and minorities to demand distinct mechanisms for improving their political presence (cf. Bird 2003; Htun 2004). Framed in general terms, this perspective anticipates that women will receive guarantees in some countries, while minorities will receive them in others. Moreover, where these measures do appear, they will tend to take different forms. The evidence, as already reviewed, largely confirms this hypothesis: thirty-four countries have passed policies only for women, while twenty-one have approved them

only for minorities and sixteen have made provisions for both groups. Yet, the data do not support the second half of the argument. While most policies for women entail legislative quotas, and those for minorities tend to involve reserved seats, women have been granted reserved seats in nineteen countries, including past measures which have since been repealed, while minorities have received quotas in at least one. Further, where both women and minorities are guaranteed representation, measures are distinct across groups in eight countries, but also similar across groups in eight. These patterns appear to be driven by variations in policies for women, which correlate highly with world region. The policies pursued in each case may subsequently have less to do with features of these identities, and more to do with country- and region-specific ‘repertoires’ of group representation.

Politicizing Group Representation

While the primary purpose of the literature on group recognition is to develop normative standards, it often informs – and is informed by – evidence from individual cases. Yet, the three hypotheses derived from this work do not appear to match empirical patterns of quota adoption around the world. To gain better leverage on links between identities and measures to ensure descriptive representation, we substitute an inductive approach to map and compare quota policies around the globe in order to theorize why, when, and where groups receive guarantees. This data points to an alternative hypothesis: group recognition emerges through the construction of ‘relevant’ political identities, which are framed in the process as innately or historically important. This perspective highlights the politically contested origins behind the identities that are recognized, as well as how and when their representation is guaranteed.

The argument that group recognition emerges in the course of political debate, or as a result of political calculations, has been recognized by some scholars. Daniel N. Posner (2004) finds a relationship between the salience of ethnicity and the extent to which this group identity can be

mobilized to gain electoral support. The work on affirmative action outside the realm of electoral politics explains the adoption of such measures in terms of the need to align groups in support of a particular regime (Galanter 1984), or emphasize a country's "highest ideals" and "most significant identities" (Dobrowolsky and Hart 2003, 2). Therefore, given this diversity in motivations and incentives, the groups that are recognized can be expected to, and do, vary significantly across states. These dynamics are not always evident when scholars analyze events in single countries, but quickly become apparent when developments across several countries are compared.

A comparative lens suggests, in turn, that there is no "right remedy" (cf. Htun 2004, 450) when it comes to forms of group recognition, with women receiving legislative quotas and minorities getting reserved seats. While this pattern is true of many countries, substantial variations in the types of policies granted to women signal another possibility, namely that these choices stem instead from nation- and region-specific repertoires of group representation. In research on social movements, 'repertoires' refer to "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice," which constitute "the established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive claims bearing on each other's interests" (Tilly 1995, 42, 43). They thus constitute a set of measures that political actors employ, consciously or unconsciously, to make their actions understood in relation to already legitimized political practices. Because debates over group representation are embedded in specific national contexts, prevailing repertoires are likely to guide decision-making with regard to the particular measures that are adopted, or not, in the course of group recognition. Based on patterns in the adoption of representational guarantees for both women and minorities, we theorize that these repertoires have two sources: (1) historical practices with regard to group representation and (2) transnational influences in the form of international pressure and information sharing.

Repertoires for Representing Women

Policies to promote women have been implemented in more than one hundred countries around the world, but exist at the statutory level in fifty states. A survey of these policies reveals no systematic patterns in terms of their adoption: gender quotas appear in all major world regions in countries with a broad range of institutional, social, economic, and cultural characteristics. At the same time, the mere application of these measures has not led to a uniform rise in the proportion of women elected: some countries witness strong increases following quota adoption, while others see more modest changes or even setbacks in the percentage of women elected to national assemblies (Krook 2009). These outcomes stem from the fact that most quota policies apply to the proportion of candidates, rather than to the final number of women elected. This feature introduces a number of intervening factors between the adoption of quotas and their impact on the election of more women to political office, including variations in the language and requirements of quota policies (Schmidt and Saunders 2004), the ‘fit’ between quotas and existing institutional frameworks (Matland 2006), and the balance of actors for and against quota implementation (Jones 2004).

Closer examination of the types of policies adopted, as well as where and when they appear, provides initial support for the notion of repertoires of group representation. In contrast to those for minorities, which tend to appear as reserved seats, measures to increase the number of women in politics take three different forms: reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas. These policies vary with regard to how they promote women’s access, as well as where they appear geographically. Reserved seats set aside places for women in political assemblies that men are not eligible to contest. This proportion is usually very low, often less than ten percent, although recent policies reserve as many thirty percent of all seats for women. These measures are concentrated in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Party quotas, in contrast, are voluntary pledges by political parties to include a certain proportion of women among their candidates. They generally mandate a much higher proportion of

women, usually between twenty-five and fifty percent, but apply only to slates of candidates rather than to the final proportion of women elected. Party quotas appear in parties across the political spectrum and in all regions of the world, but are the most prevalent measure employed in Europe. Legislative quotas, finally, are measures passed by national parliaments requiring that all parties nominate a certain percentage of female candidates. They typically call for women to constitute between twenty-five and fifty percent of all candidates. While legislative quotas are particularly dominant in Latin America, they can also be found in Africa and parts of Europe (Krook 2009).

