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RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM: GENDER QUOTAS

Contesting gender quotas: dynamics of resistance

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Gender quotas have diffused rapidly around the globe in recent decades, suggesting widespread and dramatic transformations in women’s access to political power. Yet, quotas often face serious challenges following their introduction, resulting in a gap between quota requirements and electoral outcomes. To explore these dynamics, this article develops a theoretical account of how and why political elites resist the changes called for by quota reforms. It argues that three tools predicated upon women’s exclusion from the political sphere – false universalism and political principles, male power and political survival, and gender and leadership norms – are often mobilized to render quotas illegitimate, making resistance understandable and, indeed, even desirable on a host of grounds. The article then catalogues trends in resistance at different stages of the electoral process, integrating materials from case studies around the world – and exposing a wide range of strategies, often creative, to subvert the impact of quota policies. Adopting gender quotas may thus be only the beginning – rather than the end – of a long and contested process to empower women as political actors.

Keywords: gender quotas; women in politics; political empowerment; resistance; backlash

Quotas for women in politics have spread rapidly around the globe over the last two decades, from a handful of states in the 1970s and 1980s to more than 130 countries today.1 These policies now exist in very diverse cultural contexts, at all levels of development and democracy (Hughes, Krook, and Paxton2015). Their aim – through constitutional, legal, and/or political party reforms – is to ensure a minimum proportion of women as political candidates or legislators. The result has been an impressive rise in the share of women in national parliaments, with the global average nearly doubling from 11.3% in 1995 to 22.1% in 2015.2 Yet, in the vast majority of cases, elections produce lower – sometimes much lower – numbers of women in parliament than the proportions identified in quota policies.

Many comparative studies attribute these gaps to variations in policy design and institutional frameworks, with the most effective quotas being those with placement mandates and strict sanctions for non-compliance, implemented in closed-list proportional representation electoral systems (Larserud and Taphorn2007; Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009). What emerges as a key factor in many case study accounts, however, is the crucial role of “political will” as an element shaping the degree to which quota requirements are respected (Krook2009). Unlike research on the structural variables affecting quota implementation, however, this work has not sought to systematize these insights into a shared framework. Yet, political elites have
the clearest and most immediate impact in translating policies into outcomes, suggesting that closer attention to these dynamics might reap important analytical benefits. Furthermore, country-level accounts, despite enormous heterogeneity across contexts, often tell very similar stories about the ways in which various actors seek to weaken, undermine, or subvert quota policies.

To fill this gap, this article draws on case studies from around the world, as well as literatures in a variety of disciplines, to explore why political elites refuse to implement, openly or surreptitiously, measures that – in many cases – are adopted via largely unanimous decisions and are supported by widespread consensus at the global level (Towns 2010; Driscoll and Krook 2012; Krook and True 2012). Mapping and linking empirical examples of resistance, the article develops a theoretical account of how and why political elites resist the changes called for by quota reforms. Inverting research on “everyday forms of resistance,” which theorizes how marginalized groups subvert attempts at control by dominant groups, the article explores how dominant actors may push back against change by mobilizing a series of tools to protect their privilege, normalizing and/or justifying their non-compliance – in this case, by invoking gendered norms and practices predicated upon women’s exclusion from the political sphere. In the clash between new and old ways of doing things, in other words, members of dominant groups may draw on existing values and routines to impede transformation – dynamics often willingly supported by members of marginalized groups, who may not recognize their own disadvantage. Exposing these forces is crucial, the article argues, for ensuring that quotas succeed in increasing the share of women elected, as well as achieve – in due course – the broader transformation of gender roles.

The first section elaborates this theoretical account of resistance, opening up the “black box” of political will to theorize the mechanics of non-compliance in the case of quota policies. It then identifies three tools mobilized across various contexts to subvert quotas and reinforce male dominance in public life: false universalism and political principles, male power and political survival, and gender and leadership norms. The second section turns to empirical examples, illustrating how these tools come into play at different stages of the electoral process. Drawing on data from case studies from around the world, as well as original field research in Africa, Europe, and Latin America, the analysis systematizes this evidence to catalogue behaviors that emerge before, during, and after elections to undermine quota provisions. This exercise reveals that the distinct prerogatives of these three stages – responding to policy adoption, preparing for and conducting elections, and settling into legislative work – shape the actors engaged in resisting quotas, as well as their goals and intended effects. These numerous and varied methods of obstruction, the article concludes, indicate that policy reform alone is not sufficient to promote greater gender equality in elected office. Quota adoption thus should not be viewed as the end, but rather the beginning, of a long and contested process to transform the principles and practices privileging men over women as political actors.