While many of these measures currently co-exist, their dates of adoption reveal that they are strongly clustered in terms of their introduction over time. Only ten states established policies for women between 1930 and 1980, followed by twelve countries in the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, measures for women appeared in more than fifty countries, which since the year 2000 have been joined by more than forty more (Krook 2006, 312-313). Intersecting with these trends, specific policy types have been prevalent at distinct moments in time. Reserved seats were the main type of quota adopted between 1930 and 1970, but have become popular since 2000 in countries with very low levels of female representation. In comparison, party quotas first appeared in the early 1970s, but grew more widespread over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, as more parties in more countries began promoting women. Legislative quotas emerged first in the 1990s, but have recently gained momentum and constitute the majority of quota policies adopted today. At the macro-level, these patterns within regions and across time point to the possibility of ‘learning’ within and across national borders.

A move to the micro-level offers more concrete evidence for historical and transnational repertoires of representation. The importance of historical practices can be seen in several instances of quota reform. One relates to the idiosyncratic case of colonialism, secession, and independence in South Asia. During British rule, the Government of India Act reserved seats in the federal legislature

for fifteen different groups based on sex, profession, race, religion, 'social backwardness,' and other minority status, such that the 145 special seats actually outnumbered the 105 open seats based on territorial representation (Tinker and Walker 1956). The dramatic increase in the number of seats and recognized categories of representation led nationalists to conclude that reservations were a tactic to perpetuate British control by dividing the population into numerous special interests (Jenkins 1999). As such, the Indian National Congress objected to special rights for any of these groups, and following independence, largely eliminated reserved seats. After partition, however, seats were reserved for women in Pakistan that continue to exist through the present day, with the only gap in these provisions occurring between 1988 and 2000. Similarly, upon independence from Pakistan, seats were reserved for women in Bangladesh, which expired but were renewed on several occasions and currently apply to the national parliament (Chowdhury 2002; Krook 2009).

Other examples of historical repertoires emerge in cases where both women and minorities receive guarantees. In these countries, the measures used for one group are simply extended to another. Returning to the case of India, the only groups to receive guarantees after independence were the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Traditionally the most marginalized members of Indian society, these groups were allocated reserved seats according to their proportion of the population in the various states. When local government structures were reformed in the 1990s, similar guarantees were not only repeated for these groups but were extended to women as well, in the form of one-third of seats in all tiers of local government. At the national level, debates over women's representation have also revolved around proposals for reserved seats, despite calls to consider other types of quotas (Krook 2009). Similar dynamics have taken place in reverse in the United Kingdom. In 1993, the Labour Party instituted a policy of all-women shortlists, which stated that the final lists of candidates in certain districts must consist entirely of women, thereby ensuring the selection of a female candidate. This measure was proposed by women inside the party, realizing

that other types of quotas would be difficult to apply, in light of the first-past-the-post electoral system organized around single-member constituencies (Russell 2005). When the party later implemented a policy to promote black and minority ethnic candidates, they adopted similar all-black shortlists in specified electoral districts.

A third illustration can be viewed in instances of party reform, which offer further evidence of within-country innovation and learning. As many observers have noted (cf. Matland and Studlar 1996), in Western European countries the adoption of quotas by one party has often precipitated their adoption by other parties. On the whole, early adopters tend to be small new-left parties that include gender equality among their political goals, but in many cases, center-left and sometimes center-right parties follow suit (Kittilson 2006). In Germany, the newly formed Green Party applied a 50% quota in 1983 requiring all its lists to alternate between women and men. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), concerned about possible erosion in electoral support, responded by adopting its own 25% quota in 1990, which it subsequently raised to 33% in 1994 and 40% in 1998. This led the SPD's main rival, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), to adopt its own 33% policy for party lists in 1996 (McKay 2004). Taken together, these various patterns point to the presence of national repertoires, developed over time, that determine how guarantees of group representation 'are done' within specific countries. While there are elements of contingency in the initial decisions to create these policies, linked perhaps to the structure of the electoral system, the shape of later measures appears to follow from earlier decisions made by political actors.

There is even greater evidence for transnational repertoires, however, when it comes to guarantees for women. One pattern that often strikes observers is the fact that most policies for women call for women to occupy thirty percent of all seats or candidate slots (see Appendix). This trend likely has multiple sources, one being emulation of neighboring countries with thirty percent policies (Htun and Jones 2002) and the other stemming from the recommendations of international

and regional organizations, including the United Nations and Southern African Development Community, which identify thirty percent as a target for female representation (Bauer 2008; Krook 2006).² A second trend, as signaled above, is the striking similarities in the timing of quota adoption: more than three-quarters of these measures have been proposed and approved within just the last fifteen years. These guarantees point to growing international norms regarding the need to promote women's participation in electoral politics (Krook 2006; Towns 2004). A closer look at individual countries uncovers more specific mechanisms of diffusion, generated by international organizations, cross-border contacts among civil society groups, and straightforward emulation of the policies adopted in neighboring countries. Beyond international declarations, for example, international actors have played a direct role in pressing for gender quotas in some post-conflict societies. In Kosovo, the UN Interim Administrative Mission and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) imposed a thirty percent legislative quota for local and national elections in 2000, despite international and local opposition (Corrin 2002). In Afghanistan, the UN Special Mission and the United States government pressed for the inclusion of women in the new government and parliament, following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Norris 2007).

In other cases, the process of quota diffusion is the result of various kinds of information sharing across national borders. The most direct route is through individual connections: Anwar Sadat introduced reserved seats for women in Egypt in 1979, following a trip by his wife Jihan to Sudan, where a quota had been in effect for several years (Howard-Merriam 1990). More commonly, the connections are more indirect: women's groups in countries with similar languages have been documented as sharing information on quota strategies across national borders (Bergqvist et al

² It is not known where the thirty percent figure in fact originates, but one possibility is that it is linked to the concept of a 'critical mass,' a theory used in some research on women's substantive representation which speculates that women need to form a large minority of all legislators before they can make a difference in public policy.

1999), as have women's groups in parties with similar ideologies. The diffusion of legislative quotas across Latin America, most notably, was facilitated by the use of Spanish in many countries across the region. Women in Argentina first learned about quotas through contacts with women inside the Spanish Socialist Party, where party quotas had been adopted in the late 1980s, and women in Costa Rica, who were mobilizing to include a legislative quota in the Bill on Real Equality between Women and Men (Lubertino Beltrán 1992). Argentina passed a quota law in 1991, and following the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women, became an important model within the region and the subject of a series of meetings among Latin American female politicians in 1995 (Htun and Jones 2002). This later culminated in the adoption of remarkably similar quota laws in fourteen Latin American countries in 1996, 1997, and 2000. Along similar lines, the spread of party quotas across Europe emerged in part from connections among socialist and social democratic parties within the region. According to observers, quotas in the Norwegian Labour Party were influential in the adoption of a parallel measures by the German SPD (Wisler 1999), while the use of quotas in various socialist parties in Europe shaped the decision of the British Labour Party to pass all-women shortlists (Russell 2005). European socialists, in turn, mobilized within the Socialist International for the promotion of quota adoption by its affiliates in countries around the world.

Repertoires for Representing Minorities

Measures for minorities exist in nearly forty countries and apply to a wide array of groups (Reynolds 2005). Even more than with women, 'who' is recognized as a minority depends very closely on the political context. While most of these policies are based on ethnic divides (Bird 2003;

Kymlicka 1995),³ the identities in question vary enormously across cases. In some countries, they are classified by race, as in Latin America and Oceania where seats are allocated to indigenous peoples (Geddis 2006; Van Cott 2005). In others, they are based on nationality, as in Eastern Europe where laws often ensure some level of representation for extremely small national communities (Alionescu 2004). Further groups that receive guarantees are those defined by religion, language, and class. In several Middle Eastern states, for example, provisions have been made to members of minority religions (Salloukh 2006). Belgium divides legislative seats among linguistic groups (O’Neill 1998), while India allocates seats for members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (Galanter 1984). Finally, a number of regimes reserve seats for groups based on age, ability, and occupation. In Rwanda, the new constitution approved in 2003 guarantees seats for youth, the physically disabled, and university professors (Powley 2005). Similarly, the Tibetan Government in Exile sets aside seats for three members with “distinction in the fields of art, science, literature, and community service” (Government of Tibet in Exile 2004). As reserved seats provisions, all of these measures address the number of individuals elected, transforming them into stronger guarantees of presence than most quotas for women.

A more detailed look at the aims of these policies, as well as where and when they appear, is suggestive of broad trends in the repertoires of minority representation. Although taking the similar form of reserved seats, these measures tend to have one of two goals: ‘protection’ or power-sharing. Protection measures entail allocating seats to peripheral groups which constitute a relatively small contingent within the population, including indigenous peoples, members of minority religions and nationalities, and class- or caste-based groups that have historically been economically and politically

³ Here we distinguish between religion, race, nationality, and ethnicity – one might also add language – which other scholars might prefer to place under the umbrella concept of ‘ethnicity.’ Although we recognize this possibility, we retain these distinctions simply to remain more precise with regard to differences across cases.

marginalized. These provisions are minimal, involving as little as one or two percent of all seats, but often over-represent the group in question in order to ‘protect’ their status within the larger society (Reynolds 2005; Van Cott 2005). As previously highlighted, the specific groups protected in this way vary across world regions. In contrast, power-sharing arrangements involve dividing up most or all seats in the legislature between two or more political factions, usually defined by ethnicity, religion, or language. These policies entail a higher proportion of seats, often as much as twenty-five to seventy percent, and exist in most regions, including Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. While distinct, the two categories of measures have appeared in similar waves: they first became popular in the years following World War II and were later “rediscovered” in the 1990s (Reynolds 2005, 302). These patterns offer initial evidence for global and regional repertoires of representation, in terms of who receives guarantees, for what purposes, and in what contexts.

Individual cases, in turn, lend more tangible support for the notion of region- and situation-specific repertoires. Historical influences are more evident than transnational effects, but these vary to some degree across the two categories of minority provisions. In instances of protection, the aim is often to compensate for past oppression. Reserving seats in these cases typically over-represents the minority in question, whether it involves indigenous peoples, racial minorities, ‘untouchables,’ or members of non-dominant nationalities (Bird 2003; Htun 2004). Historical grounds for recognition often trump other considerations. In Slovenia, there are two seats in the national assembly reserved for Hungarians and Italians, but not Serbs or Croats, who comprise a significantly larger percentage of the population. The official rationale for excluding these latter groups is that they are immigrants who came to the country primarily for economic reasons, while Italians and Hungarians are viewed as native Slovenians (Alionescu 2004). More commonly, these measures are a legacy of colonialism. Communal representation was particularly central to the British colonial system. While most former colonies abandoned these policies, several decided to retain reserved seats upon independence. In

New Zealand, four seats were set aside for Maoris, an indigenous group, in 1867 during the period of British rule. These measures were revised and renewed a number of times over the course of the next century, even as the country gained independence. Indeed, reforms to the Electoral Act in 1993 increased rather than decreased the number of seats, which now stand at seven, determined by the population of those who self-identify as Maori (Geddis 2006). In other cases, reserved seats are used to protect the interests of the former colonizers who remain in the territory following independence: at some time, laws in Sri Lanka, India, Samoa, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe have made provisions for the descendants of European or Asian colonists (Reynolds 2005).