Political will and tools of resistance

Electoral gender quotas, whether introduced at the national or party level, have altered the landscape of candidate selection in a large and growing number of countries around the world. Yet, upon closer inspection, resistance – not compliance – appears to be the standard with regard to quota implementation, painting a more complex picture of women’s inclusion than accounts of diffusion and norm change might suggest. While arguments for and against quotas prior to their introduction have been thoroughly discussed (Bacchi 2006; Dahlerup 2007; Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009), hostility to these reforms after they have been adopted has not yet been the subject of systematic analysis. Nonetheless, case studies from every region of the
world provide glimpses into the dynamics at work in translating quota requirements into electoral outcomes. Despite taking diverse forms, a closer look reveals that these tactics of resistance tend to draw from a common “toolkit” of gendered norms and practices, rendering them effective in their goals to reduce or eliminate the impact of quota reforms.

A theory of resistance

Dynamics of political stability and change have intrigued scholars in a wide variety of disciplines, interested in explaining why efforts for reform are often foiled. Earlier Marxist political theorists, for example, developed concepts like “ideology” and “hegemony” to illuminate why workers did not revolt against capitalism, despite it being against their class interests (Gramsci 1971; Althusser 2008). Work in the “new institutionalist” tradition in political science, sociology, and economics employs the concept of formal and informal “institutions” – defined widely to include rules, conventions, and codes of behavior (North 1990) – to clarify how and why such dynamics lock the expectations and behavior of individuals into relatively predictable, self-reinforcing patterns, even in the face of major changes in background conditions (Pierson 2000). These contributions suggest that larger processes of social, economic, and political transformation may not proceed in a linear fashion, with important constraints being imposed by habits and traditional modes of thinking.

Anthropologists, sociologists, and management scholars, however, have sought to nuance such explanations by casting light on “everyday forms of resistance,” or the more “clandestine” efforts on the part of marginalized groups to undermine efforts at control (Scott 1990; Thomas and Davies 2005). This research thus posits two levels of social interaction: a surface level of apparent compliance with social rules, coexisting with a deeper level of actions taken to thwart the impact of those same rules. Though not engaging with this work, other bodies of research suggest that members of dominant groups may do the same, relying on informal institutions when they are pursuing goals that are not publicly acceptable (Helmke and Levitsky 2004), or alternatively, approving symbolic reforms which come at little cost but provide important benefits like public recognition, coalition-building capabilities, and interest group support (Leff 1984; Mazur 1996).

Combined, these literatures indicate that a variety of actors – in different parts of the social hierarchy – may take actions at a deeper level to subvert the rules and regulations governing social interactions. Individuals may promote or thwart change, consciously or not, according to Emirbayer and Mische (1998), because “agency” has three temporal dimensions: an orientation toward the past (iteration, its habitual aspect), an orientation toward the future (projectivity, its capacity to imagine alternative possibilities), and an orientation toward the present (practical evaluation, its ability to contextualize past habits and future projects with the contingencies of the moment). Actions may thus have both reproductive and transformative aspects.

Although members of both dominant and marginalized groups play a role in shaping outcomes, the latter must in most cases act surreptitiously when challenging the power of dominant groups (Scott 1990). Members of dominant groups, in contrast, have an array of ideological and material resources at their disposal to alter or reinforce the status quo. This is because, while constrained by the pressures of public opinion, as well as the formal letter of the law, dominant groups benefit from rules, practices, and norms that support and justify their position of privilege. Many cultures around the world, for example, associate men with the public sphere of politics and the economy and women with the private sphere of home and the family (Elshtain 1981; Okin 1989). Historically, this idea of separate spheres was used to deny political rights to women (Pateman 1994). Although this view has eroded in recent years, gender stereotypes continue to affect women’s perceived qualifications and ambitions to run for office (Lawless and Fox 2005), as well as shape how voters evaluate female politicians (Matland and Tezcür 2011).
The tendency for women to be excluded from politics is thus supported by a vast infrastructure reinforcing this divide as the “natural order” of society (Elshtain 1981). By enabling more women to enter politics, quotas highlight and challenge beliefs and practices regarding politics as a male domain. As institutionalist research shows, however, reigning rules, practices, and norms provide formidable tools for those keen to defend the status quo. This is because, as social movement scholars observe, the “framing processes” that succeed in attracting and shaping media coverage, winning public support, constraining opponents, and influencing state authorities are those that “package … issues simply and in ways that are consistent with the ideals and contemporary themes of civic life” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 309). As a result, members of dominant groups may draw on existing values and routines – which support their dominant status – to impede transformation.