In cases of power-sharing, the goal is to ensure democratic stability in an otherwise divided society (Bird 2003). Reserving seats for particular groups grants members a guaranteed voice in the political system as a means for preventing their defection which, it is feared, might provoke collapse of the state and subsequent resumption of civil conflict (Geddis 2006; Htun 2004). In the wake of conflict, several countries have devised power-sharing provisions based on historical practices of group representation. In the negotiations ending decades of civil war in Lebanon, the Taif Agreement of 1989 made explicit reference to principles of power-sharing that had been established in the National Pact of 1943 (Rigby 2000). The National Pact was an unwritten agreement that laid the foundations of Lebanon as a multi-confessional state by, among other things, designating that the President of the Republic be a Maronite, the President of the Council of Ministers be a Sunni, and the President of the National Assembly be a Shi'a. It also provided for members of parliament to be in a ratio of six to five in favor of Christians to Muslims. The Taif Agreement amended the constitution to reduce the power of the Maronite president and establish a parliamentary ratio of equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. Intended as a mechanism of national reconciliation, the constitution provides for these seats to be filled by eleven religious confessions in relation to their share of the population: the sixty-four Muslim seats are divided as twenty-seven for Sunnis, twenty-

seven for Shi'ites, eight for Druzes, and two for Alawites, while the sixty-four Christian seats are divided as thirty-four for Maronite, fourteen for Greek Orthodox, eight for Greek Catholic, five for Armenian orthodox, and one each for Armenian Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, and other Christian minorities. Along somewhat similar lines, a constitutional review in Fiji in 1997 reaffirmed the reserved seats system dividing seats between the indigenous and Indian populations. Similar power-sharing arrangements originated in the period of British rule and had been in effect since the time of independence (Fraenkel 2001).

While these patterns suggest that minority group guarantees are likely to be more localized and historically specific, there is significant evidence of transnational repertoires as well. Indeed, a global view points to a growing international norm in favor of reserved seats: while initially treated as idiosyncratic solutions to the problem of governing multicultural societies, “at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the attitude toward reserved communal seats and special mechanisms has swung to a point where they are considered signs of liberal progressiveness” (Reynolds 2005, 302-303). This appears to be true of multiculturalism more generally. Domestic processes still play a major role in the granting of minority rights, but in recent years, these ideas have gone global as a range of international organizations, like the UN, the International Labor Organization, and the World Bank, have approved various declarations on indigenous and minority rights (Kymlicka 2007). Promoting protection measures, for example, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities made a speech in 1999, largely in reaction to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, in which he asserted that “states should ensure that opportunities exist for minorities to have an effective voice at the level of the central government,” through “special arrangements” like reserved seats in “one or both chambers of parliament or in parliamentary committees.”⁴ More diffuse evidence can be seen in the case of indigenous rights in Latin America, where countries expanded

⁴ http://www.osce.org/documents/hcnm/1999/07/2913_en.pdf (accessed May 28, 2008).

and deepened these rights as they were adopted in neighboring countries. More specifically, after Colombia passed a significant set of indigenous constitutional rights, similar reforms appeared in Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela (Van Cott 2005).

Power-sharing provisions provide even greater evidence of pressure from the international community and the role of individual policy entrepreneurs. Many of these measures are rooted, at least historically, in earlier models of compromise known as ‘consociationalism.’ In these regimes, no group is large enough to be the dominant majority and cooperation among groups is ensured through a variety of measures, mainly through consultation among the elites of each of the major groups, but also through several mechanisms that facilitate group participation (Andeweg 2000; Lijphart 1969). An example is the case of Switzerland, where these arrangements include, among other things, a collective head of state. This Federal Council consists of seven members, selected according to the ‘magic formula’ of two members each from three parties and one member from a fourth party. Every year, one of the seven councilors is elected President of the Confederation, rotating annually such that each serves in this position once every seven years. These and other mechanisms facilitate the inclusion of a wide range of groups, including Protestants and Catholics, as well as French-, German-, Italian-, and Romansch-speaking Swiss (Lehmbruch 1993).

Although consociationalism initially emerged as a descriptive theory of conflict resolution in Western Europe, it soon developed into a more prescriptive theory as how to resolve ethnic conflict throughout the world (Lustick 1997; Wilkinson 2004). Scholars like Arend Lijphart point to societies where they believe power-sharing arrangements have reduced ethnic conflict, like Cyprus, Lebanon, and Malaysia, and have actively promoted consociationalism in countries like South Africa. Many of these ideas have been taken up and promoted by international actors, like the Carnegie Corporation, the OSCE, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. They have also been influential among actors on the ground. In the former Soviet Union, Tatars argued that such

policies would reduce conflict with Russians and Ukrainians in the Crimea, while in Moldova elites agreed in 1994 that consociationalism was the best solution to reduce tensions among Russians, Gagauz, and Moldovans (Wilkinson 2004). The influence of these models is evident in the fact that nearly all negotiated civil war settlements today include some form of political power-sharing arrangement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Notable examples include the interim constitution in South Africa, the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the governments of national unity in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the transitional law in Iraq, and the Naivasha Accord in Sudan (Reynolds 2006).

The force of ideas is not the only reason that power-sharing is now a dominant repertoire in post-conflict negotiations, however. In several instances, international pressure has played a key role in forcing governments to consider sharing power with other groups. In Rwanda, for example, the United States, France, and the Organization of African Unity organized the talks leading up to the signing of the failed Arusha Accords in 1993, which sought to end a three-year civil war between the government and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front through the incorporation of power-sharing into political institutions. Power-sharing solutions may appear especially attractive to parties if the agreement offers important side benefits, like foreign aid or international legitimacy, which can be jeopardized if a settlement is not reached (Spears 2002). In Angola, these concerns led the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola to end its military offensive and enter power-sharing negotiations in 1994 with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, despite the fact that the rebels were retreating. Similarly, the African National Congress reportedly tolerated power-sharing in the post-apartheid transition in South Africa because it added legitimacy and stability to the political process and helped garner support from whites (Spears 2002). Pressure from international actors may also intersect with historical repertoires of representation: since 1985, a

series of UN Secretary-Generals have made proposals for a unified Cyprus that strongly resemble the basic power-sharing features of the 1960 constitution (Lijphart 2002).

Mapping Group Representation

Broad trends in the guarantees made to women and minorities around the globe thus do not conform to the three hypotheses implicit in the normative literature on group representation that informs a great deal of empirical research. Rather, when viewed more inductively, the data point to the presence of both historical and transnational repertoires of group representation, which shape decisions as to which groups are recognized and how and when their representation is guaranteed. These patterns indicate that policies emerge from the construction of ‘relevant’ political identities, rather than any ‘objective’ criteria for group recognition. To further explore these points, as well as the relations between guarantees, we now engage in a closer examination of four countries where proposals for legal provisions have been made for both women and minorities. We focus on cases where these demands have been resolved in distinct ways, as a means to juxtapose the relative leverage afforded by the four hypotheses. Viewed separately, each case lends support to one of the three traditional intuitions about group representation: selection in Rwanda, where both women and minorities are recognized; hierarchy in Belgium, where minorities were first to receive guarantees that were later extended to women, albeit in a less stringent form; and competition in India and Iraq, where either women or minorities, but not both, gained measures of group representation. On their own, each set of debates suggests very different conclusions regarding the nature of sex, language, caste, religion, age, profession, and ability as political identities. Comparing them, however, exposes the contingent nature of these solutions as the product of vivid struggles over what kinds of identity groups ‘deserve’ recognition, in light of historical and transnational repertoires of representation.

Rwanda: Reserved Seats for Minorities and Quotas and Reserved Seats for Women

Rwanda reflects a striking double distinction as regards the status of women and minorities: it is the country in the world with the most women in parliament, but it is also known for one of the most infamous genocides perpetrated along ethnic lines. Both can be linked back to the Arusha Accords, an internationally-backed power-sharing agreement which in 1993 sought to end three years of civil conflict between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF, an exiled Tutsi guerrilla group) and the Hutu government. The agreement proposed to divide the seats within the legislative branch between the governing regime, the Hutu opposition, and the RPF. Though designed to ensure a lasting peace, a series of events in 1994 – including the shooting down of a plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundi presidents – sparked a three-month genocide, during which Hutu extremists killed one million people and produced two million refugees before the RPF could gain control of the country (Stettenheim 2002). These events had profound effects on gender relations, as they forced women into new roles as heads of households and economic providers, as well as community leaders and activists (Tripp et al 2006). In this context, women’s networks began to mobilize for the inclusion of women’s concerns into the drafting of the new constitution (Longman 2006). At the same time, a number of male RPF officials in the transition government expressed strong support for women’s representation. Drawing on experiences with reserved seats in Uganda and party quotas in South Africa, as well as the help of the international community (Powley 2005), they instituted an extended system of reserved seats, quotas, and other mechanisms to ensure the representation of women and other marginalized groups.

In the Chamber of Deputies, fifty-three members are elected by direct ballot. The remaining twenty-seven members are reserved for traditionally under-represented groups: twenty-four women, selected by women’s organizations; two young people, elected by the National Youth Council; and one disabled person, chosen by the Federation of Associations of the Disabled. The Senate, in turn,

is composed of twenty-six indirectly elected members: twelve nominated by the each of the twelve provinces, four chosen by the parliamentary Forum of Political Parties, eight nominated by the presidents to represent marginalized groups such as the Twa and the disabled, and two put forward by institutions of higher learning. Although there are no seats explicitly reserved for women, the constitution mandates that at least thirty percent of the twenty-six representatives be female. These provisions are striking in two ways. First, they identify nearly similar groups as neighboring Uganda, where many of RPF members spent their exile: since the 1980s, Uganda has reserved two percent of its seats in parliament for youth and two percent of its seats for the disabled, in addition to reserving seats for organized labor and the army (Tripp 2000). Second, they explicitly ignore ethnicity as a political cleavage, going as far as attempting to re-educate people to believe that it does not exist (Lacey 2004). The experience of genocide, therefore, has removed ethnicity from the political agenda in favor of recognizing sex, age, and ability as identities that deserve political representation.