In the case of gender quotas, three tools are commonly utilized to normalize and/or justify non-compliance: false universalism and political principles, male power and political survival, and gender and leadership norms. All three are rooted in gendered ideas and dynamics that, while cast as “universal” or “gender neutral,” together confer on men greater access and legitimacy as political actors. In the process, quota rules are rendered illegitimate, making resistance understandable and, indeed, even desirable on a host of different grounds. The result, as feminist institutionalists point out, is a patchwork of new and old institutions, simultaneously propelling and restricting momentum toward change (Krook 2009; Bjarnegård 2013; Kenny 2013). Unpacking the foundations behind these three tools is thus not only vital for appreciating the nature of resistance, but also for devising counterstrategies to realize the transformative potential of quota reforms.

**Tool 1: false universalism and political principles**

One of the key contributions by early feminist political theorists was to unveil the male bias inherent in supposedly “universal” and “impartial” concepts like equality and democracy. Re-reading core texts in classical and modern political theory, these scholars observed that women were excluded as a first step in nearly all well-known theories about politics (Okin 1979; Pateman 1988). As a consequence, neutral-sounding concepts like “citizen” were historically deemed to apply only to men – with women being defined, prior to theorizing, as existing outside the scope of the political. Consciously done, this move implies that “the ideal of the civic public as expressing the general interest, the impartial point of view of reason, itself results in exclusion” (Young 1985, 389). The implication is a “false universalism” behind core concepts, which as a result, cannot be a remedy for incorporating women on similar terms as men. As Okin argues, it is impossible to “include women, formerly minor characters, as major ones within the political drama without challenging basic and age-old assumptions about the family, its traditional sex roles, and its relation to the wider world of political society” (1979, 286).

The operation of this “male norm” in practice can be seen in the example of gendered suffrage extension in the USA. According to Harvey (1998), the fact that women gained the right to vote decades after men has had a lasting impact on women’s ability to transform their voting rights into the passage of policies beneficial to women as a group. As latecomers to the political game, women faced a political landscape that was already organized around other interests prior to their arrival. As a result, after an initial flurry of legislation immediately after women gained the right to vote in 1920, women’s issues – and women as voters more generally – received very little attention from the major political parties until decades later when women again began organizing collectively on a broader scale. Simply extending the same rights to women, therefore, did not make them equal actors in American politics. Rather, universal-sounding political rights masked a bias toward masculine actors and priorities in the public sphere, leading to a false perception of full equality in the political realm.
Tool 2: male power and political survival

Normative arguments for women’s political representation often frame women’s presence as benefiting everyone, leading to an enhanced sense of justice, attention to a wider range of interests, and greater legitimacy of the polity (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999). Yet, in nearly all cases, increasing the number of women in elected positions requires – mathematically – a reduction in the share of men. Quota reforms thus entail a “negative sum” game from the perspective of current and prospective male aspirants – men who must step aside or be overlooked in order to make way for women (Baldez 2006). Not surprisingly, therefore, quotas can spark acrimonious conflict within political parties, leading some disaffected men to challenge their parties’ selection policies and even establish rival candidacies (Cutts, Childs, and Fieldhouse 2008; Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012).

These dynamics render both remarkable and puzzling the apparent consensus at the global, national, and party levels in favor of gender-balanced decision-making. Since at least the work of Downs (1957), political scientists have largely operated from the assumption that politicians seek to maximize their chances of election and reelection. Yet, legislators and party elites – who in most cases are male – publicly support gender quotas, despite the potential implications for their own careers. According to one game-theoretic analysis, the answer is simple: quota adoption is in male legislators’ self-interest. Due to voter bias in favor men, the authors propose, male incumbents stand a greater chance of being reelected if they face a female challenger (Fréchette, Maniquet, and Morelli 2008). While theoretically and empirically weak (Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012), this model suggests that policy adoption may be driven by motivations that may have little to do with empowering women in politics per se.

Quotas may thus potentially challenge and preserve male privilege in the political sphere. They may also, counter-intuitively, enhance power inequalities among different groups of men. In some instances, quotas have provided a convenient excuse for party leaders to cull the ranks of male candidates, taking out those they disagree with or whom they view as lower performing for whatever reason (Bird 2003). In Sweden, indeed, the advent of formal quotas in the 1990s provoked what female party activists labeled the “crisis of the mediocre man” (Besley et al. 2013). As a result, strategies to inject change can threaten to destabilize the various kinds of male-dominated networks that have traditionally served as recruiting grounds for elected officials (Bjarnéngård 2013).