Belgium: Reserved Seats for Minorities and Quotas for Women

The Belgian conception of citizenship has long been oriented towards social groups, mainly religious, economic, and linguistic factions (Meier 2005). Struggles between French- and Flemish-speaking elites in the nineteenth and early twentieth century led to a series of language laws that increased the status of Flemish speakers and eventually culminated in a bilingual state, divided into two largely monolingual regions, Flanders and Wallonia, and one bilingual region, Brussels. These linguistic ‘frontiers’ were formally acknowledged in 1962, when they became a template for redrawing local government administrative boundaries (O’Neill 1998). Subsequent reforms created a more federal state structure, based on an increasing degree of decentralization and autonomy for these linguistic communities. Constitutional reforms in 1970 took the first steps towards creating formal power-sharing arrangements by introducing the obligation to have an equal number of

French- and Flemish-speaking ministers in government, members of the highest courts, and officers in the upper ranks of the military. They also split the House of Representatives into two language groups, who obtained their own constitutional status and special veto rights in order to prevent the adoption of major decisions against the will of one group. Reforms in 1988 and 1993 extended further autonomy by establishing directly elected regional and communal parliaments (Schneckener 2002). The Senate was similarly divided according to language groups. Forty-one seats were reserved for Flemish speakers, chosen by a Dutch-speaking electoral college and the Flemish Parliament; twenty-nine seats were reserved for French speakers, selected by a French-speaking electoral college and the Parliament of the French Community; and one seat was reserved for German speakers, appointed by the Parliament of the German-speaking Community.

The first quotas for women were adopted by various political parties in the 1980s and 1990s. At the initiative of the government, legislative quotas were passed by parliament in 1994, mandating that women comprise at least twenty-five percent of all electoral lists until 1999, after which the requirement would be increased to thirty-three percent. After the passage of a new law on equality between women and men, parliament revisited the measures and raised the quota to fifty percent in 2002 (Meier 2004a). The main point of contention in these debates was whether sex was a category of representation on par with linguistic identities. Aware that even those opposed to quotas for women accepted the idea of proportionality, advocates stressed that balanced representation of key social groups was an essential legitimizing feature of the political system and mobilized on the basis of this norm to justify the adoption of quotas for women (Mateo-Diaz 2002). These discussions led to extensive bargaining over the form that such quotas might take. The governing parties agreed to quotas for women, but ensured that they would be distinct from those for linguistic groups. As a result, gender quotas apply to electoral lists, and thus only to potential candidates for political office, while seats for linguistic groups are guaranteed regardless of election outcomes (Meier 2004b). The

presence of linguistic seats therefore created opportunities for improving women's descriptive representation, but these claims were not on par with existing guarantees for these other groups.

India: Reserved Seats for Minorities over Reserved Seats for Women

India gained its first experiences with reserved seats as part of the British Empire. The Government of India Act of 1935 reserved seats in various assemblies for fifteen groups on the basis of sex, profession, race, religion, 'social backwardness,' and other kinds of minority status, such that special seats actually outnumbered open seats (Clokie 1936). Because these provisions were made in the context of discussions regarding shared government, many nationalists concluded that reservations and separate electorates were simply tactics to perpetuate British control by dividing the population into numerous special interests (Galanter 1984; Jenkins 1999). For this reason, the Indian National Congress objected to reserved seats, and its women's group issued a statement denying special privileges for women for the sake of the common good. Following independence in 1947, debates surrounding the new constitution included questions about reserved seats for various kinds of groups, but the only ones to receive guarantees were the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), the two groups that had traditionally been the most marginalized members of Indian society, distributed according to their proportion of the population in the various states. The constitution also made reference to a third category, later known as the Other Backward Castes (OBCs), who did not merit reserved seats but who had the right to other types of assistance from the state (Tinker and Walker 1956).

Although the newly drafted constitution abolished special seats for women, by the 1980s several states began to set aside places for them. These policies were extended to all states in 1992, when constitutional reforms reserved one-third of all seats in local government for women. A bill proposing similar provisions for women in the national parliament followed in 1996. Although many

parties had enthusiastically embraced this idea during elections earlier that year, a large number of parliamentarians voiced opposition, primarily on the grounds that the bill would promote upper caste Hindu women if it was not revised to incorporate sub-quotas for OBCs and Muslims (Jenkins 1999). Female MPs suggested that attention to minority women was simply a convenient excuse for male leaders who did not want to lose their own seats (Nath 1996). A select committee determined that sub-quotas could not be included in the bill, because provisions for these other groups did not yet exist in the constitution (Balasubrahmanyam 1998). Despite this clarification, a reserved seat bill has not yet been passed, despite having been introduced in every parliamentary session over the last ten years. Debates on the representation of women and minorities in India have thus been on-going, revolving around the mechanism of reserved seats. Across all these discussions, provisions for minorities are prioritized over those for women, whether these are real (in the case of SCs and STs) or projected (OBCs and Muslims).

Iraq: Quotas for Women over Reserved Seats for Minorities

The U.S.-led invasion and associated change of political regime in Iraq raised various issues related to the representation of women and minorities. Given the history of Sunni dominance over both the Kurds and the Shi'as, despite the Sunnis' numerical minority, U.S. authorities initially focused on laying the foundation for a consociational power-sharing agreement between the three groups. This principle informed the composition of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) along ethnic and religious divides to include thirteen Shi'as, five Sunnis, four Kurds, one Turkoman, and one Assyrian Christian (Dodge 2005). At this time, U.S. authorities made few attempts to ensure comparable representation for women: almost no women were invited to attend a conference of future Iraqi leaders, and only three women were appointed to Iraqi transitional government. As a result, women were not included in either the nine-member rotating presidential council or the

committee working on constitutional reform. Further, while the British government – and U.S. coalition partner – advocated a twenty-five percent quota for women (Dahlerup and Ballington 2006), American officials emphasized that there were “no plans for quotas,” though they were “planning on empowering women through...women’s organizations, democracy trainings, and involving them in the political process” (Ciezadlo 2003). Consequently, in the early days of transition there was a deep concern with ensuring equitable treatment for religious and ethnic minorities, but overt hostility towards mechanisms for promoting women’s inclusion.