As occurs with efforts to promote gender equality more generally, some men may experience these changes as a loss of status, triggering a search for counterstrategies to recuperate a sense of power and control (Mansbridge and Shames 2008). Survival tactics, witnessed by scholars in diverse disciplines, range from overt acts of violence to more subtle strategies to marginalize and render women less effective, perpetrated by men at all levels of the social hierarchy (Cockburn 1991; Gallagher and Parrott 2011). Ås (1978) describes efforts to reinscribe male authority as “domination techniques,” aimed at reducing women’s impact in organizations as women enter these new spaces. These include rendering invisible, ridiculing, withholding information, double-punishing, and blaming and shaming – a repertoire of behaviors that, at their core, seek to delegitimize and exclude women, even when they are formally incorporated within previously male-dominated spaces.

Tool 3: gender and leadership norms

Developments over the last several decades have opened up a wider range of roles in society for both women and men. Nonetheless, research in psychology finds that the same traits deemed desirable for women in the 1970s continue to be viewed in similar terms today (Rudman and
In line with traditional gender roles, women are (or should be) more “communal,” concerned with the welfare of others, while men are (or should be) more “agentic,” assertive, controlling, and confident – qualities that are, in turn, equated with a good leader (Eagly and Karau 2002). Consequently, women who aspire to leadership positions face a dilemma. If women are seen as less agentic than men, individual women may be overlooked for leadership positions unless they convey themselves to be atypical women. Yet, female agency can provoke negative reactions due to a “lack of fit” between feminine stereotypes and leadership qualities (Eagly and Karau 2002; Okimoto and Brescoll 2010), leading to attacks for perceived status violations in efforts to defend reigning gender hierarchies (Rudman et al. 2012).

In light of these dynamics, it is perhaps not surprising that many female politicians frame their participation as an extension of their roles as mothers (Chaney 1979) or elect not to have children or wait until their children have grown before pursuing a political career (McKay 2011). In the former case, women’s entry poses less of a challenge to traditional gender roles, while in the latter, women are better equipped to conform to the male norm. Nonetheless, women’s presence in political institutions can be unsettling to reigning standards and practices of political life, precisely because this space has been constructed through women’s exclusion (Puwar 2004). Whether or not it is their intention, simply by being present in the public sphere, women can jeopardize existing gendered norms of power, forcing reconsideration or backlash to resolve these apparent conflicts (Katzenstein 1998; Rudman et al. 2012).

**Resistance and the electoral process**

Theoretically elaborated and extensively documented across various academic disciplines, these tools of resistance reveal the multifaceted challenges facing efforts to include and empower women in public life. While incidents of resistance have not been a primary focus of analysis, case studies – as well as original field research – reveal that moments of defiance occur at all stages of the electoral process. Although all three tools work together to shape the opportunities for women to enter politics, each dynamic plays an especially prominent role at one particular stage.

Prior to elections being organized, false universalism can be used to support claims that quotas for women are discriminatory, leading these policies to be repealed before they can be applied. During election preparations, attempts to preserve male power can drive political party choices regarding candidate selection and support, undercutting the likelihood that women will be nominated and elected. Following elections, finally, gendered beliefs about leadership can delegitimize female politicians, preventing them from being able to participate fully as decision-makers.

Systematizing these acts reveals that resistance to quotas does not unfold in a random, *ad hoc* way. Rather, the goals of resistance, the forms that it takes, the actors who express it, and the effects of these acts are more or less consistent within each electoral stage across a wide range of countries (see Table 1). This exercise, in turn, illuminates potential counterstrategies for tackling resistance at each stage, from rendering unambiguous the legal status and practical requirements of gender quotas to fostering deeper appreciation of the gendered barriers to women’s full and equal participation.

**Pre-election period**

Prior to elections, political parties devise their electoral strategies, deciding how to select their candidates and draft their party platforms. Where quotas exist, parties must resolve how to implement these provisions. Case studies indicate that the main focus of resistance at this stage is to criticize the policy per se, declaring quotas to be illegitimate and invalid in order to foster
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ambiguity regarding their legal status. While members of the public, especially the media, may be engaged in these debates, the key actors tend to be aggrieved men and those who – whether motivated by pure principles or not – claim to be defending “equality” as it is defined in the constitution and anti-discrimination law, thus invoking the tool of false universalism to undercut quota provisions.