Although the U.S. authorities had clearly identified Iraq’s three sectarian factions for guaranteed representation, virtually all notions of power-sharing were abandoned over the course of the constitutional drafting process. They were replaced instead with various mechanisms providing for decentralization, federalism, and majoritarianism. In contrast, article 47 stated that the electoral law would aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly. This provision had its origins in demands for a forty percent gender quota, which was supported by a wide range of female actors. The three women nominated to the IGC spoke openly in favor of quotas (Dahlerup and Ballington 2006), and in December 2003, two women co-authored a *New York Times* editorial in which they urged the U.S. to “ensure that the Governing Council sets aside slots for women in all levels of government and in the constitutional drafting process in proportion to their percentage of the population” (Khuzai and Chapouk 2003). Following similar claims by many other women’s groups, the new electoral law clarified that no fewer than one out of the first three candidates on the list must be a woman, effectively creating a thirty-three percent quota. Hence, while reserved seats for minorities were initially the focus of U.S. officials, these measures took other forms as attention turned to the representation of women in the new regime. Invasion created opportunities for women’s groups to speak to international audiences and mobilize for gender quotas, despite continued focus on sectarian violence.

Conclusions: The Politics of Group Representation

In the literature on group recognition, women and minorities are often treated as presenting similar challenges to existing patterns of representation, although they are rarely studied together as such. Recent developments in quota provisions granted to both groups present an opportunity to explore how, where, and when identities get recognized in politics. In this article, we seek to grapple with these questions through a series of comparisons between normative and empirical research, provisions for women and minorities, and countries where similar claims have been resolved in distinct ways. Among the various intuitions regarding group representation, we find the greatest support for the argument that women will receive guarantees in some countries, while minorities will receive them in others. Yet, we also observe that a second set of expectations related to this account are disconfirmed, namely that differences in these group identities will tend to result in quotas for women and reserved seats for minorities.

Reversing our approach, we approach the material more inductively and generate an alternative hypothesis: group recognition emerges through the construction of ‘relevant’ political identities, which are framed in the process as innately or historically important. This lens suggests two influences on the measures that are adopted, or not, in the course of group recognition: historical practices and transnational effects. After presenting the evidence for the existence of repertoires of group representation, we evaluate the validity of all four hypotheses through case studies of countries where proposals have been made for both women and minorities. Individually, each case lends support to one of the three traditional intuitions about group representation, suggesting different conclusions regarding the nature of sex, language, caste, religion, age, profession, and ability as political identities. Collectively, however, they reveal the more contingent

dynamics behind policies of group representation, which cause groups to be recognized in diverse ways across national contexts.

These findings fill an important gap in the literature on group recognition, which has not been characterized, to date, by a great deal of comparative research on measures within and across cases, especially with regard to provisions for both women and minorities (for exceptions, see Bird 2003; Htun 2004). The analysis, in turn, offers several broad insights for future research on these groups, at least as it concerns elected political office. First, the patterns we observe caution against studying one group and then generalizing to the other, without careful justifications as to why these might be appropriate parallels to draw. This is not to say that women and minorities share no common experiences of marginalization, but rather, that scholars should outline and defend their assumptions regarding similarities or differences among these groups. Second, diversity among empirical patterns around the globe, juxtaposed with some ideas implicit in the normative literature, points to the importance of distinguishing between empirical statements about how the world is and normative arguments about how the world should be. Third, these results add an important new layer to recent work in political theory emphasizing the active and mutually constitutive nature of the representative process (Saward 2006; Squires 2008). This lens stresses that such judgments do not simply emerge from who these groups are, but from what they are represented to be – and for what reasons and to what effect. Subjecting these policies to closer empirical study is not simply an academic question: it requires us to re-examine and re-engage with the theory and practice of political representation itself.

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Appendix

Table 1. State-Mandated Quotas for Women in Single or Lower House of Parliament⁵

Country⁶	Quota Percent and Type	Percent Female MPs
Afghanistan	27% reserved seats	27% (2005)
Argentina	30% legislative quotas	40% (2007)
Armenia	15% legislative quotas	9% (2007)
Bangladesh	13% reserved seats	15% (2001)
Belgium	50% legislative quotas	35% (2007)
Bolivia	30% legislative quotas	17% (2005)
Bosnia- Herzegovina	33% legislative quotas	14% (2006)
Brazil	25% legislative quotas	9% (2006)
Burkina Faso	6% reserved seats	15% (2007)
Burundi	30% legislative quotas	31% (2005)
China	22% legislative quotas	21% (2008)
Costa Rica	40% legislative quotas	39% (2006)
Djibouti	10% reserved seats	14% (2008)
Dominican Republic	33% legislative quotas	20% (2006)
Ecuador	30% legislative quotas	25% (2006)
Eritrea	30% reserved seats	22% (1994)

⁵This list refers to current measures only; several countries have revised earlier policies. In addition to these provisions, party quotas exist in more than seventy countries (for details, see Krook 2009).

⁶Countries where state-level provisions existed previously include Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Italy, and Serbia and Montenegro.