Legal challenges come into play during this period. Claims that quotas are unconstitutional, of course, may be voiced before quotas are approved, as in Russia, where members of parliament cited constitutional guarantees of “equality” when rejecting a bill in 2005 to set a minimum of 30% female representation in the federal and regional legislatures. In several cases, however, quotas have been challenged after they have been passed. The quota law in Italy, for example, was overturned by the Constitutional Court in 1995, ruling that Article 51 did not permit distinctions of any kind (Palici di Suni 2012). Similarly, in France, a 1982 quota for local elections was declared unconstitutional, according to the Constitutional Council, because the principle of “equality before the law” precluded the “division” of voters and candidates into “categories” for the purposes of elections. Not all legal challenges succeed, however. In Spain, courts affirmed the constitutionality of quota provisions (Verge and Troupel 2011), while in Mexico, judges took the opportunity to pass positive judgment on the constitutionality of quotas even as the local conservative party that had registered the case sought to withdraw it (Baldez 2004).

Two main counterstrategies have emerged to deal with these types of legal challenges. The first is to pursue legal and constitutional reforms to “legalize” positive action. In the UK, two male party members sued the Labour Party in 1995, arguing that their exclusion as men from certain selection contests entailed sex-based discrimination. The court agreed, but six years later, parliament reformed the Sex Discrimination Act to permit parties to use affirmative action in their candidate selection processes (Childs 2003). In France, advocates responded to “quotas” being declared illegal by launching a campaign for constitutional reform in the 1990s around the concept of “parity.” They argued that sex was the “universal” difference, cutting across all other categories and groups in society (Bereni and Lépinard 2004). When senators challenged the resulting electoral law in 2000, the constitutional amendment meant that, this time around, the Council confirmed its constitutionality (Krook 2009).

Anticipating such claims, quota advocates in countries like Slovenia have taken steps to establish the constitutionality of affirmative action prior to pursuing quota reforms (Antic and Lokar 2006). Doing so, however, has not always paved the way for greater acceptance. In Haiti, a constitutional reform in 2012 recognized the principle of a minimum 30% quota for women at all levels, but legislation necessary to formalize such a quota has never been passed. Similar conflicts led legislators in Kenya in 2012 to refer to the Supreme Court a decision on the new electoral system, which was supposed to implement a new constitutional provision that “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender.” Justices ultimately ruled that “the historical marginalization of women in elective politics could not be resolved by quotas but would only be realized over time and in stages.”

A second counterstrategy is to use gender-neutral phrasing in the quota policy, transforming men and women into potential beneficiaries of the policy, with neither sex receiving special treatment. In Macedonia, for example, fears that singling out women as the focus of a quota would violate Article 9 of the Constitution led the policy to be phrased in terms of the minimum 30% presence of the “under-represented sex” (Dimitrievska 2004). Related alternatives include stipulating a maximum percentage of one sex, as in the 1994 quota law in Belgium; a minimum proportion of both sexes, as in Niger; or a maximum percentage of one sex and a minimum proportion of another, as in Chile. Growing use of gender-neutral language around the world appears to indicate recognition of the need to reduce legal or constitutional ambiguity, lessening the vulnerability of quotas to challenge on principled grounds.
**Election period**

In preparations leading to elections, parties select their candidates, deciding which individuals to nominate based on a host of criteria (Rahat and Hazan 2001). During this period, parties also determine which candidacies to prioritize and how to allocate their campaign resources. Far from reflecting society, these processes generally result in the election of more affluent, male, middle-aged, and white-collar people than exist proportionally among voters (Norris 1997). Gender quotas seek to interrupt these dynamics by mandating that parties choose at least a minimum proportion of women (Krook 2009). Resistance to quotas at this stage typically involves following the letter, but not the spirit of the reforms. In some cases, however, it may entail not even following the letter of the law. The main actors include party elites charged with selecting and distributing resources to candidates, but may also extend to rival male candidates and party colleagues, employing the tool of male power to retain men’s dominance in the political sphere.

These tactics take a host of different forms but have one of two goals: to ensure that quotas are not effective in electing more women and to undercut the potential of quotas to empower women as political actors. Evidence of the former appears across many cases. One version is to “misunderstand” or misconstrue these regulations. Party lawyers in Brazil, for example, interpreted the 1997 quota law – stating that “parties should reserve 30% of their list positions for women” – to mean that parties were not required to select female candidates, but only that a share of the slots not be filled with men.9 A related approach is to “forget” to implement the quota. In Finland, in the late 1990s, many local officials failed to fulfill a legally mandated quota for appointed boards at the municipal level. They implemented the provision in the previous election cycle, suggesting deliberate obstruction, rather than inadvertent oversight of the law (Holli, Luhtakallio, and Räevaara 2006).