France	50% legislative quotas	18% (2007)
Guyana	33% legislative quotas	29% (2006)
Honduras	30% legislative quotas	23% (2005)
Indonesia	30% legislative quotas	11% (2004)
Iraq	25% legislative quotas	26% (2005)
Jordan	5% reserved seats	6% (2007)
Kenya	3% reserved seats	7% (2002)
Kyrgyzstan	30% legislative quotas	26% (2007)
Liberia	30% legislative quotas	13% (2005)
Macedonia	30% legislative quotas	28% (2006)
Mauritania	30-50% legislative quotas	18% (2006)
Mexico	30% legislative quotas	23% (2006)
Morocco	9% reserved seats	11% (2002)
Nepal	5% legislative quotas	17% (2007)
Niger	10% legislative quotas	12% (2004)
North Korea	20% legislative quotas	20% (2003)
Pakistan	18% reserved seats	23% (2007)
Palestinian Authority*	20% legislative quotas	Unknown
Panama	30% legislative quotas	17% (2004)
Paraguay	20% legislative quotas	10% (2003)
Peru	30% legislative quotas	29% (2006)
Philippines	1% reserved seats	23% (2007)
Portugal	33% legislative quotas	21% (2005)
Rwanda	30% reserved seats	49% (2003)

Serbia	30% legislative quotas	20% (2007)
Somalia	12% reserved seats	8% (2004)
South Korea	50% legislative quotas ⁷	14% (2008)
Spain	40% legislative quotas	36% (2008)
Sudan	13% reserved seats	18% (2005)
Taiwan*	10-25% reserved seats	Unknown
Tanzania	30% reserved seats	30% (2005)
Tibetan Government in Exile*	13% reserved seats	Unknown
Uganda	18% reserved seats	30% (2006)
Uzbekistan	30% legislative quotas	18% (2004)

*Non-independent territory.

⁷This regulation applies only to elections by proportional representation in the mixed electoral system. In addition, the law recommends that parties include 30% women among their candidates in single member districts.

Table 2. State Mandated Quotas for Minorities in Single or Lower House of Parliament⁸

Country⁹	Quota Percent and Type
Afghanistan	4% reserved seats for Kuchi nomadic community
Belgium	58% reserved seats for Flemish speakers (upper house) 41% reserved seats for French speakers (upper house) 1% reserved seats for German speakers (upper house)
Bhutan	7% reserved seats for Buddhist monks
Bosnia-Herzegovina	33% reserved seats for Bosniacs (upper house) 33% reserved seats for Croats (upper house) 33% reserved seats for Serbs (upper house)
Burundi	58% reserved seats for Hutus 39% reserved seats for Tutsis 3% reserved seats for Twa 50% reserved seats for Hutus (upper house) 50% reserved seats for Tutsis (upper house)
Cape Verde	8% reserved seats for expatriates
China	15% reserved seats for minority nationalities
Colombia	3% reserved seats for indigenous peoples,

⁸This list refers to current measures only; several countries have revised earlier policies. The list excludes countries that employ representational rules for off-shore territories and protectorates, for example Puerto Rico in the United States House of Representatives, French Overseas Departments and Territories in the French National Assembly, and Greenland and the Faroe Islands in the Danish parliament. Our grounds for excluding these cases is that the logic behind these provisions is firmly territorial, even if their main effect is to elect some indigenous representatives.

⁹Countries where state-level provisions existed previously include Cyprus, Serbia and Montenegro, and Zimbabwe.

	Afro-Colombians and Colombians living abroad
	2% reserved seats for indigenous population (upper house)
Croatia	No more than 9% reserved seats for Croat diaspora
	<1% reserved seats for Czech/Slovaks
	<1% reserved seats for Hungarians
	<1% reserved seats for Italians
	<1% reserved seats for Ruthenian/Ukrainian/ German/Austrian
	<1% reserved seats for Serbs
Ethiopia	19% reserved seats for minorities (upper house)
Fiji	32% reserved seats for indigenous population
	27% reserved seats for Indians
	1% reserved seats for Rotumans
France	4% reserved seats for expatriates (upper house)
India	14% reserved seats for Scheduled Castes
	8% reserved seats for Scheduled Tribes
	<1% reserved seats for Anglo-Indians
	2% reserved seats for Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians
Iran	11% reserved seats for Christians
Italy	2% for expatriates (both houses)
Jordan	4% reserved seats for Circassians and Chechens
	8% reserved seats for Bedouins
Kosovo*	8% reserved seats for Serbs
	8% reserved seats for Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Bosniac,

	Turkish, and Gorani
Lebanon	50% reserved seats for Christians 50% reserved seats for Muslims
Mauritius	11% reserved seats for 'best loser' ethnic balancing
Montenegro	6% reserved seats for Albanians
Mozambique	<1% reserved seats for expatriates
New Zealand	5% reserved seats for Maori
Niger	10% reserved seats for Tuareg
Pakistan	3% reserved seats for Hindus 3% reserved seats for Christians <1% reserved seats for Ahmadis/Parsees <1% reserved seats for other religious minorities
Palestinian Authority*	7% reserved seats for Christians 1% reserved seats for Samaritans
Poland	<1% reserved seats for Germans
Portugal	2% reserved for expatriates
Romania	4% reserved seats for small minorities
Rwanda	1% reserved seats for youth 8% reserved seats for disabled 8% reserved seats for 'historically marginalized' (upper house) 31% reserved seats for universities (upper house)
Samoa	4% reserved seats for part- and non-Samoans
Singapore	33% legislative quotas for Malay, Indians, or other minorities
Slovenia	1% reserved seats for Hungarians

	1% reserved seats for Italians
Taiwan*	3% reserved seats for aboriginal people
Tanzania	19% reserved seats for Zanzibaris
Tibetan Government in Exile*	7% reserved seats for Tibetan diaspora
Uganda	2% reserved seats for organized labor
	2% reserved seats for disabled
	2% reserved seats for youth
	3% reserved seats for army
Venezuela	2% reserved seats for indigenous population

*Non-independent territory.