In other countries, parties do comply with quotas, but apply the minimal interpretation possible. In China, the law for local elections mandates that there be “an appropriate number” of women on each village committee. Many committees do not have a single woman – seen, perhaps, as the “appropriate” level. While some provinces have introduced regulations clarifying that “appropriate” means “at least one woman,” in most instances, the practice is to include no more than one woman (Jacka 2008). In a related fashion, the phrasing of the quota law in Argentina, requiring “30% women, in proportions which make their election possible,” was initially read by politicians as applying to all party candidates – who could in theory be elected – rather than to the positions at the top of list that parties were most likely to win (Durrieu 1999). In countries with reserved seats, like India, elites appear to assume that seats not explicitly reserved for women are thereby reserved for men, reducing the opportunities for women to stand as candidates in open seats and run for re-election when their seats are de-reserved (Dalal 2000).

Parties following the letter of the law can also, through various methods, engineer women’s electoral losses. One is through “list proliferation,” a strategy seen in France in 2001 after the parity law required alternation between male and female candidates on the lists for Senate elections. To avoid being moved down the ranks and risk not being elected, many male incumbents set up alternative lists in which they appeared in the top position (Sineau 2002). In another approach, parties in Uruguay placed the same women on lists for elections to the country’s two chambers, such that if the women won both posts, one of these would pass over to their male alternates.10 Further ways to undermine quotas in this way include deliberating placing women in losing districts, as elections to the National Assembly in France (Murray 2008);11 channeling the vast majority of funds and resources to men, despite state policies that women receive a minimum share, as in Brazil (Sacchet and Speck 2012);12 and prioritizing men at the top of lists in cases where parties are likely to win only one seat, as in Tunisia where women headed fewer than
3% of lists in 2011 and 15% of lists in 2014. As a result, women’s electoral prospects are substantially reduced, even when they form the requisite number of candidates.

Even more nefarious tactics, unfortunately, are not uncommon. In parts of Latin America, women have been pressured to step down after being elected, either by prior agreement with their male alternates or as a result of various forms of violence and aggression against them and their families (Krook and Sanin 2016). The issue came to light in Mexico after the 2009 elections, when eight women resigned almost immediately after being elected, transferring their seats to men inside their parties. The same occurred in Kosovo in 2000, when a number of women quit their posts right after the election (Nordlund 2003). Yet, perhaps the most egregious example is the widespread electoral fraud perpetrated in the 1999 municipal elections in Bolivia, when parties systematically “misspelled” the names of some male candidates, listing them in the feminine form (Albaine 2009).

A final, and perhaps the most widespread, means to reduce the impact of quotas is to nominate the wives and daughters of male elites—reproducing the political class, rather than empowering women more broadly as political actors. Some leaders are relatively unabashed about this practice, with a man in Argentina admitting that his wife was placed in the second list position after himself, stating that “we have complied with the quota through our marriage” (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 418). In India, the lottery system of designating the reserved seats for women has given rise to the practice of nominating a female relative to “hold” a male incumbent’s seat until it is de-reserved (Krook 2009). In other cases, like Mexico, party women who have challenged the party’s lists because these did not comply with the quota law found themselves punished by not being re-nominated as candidates— and replaced not by other long-standing female party activists, but instead female family members. While some of these women do have substantial prior political experience, their closeness to male elites suggests that their presence may contribute to strengthening, rather than undermining, male domination.

Struggles to ensure that quotas are respected have led to two broad responses. One focuses on the policies themselves, pursuing clarifications to quota requirements and lobbying for improved monitoring of party compliance. In Brazil, the low numbers of women selected as candidates despite the quota law inspired female parliamentarians to lobby for a “mini-reform” in 2009, replacing the phrase “should reserve” with “shall fulfill” a minimum of 30% and maximum of 70% of candidates of each sex. As a result, women constituted close to 30% of candidates for the first time more than 10 years after quotas were first introduced (Wylie 2012). A growing trend in relation to “forgetting” to implement quotas has been to establish the ultimate sanction: rejection of lists that fail to comply. An illustrative case is France, where sanctions for non-compliance vary across levels of government: financial penalties in national elections have led to low levels of compliance, while list rejection in local elections has resulted in nearly perfect implementation (Krook 2009).

Across Latin America, electoral court decisions and presidential decrees have served to clarify quota requirements (Piscopo 2015). In Costa Rica, for example, the Supreme Elections Tribunal ruled in 1999 that based on its interpretation of the spirit of the law, parties must include at least 40% women in the electable positions on their lists, determined using prior election results. This change led to a near doubling in the share of women elected as a result (Jones 2004). Learning from past practices, reforms in Mexico in 2014 stipulated that—in the majoritarian portion of the country’s mixed electoral system—parties could not “exclusively” place women in “losing districts.” This change was the result of extensive mobilization of women in politics and in civil society, together with landmark cases decided by the country’s electoral courts, to highlight and fight a culture of non-compliance among Mexican parties.

A second group of strategies involves tackling the practices that hollow out the impact of quota reforms. Pressures on women to step down after being elected have been observed in
countries across Latin America. In Mexico, this phenomenon was common enough to spur the country’s electoral tribunal – and later, the country’s new electoral law – to establish that alternates must be of the same sex as the person stepping down. In Argentina, a similar rule was stipulated for candidates in a presidential decree in 2000: should female candidates drop out for any reason, they must be replaced by women, while men in the same situation may be replaced by men or women. While the decree only applies to candidates, a similar practice has emerged whereby female deputies who step down are replaced by women, even if a man is the next person on the list, with these men voluntarily recusing themselves to enable a woman to take the seat. Legal reforms pursued in other cases, where pressures to resign have resulted from threats of violence and intimidation, include Bolivia, where locally elected women lobbied for – and eventually achieved in 2012 – a law criminalizing this behavior (Krook and Sanin 2016).

To counteract tendencies to nominate female relatives, finally, women’s groups in various countries have organized campaigns to collect the names of women willing to run, with the aim of responding to elite claims that they cannot find enough female candidates. This was, for example, a strategy used by women in the 1970s and 1980s in Sweden as they mobilized to get more women included on party lists. Collectively, all of these strategies aim to reduce the possibilities for male domination to be reinscribed in the face of quota policies.

### Post-election period

After elections, those who are elected take up their posts and turn their attention to policy-making. Resistance to quotas at this stage is perhaps the least obvious, because quotas per se are not being applied. However, a host of tactics may be deployed by various actors to reduce quota women’s capacity and legitimacy as legislators, often at the level of perceptions rather than in actuality – using controversies surrounding quotas to suggest that women elected via these policies are not effective politicians. Actors are diverse, ranging from male rivals and colleagues to journalists and citizens writing in the media or social media outlets. While often framed in the language of democratic accountability, the goal is to reduce women’s legitimacy and voice as political actors, sending out the message that women do not belong in politics – whether or not they are elected through quota policies. It is at this stage that the tool of gender and leadership norms most comes into play, tapping into stereotypes that disparage female politicians and, in turn, reduce other women’s political ambitions by fostering a hostile climate for women’s participation.

Resistance at this stage falls into two broad categories, related to perceptions and portrayals of quota women, on the one hand, and their legislative performance, on the other. A common concern in many debates is that quotas may lead to the election of “unqualified” women, nominated only because they are female, without regard to whether they truly deserve to be selected (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). Such discourse is especially prominent in the UK, where the Labour Party has applied quotas for its candidate selections for more than 20 years. Although the policy is used in only some selection contests, citizen focus groups and elite interviews indicate substantial hostility to “quota women” that they generalize to all female Labour politicians who they believe have under-performed – the vast majority of whom were not, in fact, selected via the quota policy (Childs and Webb 2012). A comparison of the backgrounds of British MPs, moreover, finds that women selected through quotas are equally and, according to some measures, more qualified than their non-quota counterparts, male and female (Nugent and Krook 2016).

Efforts to undermine women’s legislative performance, feeding back into portrayals that they are “unqualified,” include tactics to prevent them from exercising the office to which they have been elected. Women in countries like Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Afghanistan reported being prevented from attending political meetings by their colleagues, changing the time and place without informing them, and having their voices actively silenced, with their microphones being cut off.
while they are speaking (Krook and Sanin 2016). Sexist taunts and gestures are also used to unnervе women in the course of their legislative work: a local assemblywoman giving a speech in Japan, for example, faced jeers from her male colleagues telling her to get married and have children (Lies 2014). Evidence from Bolivia indicates that such incidents of violence and harassment can leave women demoralized, leading them to be less likely than men to stand for reelection (ACOBOL 2012). Introducing quotas may thus precipitate various forms of backlash, undermining the drive toward greater gender equality.

Counterstrategies to these forms of resistance focus on recasting these negative portrayals and equipping elected women with the resources to be more effective legislators. In response to a widely publicized statement by a senior male politician in Senegal, claiming that 90% of the women elected via gender quotas in 2012 were illiterate, Fatou Sow Sarr – a professor and activist – conducted a survey of these women that was published, distributed, and widely circulated in the media, showing that most of these women in fact had advanced degrees.\textsuperscript{21} To empower women as political actors, the National Democratic Institute organizes women-specific orientation programs for newly elected women to help them navigate the many informal rules and practices necessary for effective policy-making (Markham 2012). Initiatives in several countries, including Costa Rica and South Africa, have moved to address sexual harassment in parliament (Palmieri 2011), while a Bolivian law and bills in Mexico, Ecuador, and Peru seek to recognize and criminalize political violence and harassment of female politicians (Krook and Sanin 2016). These strategies thus seek to rethink, rather than reinforce, gendered norms of leadership to legitimize and empower women as political actors.

Conclusions

Gender quotas have diffused rapidly around the world in recent decades, suggesting widespread and dramatic transformations in women’s access to political power. Yet, there is substantial evidence of resistance to quotas, suggesting that – at a deeper level – political principles and practices have changed very little in the wake of quota policies. Feminist activists and academics have observed this to be true of many initiatives to promote gender equality, with equality discourses and goals being “stretched” or “bent” to accommodate other imperatives – with the result that projects may lose some of their original meaning or contribute to what some might view as less-than-feminist goals (Lombardo, Meier, and Verloo 2009). Analyzing types and forms of resistance, however, can contribute to diagnosing – and addressing – problems with implementing gender equality policies (Lombardo and Mergaert 2013).

Seeking to systematize these insights in relation to gender quotas, this article synthesizes insights from a variety of literatures and disciplines to propose a theoretical account of resistance, identifying three tools employed to preserve male domination in the political sphere. Drawing on reigning gendered norms and practices, these tools are mobilized by opponents of various types to “naturalize” or justify not complying with quota regulations – leveraging familiar values and routines, supported by wide swathes of society, to retain the status quo. The article then catalogues trends in resistance at different stages of the electoral process, providing an original integration of case study materials from all over the globe. These examples expose a wide range of strategies, some subtle and some more overt, to undermine the impact of quota reforms. These involve arguments based on political principles to more pragmatic considerations expressed through candidate selection decisions and reactions to women elected via quota policies. The remarkably creative nature of some of these tactics, moreover, provides an indication of the perceived challenge – on the part of political elites, in particular – posed by quota measures. This is because, if fully implemented, quotas threaten the reigning rules, practices, and norms of political life, long-premised upon women’s exclusion.
This exercise signals, on a global scale, lingering challenges to women’s political empowerment after quotas have been introduced. Quotas alone, therefore, are not enough to re-gender politics. The patchwork of new and old institutions – new measures introduced into existing policy environments – means that the promise of change can be thwarted and, indeed, that reversal is possible (Kenny 2013; Krook 2009). As technical reforms to the candidate selection process, moreover, quotas are not able – on their own – to resolve all inequalities in the political sphere. Rather, as this article suggests, a host of different tactics may be employed to undercut women’s ability to be selected as candidates and to exercise authority once elected. Backlash and resistance are in fact a common phenomenon (Krook 2015). These patterns point to the need for a dual focus moving forward: (1) developing a variety of strategies to foster more equal conditions for political participation, recognizing that barriers to women’s entry and influence within the political realm are multifaceted (Krook and Norris 2014), and (2) pursuing counterstrategies to tackle resistance at each stage of the electoral process, diagnosing the barriers to devise ways to counteract opposition, and thereby ensuring the better implementation of quota policies. The introduction of quotas thus represents only the beginning of long, contested process to open up politics to women and guarantee their full and equal participation.

Notes
1. For an updated list, see http://www.quotaproject.org.
3. This fieldwork was funded by the National Science Foundation’s CAREER Program, Award SES-1341129.
4. John Stuart Mill’s The Subjection of Women (1869) is a notable exception.
5. In Bangladesh, introducing reserved seats for women involved increasing the size of the parliament.
7. Décision no. 82-146 DC du 18 novembre 1982.
8. http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/12/no-women-no-elections/
12. Interviews in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia, October and December 2014.
16. This is not to deny, of course, that men also benefit from their family connections in politics.
17. Interviews in Mexico City, May and July 2014.

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